Real-Time Verification of Integrity Policies for Distributed Systems

 

Ernesto Buelna*¹, Raúl Monroy²

 

¹ Microsoft Consulting Services Microsoft México México, D. F., México. *Ernesto.Buelna@microsoft.com.

² Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Campus Estado de México, Estado de México, México.

 

ABSTRACT

We introduce a mechanism for the verification of real-time integrity policies about the operation of a distributed system. Our mechanism is based on Microsoft .NET technologies. Unlike rival competitors, it is not intrusive, as it hardly modifies the source code of any component of the system to be monitored. Our mechanism consists of four modules: the specification module, which comes with a security policy specification language, geared towards the capture of integrity policies; the monitoring module, which includes a code injector, whereby the mechanism observes how specific methods of the system, referred to by some policy, are invoked; the verifier module, which examines the operation of the distributed system in order to determine whether is policy compliant or not; and, the reporter module, which notifies the system is policy compliant, or sends an alert upon the occurrence of a contingency, indicating policy violation. We argue that our mechanism can be framed within the Clark and Wilson security model, and, thus, used to realise information integrity. We illustrate the workings and the power of our mechanism on a simple, but industrial-strength, case study.

Keywords: real-time policy verification, integrity policies, distributed systems, .NET code injection, information security.

 

RESUMEN

En este artículo, presentamos un mecanismo para verificar, en tiempo-real, políticas de integridad asociadas con un sistema distribuido. Nuestro mecanismo está desarrollado en, y es aplicable a, tecnologías MS .NET. A diferencia de sus competidores, no es intrusivo, pues no requiere modificaciones de consideración en el código fuente de ningún componente del sistema a inspeccionarse. Nuestro mecanismo consiste de cuatro módulos: el módulo de especificación, diseñado especialmente para expresar políticas de integridad; el módulo de inspección, el cual incluye un inyector de código, a través del cual nuestro mecanismo observa cómo se invocan los métodos del sistema referidos en alguna de las políticas; el módulo verificador, el cual examina la operación del sistema para determinar si éste cumple o no con las políticas; y, el módulo reportador, que notifica si el sistema está conforme a la norma, o envía alertas en el caso que ocurra una contingencia, indicando la violación a una política. Demostramos que nuestro mecanismo formalmente se enmarca dentro del modelo de seguridad de Clark y Wilson, y, por lo tanto, puede aplicarse en el establecimiento de integridad. Para mostrar el funcionamiento y las bondades de nuestro mecanismo, incluimos un caso de estudio simple, pero típico de una aplicación industrial o comercial.

 

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