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Computación y Sistemas

versão On-line ISSN 2007-9737versão impressa ISSN 1405-5546

Comp. y Sist. vol.25 no.3 Ciudad de México Jul./Set. 2021  Epub 13-Dez-2021

https://doi.org/10.13053/cys-25-3-3998 

Articles

Modelling and Verification Analysis of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games via a Modal Logic Approach

Zvi Retchkiman Königsberg1  * 

1Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Centro de Investigación en Computación, Mexico


Abstract:

In game theory, a cooperative game (or coalitional game) is a game with competition between groups of players (coalitions) due to the possibility of external enforcement of cooperative behavior (e.g. through contract law). Those are opposed to non-cooperative games in which there is either no possibility to forge alliances or all agreements need to be self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats). Cooperative games are often analyzed through the framework of cooperative game theory, which focuses on predicting which coalitions will form, the joint actions that groups take and the resulting collective payoffs. It is opposed to the traditional non-cooperative game theory which focuses on predicting individual players’ actions and payoffs and analyzing Nash equilibriums. In this work, the cooperative and non-cooperative game problem is modeled by means of a modal logic formula. Then, using the concept of logic implication, and transforming this logical implication relation into a set of clauses, a modal resolution qualitative method for verification (satisfiability) as well as performance issues, for some queries is applied.

Keywords:  Cooperative game; non-cooperative game; modal logic; model; verification; unsatisfiability; modal resolution method

1 Introduction

In game theory, a cooperative game (or coalitional game) is a game with competition between groups of players (coalitions) due to the possibility of external enforcement of cooperative behavior (e.g. through contract law). Those are opposed to non-cooperative games in which there is either no possibility to forge alliances or all agreements need to be self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats).

In this study, cooperative games are often analyzed through the framework of cooperative game theory, which focuses on predicting which coalitions will form, the joint actions that groups take and the resulting collective payoff, while non-cooperative games have been studied using traditional non-cooperative game theory which focuses on predicting individual players’ actions and payoffs and analyzing Nash equilibriums.

This paper proposes a well defined syntax modeling and verification analysis methodology which consists in representing the biological competition system as a modal logic formula.

This approach allows to represent both cases, the cooperative and non cooperative ones, in one formula and not as two separate formulas and, it also models other behavioral possibilities not always easy to represent using other techniques. The modal logic approach introduces two new operators that enable abstract relations like necessarily true and possibly true to be expressed directly, called alethic modalities, what is not possible using first order logic.

For example, the statement: 7 is a prime num-ber, is necessarily true always and everywhere, in contrast, the statement the head of state of this country is a king is possibly true, because its truth changes from place to place and from time to time. Other modalities that have been formalized in modal logic include temporal modalities, or modalities of time, deontic modalities, epistemic modalities, and doxastic modalities.

The main idea consists in modeling the biological competition system by means of a modal logic formula. Then, using the concept of logic implication, and transforming this logical implication relation into a set of clauses, a modal resolution qualitative method for verification (satisfiability) as well as performance issues, for some queries is applied. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a modal logic background summary is given. In section 3, the modal resolution principle for unsatisfiability, is recalled. In section 4, the biological competition problem is addressed. The cooperative and non cooperative cases are considered. Finally, the paper ends with some conclusions.

2 Modal Logic Background

This section presents a summary of modal logic theory. The reader interested in more details is encouraged to see [1, 2].

Definition 1 A modal language is an infinite collection of distinct symbols, no one of which is properly contained in another, separated into the following categories: parentheses, connectives, possibility modality, necessity modality, proposition variables Φ0 = {p1, p2, · · · } (called atoms), contradiction( falsity), true(tautology).

Definition 2 Well-formed formulas, or formulas for short, in modal logic are defined recursively as follows:(i). An atom is a formula,(false is a formula), T (true is a formula) (ii). If F and G are formulas then, (F), (FG), (FG), (FG), F, F, are formulas. A ≡∼ A.

Formulas are generated only by a finite number of applications of (i) and (ii), therefore the set of welled formed formulas is enumerable infinite.

Remark 3 It is important to underline the unique readability of the formulas which is secured by the assumption that the operators are one to one.

Definition 4 A Kripke frame (frame) is a pair (W, ) in which W is a set of worlds (time, states, etc), and W×W is a binary relation over W .

Definition 5 A Kripke model (model) over frame is a triple (, π) = (W, , π) where π : Φ0 2W the set of worlds where each element of Φ0 is true is an assignment or interpretation.

Definition 6 Given any model , a world wεW , the notion of true at w is defined as follows:

  • , w pnwεπ(pn), n = 1, 2, · · · ,

  • , w Fw F,

  • , w FGw F and w G,

  • , w FGw F or w G,

  • , w FGif w F then w G,

  • , w FGw F iff w G,

  • , w Fthere exists uεW such that (w, u)ε, , u F,

  • , w Ffor all uεW such that (w, u)ε, , u F.

Definition 7 A formula F is consistent (satisfiable, true at w) in a model in a world wεW iff , w F, then we say that is a. model for F . If this happens for all worlds wεW then we say it is true.

Definition 8 A formula F is inconsistent (unsatis-fiable) in a model iff , w F for every world wεW , then we say that is a countermodel for F .

Definition 9 A formula F is valid in a class of models C if and only if it is true for all models in the class. This will be denoted by C F .

Definition 10 A formula F is valid iff it is valid for every class of models C. This will be denoted by F .

Definition 11 A formula G is a logical implication of formulas F1, F2, . . . , Fn if and only if for every model , that makes F1, F2, . . . , Fn true, G is also true in .

The following characterization of logical implication plays a very important role as will be shown in the rest of the paper.

Theorem 12 Given formulas F1, F2, . . . , Fn, G, G is a logical implication of F1, F2, . . . , Fn if and only

if the formula ((F1F2. . . , ∧Fn) → G) is valid in a class of models if and only if the formula (F1F2. . .Fn (G)) is unsatisfiable.

Proof. Setting the class of models equal to all the models that make F1F2. . . , ∧Fn true. The first iff follows directly by the definition of validity in a class of models, and logical implication.

For the second one, since F1F2. . . , ∧FnG is valid in a class of models, every model that makes F1F2. . . , ∧Fn true does not satisfy ∼ (G), therefore (F1F2. . .Fn (G)) can not be satisfied. Reversing this last argument we obtain the last implication.

Next, given a class of models C, we define the syntactic mechanisms capable of generating the formulas valid on C.

Axioms:

(1). All instances of propositional logic tautologies,

(2). (FG) → F G.

Rules of inference:

(1). Modus ponens:

F,FGG,

(2). Necessitation

FG.

We write F if F can be deduced from the axioms and the inference rules.

Theorem 13 (Completeness [1]) A formula F is valid iff it is provable i.e., F F.

Definition 14 A formula F in modal logic is said to be in disjunctive normal form normal (DNF) if and only if is a disjunction (perhaps with zero disjunct) of the form F == L1L2· · · Ln D1 D2· · · Dm H1 H2· · · Hj, where each Li is an atom or its negation, each Di is a DNF, and each Hi is a CNF (next defined). A formula G is said to be in conjunctive normal form (CNF) if it is a conjunction of Fi DNF i.e., G = F1F2· · ·Fn which will be denoted by the set G = {F1, F2, . . . , Fn}

Definition 15 A formula in DNF is called a clause. A clause with only one element is called a unit clause. A clause with zero disjunct is empty and it will be denoted by thesymbol. Since the empty clause has no literal that can be satisfied by a model, the empty clause is always false.

Definition 16 The modal degree of a formula F denoted by d(F) is recursively defined as follows:

  • — if F is a literal then its degree is zero,

  • — d(F G) = max(d(F), d(G)), where isor,

  • — d(∼ F)) = d(F),

  • — d(∇F) = d(F) + 1, wherestands for or .

Given a formula F, the following inductive procedure transforms F into a CNF in such a way that the original formula is equal to its CNF form therefore satisfying validity:

  1. Using axioms 1 and 2, the definition ∼ FF and the inference rules, eliminate all propositional other than ∧, ∨, ∼ and move negations inside so that they are immediately before propositional variables,

  2. If d(F) = 0 then apply the propositional procedure [3],

  3. If F = F1 with F1 in CNF, apply the theorem (FG) ≡ F G to distribute the operator (this is proved with the aid of axiom 2).

  4. If F = F1 with F1 in CNF, then do not do anything.

  5. Otherwise, we have a combination of different formulas which can be handled using the preceding rules.

Therefore, we have proved the following result.

Theorem 17 Let S be a set of clauses that represents a formula F in its CNF. Then F is unsatisfiable if and only if S is unsatisfiable.

3 The Modal Logic Resolution Principle

We shall next present the resolution principle inspired by the propositional logic resolution principle introduced by Robinson (see [3], the references quoted therein, and [4]). It can be applied directly to any set S of clauses to test the unsatisfiability of S.

Resolution is a decidable, sound and complete proof system i.e., a formula in clausal form is unsatisfiable if and only if there exists an algorithm reporting that it is unsatisfiable. Therefore it provides a consistent methodology free of contradictions. It is composed of rules for computing resolvents, simplification rules and rules of inference. The first ones compute resolvents, simplified by the simplification rules, and then inferred by the rules of inference.

Definition 18 [4] Let Σ(A, B) → C, and Γ(A) → C be two relations on clauses defined by the following formal system:

Axioms:

(1). Σ(p, ∼ p) →⊥,

(2). Σ(⊥, A) →⊥.

Σ rules:

rule:Σ(A,B)CΣ(AD1,BD2)CD1D2,rule:Σ(A,B)CΣ(A,(B,E))(B,C,E),rule:Σ(A,B)CΣ(A,B)C.

Γ rules:

rule1:Σ(A,B)CΓ((A,B,F))(A,B,C,F),rule2:Γ(A)BΓ((A,F))(B,A,F),rule:Γ(A)BΓ(AC)BC,rule:Γ(A)BΓ(A)B,

where A, B, C, D, D1, D2, denote general clauses, E, F denote sets (conjunctions) of clauses, and (A < E) denotes the result of appending the clauses A to the set E.

Simplification rules:

The relation ’A can be simplified in B’ denoted AB is the least congruence relation containing: (S1) ⊥≃⊥, (S2) ⊥DD, (S3) ⊥, E ≃⊥, (S4) AADAD. The simplified formula obtained is called the normal form of the original formula and is the one to be considered when computing resolvents.

Inference rules:

(R1).

CDifΓ(C)D,

(R2).

C1C2DifΣ(C1,C2)D.

where C, C1, C2, D are general clauses.

A deduction of a clause D from a set S of clauses can be seen as a tree whose root is D, whose leaves are clauses of S, and every internal node C has sons A and B (respectively A) iff the rule R2 (respectively Rl) can be applied with premises A and B (respectively A) and conclusion C. The size of a deduction is the number of nodes of this tree. We say that D is a-consequence of S iff there is a deduction of D from S denoted by S D. These definitions and notations are extended to sets of consequences: if S is a set of clauses, S S iff S D for every DεS . A deduction of ⊥ from S is a refutation of S.

Theorem 19 [4] The resolution proof system is decidable.

The main two results of this subsection: the completeness theorem for the resolution proof system, and that proofs in the resolution proof system are actually proofs in our modal logic axiomatic system are next presented.

Theorem 20 [4] A set S of clauses is unsatisfiable if and only if there is a deduction of the empty clause ⊥ from S.

Theorem 21 [4] If there exists a deduction D from S in the resolution proof system then there is a deduction D from S in our modal logic axiomatic system.

4 The Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game Problem

The biological competition system behavior is described as follows:

  1. Propositional variables: S: resources are safe, D: the resources are in danger, B: the resources are being eaten, I1, I2: the organisms are inactive, L1, L2: the organisms are in search for a resource, CL1, CL2: the organisms continue searching for a resource, A1, A2: the organisms attack the resource, F1, F2: the organisms have finished eating the resource, P1, P2: the organisms die, S1: organism one is stronger than organism two, S2: organism two is stronger than organism one ; E1: organism one eliminates organism two, E2: organism two eliminates organism one;

  2. Rules of Inference: (a) if S and L1 or L2 then CL1 or CL2, (b) if S and CL1 or CL2 then P1 or P2, (c) if S and CL1 or CL2 and P1 or P2 then P1 or P2 , (d) if D and ((L1 or CL1) and not(L2 or CL2)) then A1 and not(A2), (e) if D and (not(L1 or CL1) and (L2 or CL2)) then not(A1) and A2, (f) if A1 and not(A2) then B1 and not(B2),(g) if not(A1) and A2 then not(B1) and B2, (h) if B1 and not(B2) then F1 and not(F2), (i) if not(B1) and B2 then not(F1) and F2, (j) if F1 and not(F2) then I1 and not(I2), (k) if not(F1) and F2 then not(I1) and I2,(l) if I1 and not(I2) then L1 and not(L2), (m) if not(I1) and I2 then not(L1) and L2, (n) if D and ((L1 or CL1) and (L2 or CL2)) and S1 then A1 and E1, (o) if D and ((L1 or CL1) and (L2 or CL2)) and S2 then A2 and E2, (p) if E1 then not(L2 or CL2) and not A2 and not B2 and not F2 and not I2, (q) if E2 then not(L1 or CL1) and not A1 and not B1 and not F1 and not I1,(r) if D then A1 and A2, (s) if A1 and A2 then A1 and A2, (t) if A1 and S1 then A1 and E1, (u) if A2 and S2 then A2 and E2, (v) if A1 and S2 then A2 and E2, (w) if A2 and S1 then A1 and E1.

Remark 22 It important to underline that the inference rules express the cooperative and non cooperative behavior of the players. In the cooperative case one organism takes control over the resource while the other one stays apart. This cooperative competitive behavior differs from the strictly competitive where there exists just one of the organisms (the winner) who takes completely control of the resource.

Remark 23 The main idea consists of: the biological competition system behavior is expressed by a modal logic formula, some query is expressed as an additional formula. The query is assumed to be a logical implication of the biological competition formula (see theorem 12). Then, transforming this logical implication relation into a set of clauses by using the techniques given in section 3, its validity can be checked. It is important to point out that other type of behaviors can be incorporated in to the model by the modeler, making it as close to reality as needed.

The formula that models the biological competition system behavior turns out to be Equation 1: SL1L2CL1CL2 [SCL1CL2P1 P2] ∧ [D (L1CL1)∧ (L2CL2) → A1A2] ∧ [D (L1CL1) ∧ (L2CL2) →∼ A1A2]∧[A1A2B1B2]∧[∼ A1A2 →∼ B1B2] ∧ [(B1B2F1F2)] ∧ [∼ B1B2 →∼ F1F2]∧[F1F2I1I2)]∧[∼ F1F2 →∼ I1I2] ∧ [I1I2L1L2] ∧ [∼ I1I2 →∼ L1L2]∧[D∧(L1CL1)∧(L2CL2)∧ S1A1E1] ∧ [D (L1CL1) ∧ (L2CL2) ∧ S2A2E2] [E1 →∼ (L2CL2)∧A2B2F2I2], [E2 →∼ (L1CL1)∧A1B1F1I1], [D A1 A2], [ A1 A2A1A2], [A1S1A1E1], [A2S2A2E2], [A1 S2A2E2], [A2 S1A1E1].

We are interested in verifying, the following statements:

(S1) Claim: In the cooperative case, we want to verify that in the case when one of the organisms takes control over the resource the other one stays apart i.e., if D and ((L1 or CL1) and not(L2 or CL2)) then B1 and not(B2). Specifically, we want to know if the following formula is a logical implication of equation 1: D (L1CL1)∧ (L2CL2) → B1B2.

The set of clauses for this case is given by: S = {(∼ SL1L2CL1), (∼ SL1L2CL2), (∼ SCL1CL2 P1), (∼ SCL1CL2P2), (∼ DL1L2CL2A1), (∼ DL1L2CL2A2), (∼ DCL1L2CL2A1), (∼ DCL1L2CL2A2), (∼ DL2L1CL1A1), (∼ DL1L2CL1A2), (∼ DCL1L1CL2A1), (∼ DCL1L1CL2A2), (∼ A1A2B1), (∼ A1A2B2), (∼ A2A1B1), (∼ A2A1B2), (∼ B1B2F1), (∼ B1B2F2), (∼ B2B1F1), (∼ B2B1F2), (∼ F1F2I1), (∼ F1F2I2), (∼ F2F1I1), (∼ F2F1I2), (∼ I1I2L1), (∼ I1I2L2), (∼ I2I1L1), (∼ I2I1L2), (∼ DL1L2CL2 S1A1), (∼ DL1L2CL2 S1E1), (∼ DCL1L2CL2 S1A1), (∼ DCL1L2CL2 S1E1), (∼DL1L2CL2 S2A2), (∼ DL1L2CL2 S2E2), (∼ DCL1L2CL2 S2A2), (∼ DCL1L2CL2 S2E2), (∼ E1L2), (∼ E1CL2), (∼ E1A2), (∼ E1B2), (∼ E1F2), (∼ E1I2), (∼ E2L1), (∼ E2CL1), (∼ E2A1), (∼ E2B1), (∼ E2F1), (∼ E2I1), (∼ D A1), (∼ D A2), (A1 A2A1), (A1A2A2), (A1 S1A1), (A1 S1E1), (A2 S2A2), (A2 S2E2), (A1 S2A2), (A1 S2E2), (A2 S1A1), (A2 S1E1), (D), (L1CL1), (∼ L2), (∼ CL2), (∼ B1B2)}.

Then applying the Σ ∨ rule, a resolution refutation proof for S, is as follows:

(a) (∼ A1A2B1)(∼ B1B2) → (∼ A1A2B2).

(b) (∼ A1A2B2)(∼ A1A2B2) → (∼ A1A2).

(c) (∼ DCL1L2CL2A2)(D)(∼ L2)(∼ CL2) → (∼ CL1A2).

(d) (∼ DL1L2CL2A2)(D)(∼ L2)(∼ CL2) → (∼ L1A2).

(e) (∼ L1A2)(L1CL1) → (CL1A2).

(f) (∼ CL1A2)(CL1A2) → (∼ A2).

(g) (∼ DCL1L2CL2A1)(D)(∼ L2)(∼ CL2) → (∼ CL1A1).

(h) (∼ DL1L2CL2A1)(D)(∼ L2)(∼ CL2) → (∼ L1A1).

(i) (∼ L1A1)(L1CL1) → (CL1A1).

(j) (∼ CL1A1)(CL1A1) → A1.

Now, from (b) and (j) we get:

(k) (∼ A1A2)(A1) → A2.

Therefore, from the conclusion of (f) and (k), we get a proof of S i.e., ⊥.

(S2) Claim: For the non cooperative case, we want to verify that when the resource is in danger and there is a possibility of attack by both organisms, the stronger organism is the one who takes control over the resource, and not being this enough, he decides to eliminate his opponent. Specifically, we want to know if the following formula is a logical implication of equation 1: D A1 A2 S1A1E1.

The set of clauses for this case is given by: S = {(∼ SL1L2CL1), (∼ SL1L2CL2), (∼ SCL1CL2 P1), (∼ SCL1CL2 P2), (∼ DL1L2CL2A1), (∼ DL1L2CL2A2), (∼ DCL1L2CL2A1), (∼ DCL1L2CL2A2), (∼ DL2L1CL1A1), (∼ DL1L2CL1A2), (∼ DCL1L1CL2A1), (∼ DCL1L1CL2A2), (∼ A1A2B1), (∼ A1A2B2), (∼ A2A1B1), (∼ A2A1B2), (∼ B1B2F1), (∼ B1B2F2), (∼ B2B1F1), (∼ B2B1F2), (∼ F1F2I1), (∼ F1F2I2), (∼ F2F1I1), (∼ F2F1I2), (∼ I1I2L1), (∼ I1I2L2), (∼ I2I1L1), (∼ I2I1L2), (∼ DL1L2CL2 S1A1), (∼ DL1L2CL2 S1E1), (∼ DCL1L2CL2 S1A1), (∼ DCL1L2CL2 S1E1), (∼ DL1L2CL2 S2A2), (∼ DL1L2CL2 S2E2), (∼ DCL1L2CL2 S2A2), (∼ DCL1L2CL2 S2E2), (∼ E1L2), (∼ E1CL2), (∼ E1A2), (∼ E1B2), (∼ E1F2), (∼ E1I2), (∼ E2L1), (∼ E2CL1), (∼ E2A1), (∼ E2B1), (∼ E2F1), (∼ E2I1), (∼ D A1), (∼ D A2), (A1A2A1), (A1A2 A2), (A1 S1A1), (A1 S1E1), (A2 S2A2), (A2 S2E2), (A1 S2A2), (A1 S2E2), (A2 S1A1), (A2 S1E1), (D), (A1), (A2), (S1), (∼ A1E1)}.

Then applying the Σ ∨ rule, the Σ rule and the simplifications rules, a resolution refutation proof for S, is as follows:

(a) (A1 A2 A1)(A1)(A2) → (A1).

(b) (A1 S1A1)(S1) → (A1A1).

(c) (A1A1)(A1) → (A1).

(d) (∼ A1E1)(A1) → (∼ E1).

(e) (A1 S1E1)(S1) → (A1E1).

(f) (A1E1)(A1) → (E1).

Therefore, from the conclusion of (d) and (f), we get a proof of S, i.e., ⊥.

5 Conclusions

The main contribution of the paper consists in the study of cooperative and non- games by means of a formal reasoning deductive methodology based on modal logic theory. The cooperative and non cooperative cases were addressed. Verification (validity) as well as performance issues, for some queries were addressed.

References

1.  Chellas, F. (1980). Modal logic: An introduction. Cambridge University Press. [ Links ]

2.  Blackburn, P., van Benthem, J., Wolter, F. (2007). Handbook of modal logic. Elsevier. [ Links ]

3.  Davis, M.D., Weyuker, E.J. (1983). Computability, complexity and languages. Academic Press. [ Links ]

4.  Enjalbert, P., Del Cerro, L. (1989). Modal resolution in clausal for theoretical computer science. North Holland. [ Links ]

Received: August 09, 2020; Accepted: October 12, 2020

* Corresponding author: Zvi Retchkiman Königsberg, e-mail: mzvi@cic.ipn.mx

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