SPECIALTY OCCUPATION WORKING VISA (H-1B)

At the center of the current migration debate taking place in the U.S. are the H-1B visas. These are granted to foreigners who hold a bachelor’s or higher degree and receive offers of employment related to their area of study, typically in the fields of business or science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). An H-1B visa allows people to work legally and temporarily in the U.S. It has become very popular in recent years because it is a “dual intent” visa (non-immigrant and immigrant intent), which means that an H-1B worker does not have to declare an intent to return to his/her country of origin and may actually apply for permanent residency at some point during his/her employment. Moreover, unlike other visa categories (such as the TN visa, which will be discussed below), the H-1B is not restricted to a specific list of occupational categories but falls into a broader group of “specialty occupations.”

The number of H-1B visas granted by the U.S. government is subject to an annual limit, and a cap exists on how many a particular country’s citizens can receive. According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (^{USCIS, 2017a}), in general, the H-1B cap per fiscal year is 65 000, with 20 000 additional slots for U.S. advanced degree exemptions, also known as the “master’s cap.” Recently, the government determined that these advanced degree exemptions will only apply to people who have earned a degree conferred by an institution qualified as a “United States institution of higher education” at the time the degree was earned (^{USCIS, 2017b}). It is worth noting that universities, research institutions, and government agencies can sponsor an unlimited number of workers entirely exempt from the cap (^{Huennekens, 2017}; ^{Pierce and Gelatt, 2018}). Immigrants already living in the U.S. with an H-1B visa who need to renew it are also exempt from this cap.

This visa program is a major avenue for employment-based migrants to enter the United States, and, although it generally authorizes a stay of up to six years, many of the beneficiaries stay longer while waiting for LPR status, as reported by ^{Pierce and Gelatt (2018)}. Moreover, these authors acknowledge that “about half of H-1B initial applicants transition from another status, such as student or other types of temporary workers, while already in the United States” (2018: 13). In fact, many employers hire foreign recent graduates with student visas because they consider that they have the necessary qualifications, and it would be absurd to educate them in the U.S. and then let them apply their knowledge overseas. Thus, employers obtain H-1B visas for them (^{Wilson, 2017}).

Since the demand for this visa program increased significantly in recent decades and it is subjected to numerical limitations, the U.S. government had to create a lottery system for granting them. A more rigorous selection process that only considers immigrants with graduate degrees will probably replace this lottery system (^{Tigau, 2017}).

THE TREATY INVESTOR VISA (E-2)

The purpose of employment (E) visa categories is to allow the temporary admission of “citizens of countries with which the United States maintains treaties of commerce and navigation” (^{USDOS-BCA, 2018a}). One sub-category is the E-2 Visa, which admits entrepreneurs if they invest a substantial amount of capital in an existing U.S. business or if they create a new company or acquire and manage a franchise (^{Blume-Kohout, 2016}). The investor must demonstrate at least a 50-percent ownership of the business or possession of operational control through a managerial position (^{USCIS, 2014}). The holder gets this visa for a period of up to two years but he/she can ask for an extension for him/herself, a spouse, and a child (^{Wilson, 2017}). The E-2 visas are less at “risk” of review than H-1B visas because U.S. politicians and workers perceive them more favorably since they imply investment and job creation. In contrast to the EB-5 visa (as explained below), the required amount of money that an E-2 visa holder has to invest is not specified, although it is usually around US$100 000. But as Blume-Kohout notes, “The applicant must actively and irrevocably invest substantial funds in a business that produces goods or services for profit where ‘substantial’ is defined as a proportion of the cost of establishing a viable enterprise of the type contemplated, or alternatively the total cost of purchasing an existing business. By the end of the initial two-year period, the business must also generate employment or other economic impacts above and beyond income support for the applicant and his or her immediate family” (^{2016: 1333}).

The viability of the E-2 visa is important for Mexicans because they have traditionally been among the top beneficiaries of E-2 visas (^{Frifield, 2015}). In 2013, 3,001 E-2 U.S. visas went to Mexican investors, the third highest number worldwide, though the number fell to 2,438 in FY 2017 (^{USDOS-BCA, 2018b}). Moreover, Mexico is the Latin American country that receives the largest share of E-2 visas, followed by Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela. As ^{Blume-Kohout (2016: 1333)} points out, “The E-2 visa is more broadly accessible than most other options for prospective foreign national entrepreneurs, in that there is no specific educational or work experience requirement, no numeric job creation target, and no limit on renewals.”

THE IMMIGRANT INVESTOR VISA (EB-5)

As previously stated, whereas the E-2, the H-1B, and the TN visas classify as non-immigrant visas, the investor visa is an immigrant visa. It is named the EB-5 visa because it is the fifth employment preference immigrant visa category (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016}). It is a program to “stimulate the U.S. economy through job creation and capital investment by foreign investors” (^{USCIS, 2018a}).

The EB-5 visa program has been commonly perceived as an alternative for “investors with money” (many of whom are from China). According to ^{USCIS (2018b)}, the minimum capital investment required is US$1 million, or just US$500 000 if the investment is made in a so-called “targeted employment area,” which may be a rural or high-unemployment area.

Under this visa program, immigrants may apply for the standard visa (basic EB-5 program, called stand-alone process) or the Regional Center Program intended to stimulate investment from multiple EB-5 visa holders but also from U.S. citizens in specific geographic regions (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016}). In both cases, the investment must create or sustain at least ten jobs, which should last a minimum of two years and should not be seasonal. In the case of the standard visa, jobs created must be direct, whereas in the case of the Regional Center Program, they can be direct, indirect, or induced job positions (^{USDOC, 2017}).

EB-5 visa holders are granted a conditional resident status, but after two years, “They can apply to remove the conditionality if they have met the visa requirements (i.e., invested and sustained the required investment and created the required jobs)” (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016: 7-8}), and they and a spouse and/or children can obtain lawful permanent residence in the U.S. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce (^{USDOC, 2017}), most EB-5 investment and job creation occurs through Regional Centers.

The Trump administration perceives this visa as favorable since it is linked to projects developed by foreign investors. Nonetheless, as the main interest of most of these investors is the immigration benefit, they are willing to sacrifice financial income, so they tend to accept below-market returns (^{Hodges et al., 2018}). The U.S. Congress is currently discussing increasing the minimum investment amount from US$500 000 to US$800 000 (^{Federal Register, 2017}).

One of the main criticisms regarding this visa is that it may attract wealthy people who do not necessarily have high educational levels or special skills. Some analysts also point out that this visa implies potential risks to U.S. national security because the legality of the money invested cannot be easily verified (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016}). Furthermore, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has identified seven main areas of vulnerability of this visa: “export of sensitive technology and economic espionage, use of force by foreign government agents and espionage, use by terrorists, investment fraud by regional centers, investment fraud by investors, fraud conspiracies by investors and regional centers, and illicit finance and money laundering” (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016: 20-21}). USCIS has implemented several measures to address these potential risks.

Wealthy Mexicans’ demand for this type of visa has increased over the past few years, particularly because, as mentioned above, it may lead to permanent residence for the investors, as well as their spouses and children. EB-5 visas are an alternative frequently used by Mexican entrepreneurs, since they do not require extraordinary skills or education (^{USCIS, 2017c}). Mexico does not deviate from general behavior in the sense that during the last ten years, most EB-5 visa holders have acquired their visas due to their investment in regional target areas (^{USDOS-BCA, 2008-2017}).

THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT PROFESSIONALS VISA (TN)

TN visas were instituted as a part of NAFTA, allowing citizens of Canada, Mexico, and the United States to work in any of the three countries. In contrast with the EB-5 visa, TN visas require a bachelor’s degree. For some professions (such as computer systems analysts, graphic designers, hotel managers, industrial designers, and interior designers), experience is required in addition to a degree (^{USCIS, 2018c}). This visa is restricted to a list of 63 occupational categories. Unlike the H-1B program, an employer seeking to hire a Mexican or Canadian national as a TN worker does not need to file a petition in advance (^{Government of Canada, 2017}; ^{USCIS, 2018c}) or be concerned with fiscal year limits or visa caps.

TN workers from Mexico, however, may not seek permanent residence while in the U.S.; rather, they are granted an initial period of stay of up to three years with the possibility of an extension (^{USCIS, 2017d}). Contrary to other types of visas, this one can be renewed indefinitely, and employers of TN visa workers do not have to demonstrate that native workers are not displaced (^{Jiménez Godínez, 2013}). Nonetheless, a limitation of this visa is that spouses of TN beneficiaries are not authorized to work.

The following table shows the number of visas granted to Mexicans during the last decade under the aforementioned programs.

Table 1 shows that TN visas outnumber the other types of visas under analysis. They are the only kind that has continued to grow. In fact, they have far surpassed the numbers of the H-1B, even though initially the number of TN and H-1B visas granted was very similar. The fact that TN visas are not subject to annual caps, that they do not imply a labor market test as in the case of the H-1B visas, and that they face a minimum of red tape largely explains this. The growing number of TN visas granted makes it very unlikely that the current U.S. administration will not review the issuance conditions of this program, or even eliminate it. Although the number of TN visas is significantly higher than the rest of the visas under analysis, some academics and opinion leaders have criticized the extremely low number of TN visas granted to Mexicans despite the high trade volume between Mexico and the U.S. (^{Verea, 2014}). On the other hand, some U.S. analysts have claimed that low-skilled workers (who were not the target beneficiaries of TN visas) took advantage of this program because, as previously mentioned, it does not require a sponsoring employer, it does not ask for a labor market assessment, and it specifies no minimum salary (^{Sharma, 2017}). As for the highly skilled workers, some analysts consider that TN visa attractiveness relies on the vast salary differential between the United States and Mexico (^{Vaughan, 2004}).

It is noteworthy that the numbers of both E-2 and EB-5 visas have increased significantly during the last ten years. This rise applies not only to Mexico but has been general. According to ^{Hodges, McCafferty, Li, and Grandbounche (2018)}, petitions filed by EB-5 investors, have grown over 1 000 percent from 2008 to 2015. Although the absolute number of visas granted under these programs is lower than other types of visas such as the TN, the percentage increase was very high up to 2014 (almost 89 percent in the case of the E-2 and 467 percent in the case of the EB-5). One factor that may to a certain extent explain this significant increase is insecurity, because many of the Mexicans who applied for these visa programs are businessmen who have been targeted by organized crime in Mexico. According to Mexico’s National Survey of Victimization of Companies (^{INEGI, 2016a}), 35.5 percent of economic units (private businesses) in the country were victims of some crime in 2015. In fact, more than half the economic units surveyed consider insecurity and crime the problems that most affect their business. Consequently, some Mexican executives have found the U.S. to be a more secure and stable alternative for their investment projects. Nonetheless, insecurity is not the only explanation; another reason is that the process of obtaining LPR through the EB-5 was simplified and has become simpler over the years.

The number of H-1B visas has remained relatively stable during the last decade despite the fact that the proportion of Mexican migrants with higher educational levels rose from 27.1 percent in 2008 to 35.9 percent in 2014 (^{INEGI, 2016b}). These stable numbers may be associated with the fact that these visas are strongly linked to innovation processes taking place in the information technologies field, which Indian migrants with graduate degrees in STEM have covered to an enormous extent.

U.S. VISA REFORM UNDER TRUMP

The Trump administration does not perceive the types of visas described above equally. It seems to judge some of them more favorably than others, based on their social, economic, and political implications.

During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to reduce the number of H-1B visas since they cut into jobs that, he argued, U.S. Americans should fill. In fact, since assuming office, he has ordered a comprehensive review of the H-1B visa program (The ^{White House, 2017}; ^{Tigau, 2017}). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (^{USDHS, 2017a}) reports that 44 percent of H-1B applicants approved in 2016 have a bachelor’s degree. It is then expected that any resulting changes to the program will be geared toward eliminating some employers’ common practice of hiring foreigners for jobs that only require a bachelor’s degree, and instead ensuring that H-1B visas are only granted for the most skilled immigrants filling the highest-paid jobs. In this sense, ^{Pierce and Gelatt (2018)} report that H-1B visas are highly concentrated in a small number of companies, which tend to be the ones that pay less to workers and recruit fewer employees holding advanced degrees. These authors also state that some employers have abused these visas by resorting to outsourcing for H-1B recruitment and hiring processes, saving them “from liability for replacing U.S. workers” (^{Pierce and Gelatt, 2018: 10}). Some H-1B visa critics argue that some employers do not fulfill the visa requirement of paying “the non-immigrant the greater of the actual compensation paid to other employees in the same job or the prevailing compensation for that occupation” (^{Wilson, 2017: 3}).

In short, the Trump administration wants to ensure that U.S. jobs are offered first to U.S. workers, following the so-called “Buy American and Hire American” executive order (The ^{White House, 2017}) and that the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers are protected. A study authored by ^{Bound, Khanna, and Morales (2017)} fueled this concern. These authors found that the salary of U.S. workers in the field of computer science during the 1990s would have been 2.6 to 5.1 percent higher if foreign migrants had not occupied these job positions, although it also found that wages for college-educated workers in other fields rose by 0.04 to 0.28 percent in 2001. Other studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the variation in immigrant flows and innovation (measured by the number of patents per capita). ^{Kerr and Lincoln (2010)} found that, far from having a substantial negative effect on the unemployment rate or average wages of native U.S. engineers and scientists, higher admissions of skilled immigrants instead contribute to increased U.S. invention due to a greater number of workers in the areas of science and engineering. In the same vein, ^{Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2009: 20)} found that “a college graduate immigrant contributes at least twice as much to patenting as his or her native counterpart.”

As part of the H-1B visa review, it is feasible that President Trump would require employers to pay higher salaries to skilled migrants consistent with their qualification level or that he would request labor diagnoses in order to prove that native U.S. workers do not cover the labor competencies required for a particular job. In fact, some petitioning employers are required to pay an additional fee (US$4 000) if they employ 50 or more employees in the U.S. and more than half of these employees are in an H-1B visa program (^{USCIS, 2018d}). Another possible change implies eliminating the benefit granted during the Obama administration of extending eligibility for employment authorization to certain spouses of H-1B non-immigrants who are seeking employment-based LPR status (^{USCIS, 2017e}).

The implementation of these changes may hurt highly skilled Mexican workers, since the H-1B program could cost U.S. employers more. In fact, the U.S. government has increased site visits (conducted since 2009) to verify wages, job duties, and work locations of companies that use the H-1B visa program (^{USCIS, 2018e}). What is more, the number of general approvals declined significantly from 348 162 in 2016 to 197 129 in 2017 (^{Huennekens, 2017}). Although Mexicans make up a smaller percentage of approved H-1B visa workers compared to Chinese and Indian nationals (1.3 percent versus 9.7 percent and 50.5 percent, respectively) (^{Ruiz, 2017}), Mexico is one of the top ten recipient countries of H-1B visas.

The E-2 and the EB-5 visas are more acceptable to the Trump administration because they imply investment and job creation schemes. Congress may also be reluctant to change or eliminate them for the same reason. Additionally, many E-2 treaty countries have maintained specific agreements linked to these visas; thus, E visas seem relatively safe from review. In fact, the USCIS and some non-federal organizations have committed or conducted specific studies to determine the economic impact of these investor programs and most of their findings have been positive in terms of their contribution to U.S. GDP and to annual job creation (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016}).² However, it is likely that the Trump administration will adopt stricter measures to ensure compliance with the terms of the program. In fact, proposals also exist to establish a limited stay for investor visas of up to five years, provided that the conditions that accompany the creation of new businesses are respected, namely a productive investment in the United States with growth potential and job creation (^{Fragomen, Shannon, and Montalvo, 2017}). Additionally, USCIS plans to revise EB-5 visa forms and to interview investors in order to capture more information from applicants; it also plans to expand site visits to regional centers with the aim of securing the integrity of this program (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016}).

Some positive potential changes also exist: for example, the EB-5 visa could be granted to people who are not investing their own money but that obtained through venture capitalists (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016}). This could counteract the criticism about only wealthy people having access to this visa program. Moreover, the creation of a new visa program, the EB-6, is under consideration. This program would target “foreign nationals who 1) wish to start a new commercial enterprise with a specified amount of money from qualified investors or venture capital funds; or 2) have already started and are managing a new commercial enterprise that employs a specified number of persons” (^{Argueta and Siskin, 2016: 24}). ^{Argueta and Siskin (2016: 24)} also mention a new LPR visa (EB-7) “for non-immigrant treaty investors holding an E-2 visa who 1) have maintained such status for at least ten years, and 2) created at least five jobs for at least ten years.”

Finally, TN visa holders now face more uncertainty than those with E-2 and EB-5 visas due to the NAFTA renegotiations currently underway, which open the door to the possibility that this very flexible visa may be cancelled altogether. Nonetheless, the elimination of this visa category, if it took place, would take a long time because the Congress has to approve it, and court challenges can jeopardize its elimination. In the meantime, it is possible that people who have previously considered applying for a TN visa or who already have one, might see the H-1B visa as a more feasible alternative, at least in the short term.

As NAFTA renegotiation continues, the Trump administration has issued a policy memorandum to more strictly enforce the qualifications that a person intending to apply for a TN visa must fulfill. For example, a financial analyst, a market research analyst, or a marketing specialist does not qualify as an economist because the activities he/she performs must be consistent with that profession (^{USCIS, 2017f}).

DISCUSSION OF THE U.S. VISA REFORM AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

Highly skilled migrants’ personal resources, such as a high educational level, English fluency, and financial capital, tend to give them access to opportunities that traditional migrants do not have. This set of personal resources (micro-structure) tends to increase self-confidence in the migration process. However, when institutional conditions (macro-structure) change -even more so if they change abruptly-, the micro-structure is not enough to counteract the strong influence of the macro-structure. In other words, even though highly skilled Mexican migrants have had access to visa programs with significant benefits to them such as the ones analyzed here, the recent political institutional context created by the Trump administration changes the present and future outlook for this kind of migration. This is particularly relevant since the discussion about the implications of U.S. migration reform used to be centered on traditional migrants, but has now broadened to affect highly skilled migration.

Overall, the Trump administration supports skills-based migration over family-reunification migration. The displeasure of President Trump’s administration toward so-called “chain migration,” which especially concerns Mexico, could be associated with the fact that a great percentage of Mexican immigrants who acquire LPR status do so through a family-sponsored preference type of admission (20 percent in 2016) or because they are immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (68 percent in 2016). In contrast, a much lower percentage of permanent residence cases are associated with an employment visa (around 12 percent in 2016) (^{USDHS, 2017b}). It is then likely that the Trump administration will privilege the allocation of visas to those who possess certain skills and knowledge required in the U.S. labor and business market over those who seek to visit or stay with their families (^{Fragomen, Shannon, and Montalvo, 2017}). This is particularly important for Mexicans since, as already mentioned, most of them (around 88 percent) obtained LPR status in 2016 through a family-sponsored preference type of admission or because of being an immediate family member of a U.S. citizen (USDHS, 2017c; ^{Verea, 2014}). In fact, in 2016 Mexico was the country with the highest percentage of persons obtaining LPR status (14.75 percent) followed by China (6.91 percent) and Cuba (5.62 percent). However, these percentages and countries change when linking the LPR status to the broad class of admission (visa program). In other words, if LPR status is obtained through an employment-based preference visa program, India is the country with the highest percentage (15 percent), followed by China (14.46 percent), South Korea (9.76 percent), the Philippines (5.55 percent) in fourth place, and Mexico in fifth place (4.41 percent) (^{USDHS, 2017c}).

Due to the complex nature of migration, the economic, social, and political implications of the U.S. visa reform are difficult to separate; most of the time they are inherently linked.

From the point of view of the U.S. economy, it makes sense to review the allocation process of some of these visas. This means that the visa programs themselves are not necessarily the problem, but rather it lies in the criteria employed when assigning them to some people who do not fulfill each program’s requirements and conditions. It is pertinent to recognize that the discussion about the questionable application of these programs (specifically H-1B visas) involves not only the Trump administration; in fact, discussions about legal loopholes and constant frauds committed around the granting of these types of visas have been on the table for more than a decade. Nonetheless, the U.S. government should objectively evaluate the different programs because important benefits have also derived from them, and negative consequences could result from their modification or even cancellation. For example, in the case of the TN visas, U.S. companies relying on highly skilled Canadian employees may think about setting up offices in the major Canadian cities. As ^{Tigau (2017)} asserts, a potential negative implication of the U.S. reforms is the transfer of some multinational corporation headquarters or subsidiaries to other countries such as Canada or Australia that incentivize skilled migration; this could result in a long-term loss of innovation for the U.S. Furthermore, according to Nathan’s assessment of the contributions of skilled migrants to host countries (²⁰¹⁴), the U.S. could face significant costs. From an economic and social point of view, innovation costs would be incurred because these reforms could drive down patenting rates. They would also reduce knowledge dissemination through Diaspora networks; more capital constraints would be imposed on domestic firms if they no longer had foreign investors’ capital; and opportunity costs would also arise associated with a lack of international market knowledge and information on home markets’ investment opportunities. Politically, the reforms enhance the support of Trump’s voting base since these changes involve some his presidential campaign’s most salient promises.

From the Canadian side, politicians and workers want to increase labor mobility, but NAFTA renegotiations could have exactly the opposite result: a significant number of Canadians could lose their jobs in the United States and return to Canada, which could create at least a short-term imbalance in the labor market. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has faced many complaints from trade unions and workers about job positions occupied by foreigners who, again, do not always have the required qualifications, or have them but accept lower wages, disturbing the labor market. In the end, both Canada and the United States face a talent shortage in some specific areas such as health, energy, information technologies, science, etc.; this could be aggravated with the cancellation of TN visas, forcing some domestically-based companies to look for talent in other countries such as those in Western Europe.

From Mexico’s point of view, the Trump administration’s reconsideration of visa issuance conditions would also have significant economic, social, and political implications. In the case of the H-1B visa program, the possible changes could motivate Mexican authorities to create and strengthen job opportunities at home and offer higher salaries in an effort to retain Mexican professionals who would otherwise wish to work in the U.S. under a different visa program or elsewhere. This is particularly important given that many professionals with graduate degrees have been underutilized or have had their skills devalued in Mexico. Meanwhile, in the U.S., they are often relegated to a lower occupational status or receive lower salaries because their credentials are not validated (^{Lozano Ascencio, Gandini, and Ramírez-García, 2015}). This opens the door to fostering academic transnationalism through the implementation of specific projects (for instance, between the migrant and academic governmental or private institutions) that imply the transfer of knowledge, technologies, and patents. In fact, some Mexican politicians, such as the governor of Jalisco, have been trying to position some states of Mexico as an alternative for highly qualified people, not only Mexicans but also people from India, China, and Israel, who may not be certain about the renovation of their H-1B visas in the U.S. (^{Luna, 2017}). In the case of E visas, if President Trump adopts a more permissive approach, the scenario could be positive for the Mexican economy, as long as the resulting investment projects were transnational in nature. It seems likely that Mexican entrepreneurs holding E-2 visas would use them to undertake business ventures simultaneously in the U.S. and Mexico, because this particular program does not offer a clear route to obtaining a green card or U.S. citizenship. In the case of the EB-5 visa, this transnational view is also possible since, once investors get their unconditional green card, they could invest their money in a business anywhere else (ideally in Mexico). In any case, the Mexican government should develop solid retention initiatives specifically targeting potential EB-5 visa holders, who some observers say tend to be wealthy Mexican nationals leaving the country precisely because their wealth makes them targets for kidnapping or extortion (^{Beyer, 2016}). Furthermore, the Mexican government could profit from the uncertainty surrounding U.S. visa program reforms to undertake specific initiatives that may become attractive for highly skilled migrants. For instance, the 3X1 program instituted by the Mexican government for traditional migrants could be adapted for highly skilled migration (specifically addressed to E-visa holders). This initiative could stimulate joint investments in Mexico and in the United States involving migrant-generated investments matched by governmental funds at the local, state, and federal level as long as these investments fulfill specific requirements such as the creation of a certain number of jobs in certain specific areas of the country or within the states. Additionally, Mexican authorities must resolve institutional weaknesses such as fiscal uncertainty, corruption, and bureaucratic red tape, all of which prompt affluent and well-educated Mexicans to migrate to the U.S.

From the migrant’s perspective, the implications depend on the type of visa. As for the E-visas, temporary residence of up to five years can be detrimental to Mexican migrant entrepreneurs, since both E-2 and EB-5 visa holders need to have some measure of certainty in terms of a longer-term-stay authorization. In other words, many of these investors risk their assets in using them to meet the required investment amounts that allow them to obtain these visas. Additionally, these are investments that offer a return in the long term, so the financial commitment implied by this type of visa should be backed by the certainty of retaining it for a number of years that at least equals the period necessary for the investment to pay off. Thus, if investors adopt a long-term stance toward the local economy regarding the amount and positive repercussions of their investment, U.S. policies related to the duration of the visas must be reciprocal in terms of this long-term commitment (^{Naudé, Siegel, and Marchand, 2017}). If the uncertainty continues, however, Mexican entrepreneurs may consider other interesting and potentially fruitful alternatives. For example, they might seek to do business simultaneously in the United States and in Mexico to diversify the risks associated with changing migration policies in the U.S. In turn, this could lead Mexicans to establish new links across borders in labor markets and academic exchanges and allow Mexico to profit from the skills, knowledge, experience, networks, and opportunities that these highly mobile professionals and entrepreneurs possess. Another possibility is that Mexicans would stop considering Silicon Valley the sole attractive site to create or grow a start-up and turn to other valuable opportunities in Canada, or even China and India, or invest in innovation hubs developing in places like Jalisco. This does not mean that Mexican migrant professionals and entrepreneurs will abandon efforts to either migrate to or stay in the U.S., but it may mean that an uncertain situation would cause them to extend their business ventures to other locations. Lastly, the position of Mexican migrants concerning TN visas is similar to that of Canadians in the sense that Mexicans also look for more labor mobility and are willing to accept even lower wages than Canadians do, but the renegotiation of the NAFTA makes it unlikely that this kind of labor mobility will increase or exist.