Material selection

The Statute was applicable between 1941 and 1963. During that last year it was substituted by the ‘State Workers Federal Law, Subsection B, Constitutional Article 123’ (LFTSEC). The article 123 had been reformed in 1960 with the addition of subsection B, and thus it legally supported the labor relations with the State workers.

Being the Statute substituted, the LFTSE regulated the subsection B, becoming it of general observance for all federal workers, including basic education teachers. Though each state government can create their own legislation regarding this matter, we assume the Statute-LFTSE has been a referent. We also believe the arrangements of LFTSE have been referents for state normativities, and for analysis purposes, they are essentially the same arrangements.

Since the Statue regulated the labor relations of federal workers, in 1946 the ‘Regulation of General Work Conditions for Public Education Secretariat Workers’ was decreed (Regulation), completing the normative framework for SEP employees. Despite the Statute not being current anymore, the Regulation has survived ups and downs until today.

This work analyses LFTSE and the Regulation. Both normative pieces structure different issues related to labor relations between federal employees-agents and this. So, only the articles that structure exit possibilities or, in TB’s words, ‘escape doors’, were selected. Chapters VI and VII of the Title II from the LFTSE were examined. There, the procedures for ‘suspension’ and ‘termination’ are established. From the Regulation, the Chapter XII, which deals with ‘infringements’ and ‘rewards’, is analyzed.

Data gathering and analysis

Data gathering for this work’s investigation was carried out through a LFTSE content analysis. We relied on the IGT proposed by ^{Crawford and Ostrom (1995}). IGT is commonly used to deconstruct formal institutions (regulations, laws, etc.), which operationalizes throughout institutional statements. An institutional statement is ‘a restriction or linguistic shared opportunity that prescribes, allows or suggests the individuals and corporative actors actions or results’⁶ (^{Crawford and Ostrom, 1995: 583}). An institutional statement consists of components, grammatical units (see table 1)⁷. This way, the institutional arrangements are reduced to their linguistic expression through statements (^{Crawford and Ostrom, 1995}; ^{Basurto et al. 2009}).

Initially, ^{Crawford and Ostrom (1995}) gave the institutional statements some grammatical components: attribute (A), deontic (D), condition (C), purpose (I), and or else (O). Afterwards, ^{Basurto et al. (2009}) and ^{Siddiki et al. (2011}) added the ‘object’ (B) component. In the table 1 these components are defined and exemplified. The Deontic requires some precisions though. This operator specifies if an actions is required (‘has to’ or ‘must’), permitted (‘can’) or prohibited (‘must not’ ‘cannot’).

It has not to be always specifically written, it can be implicit as well (^{Basurto et al., 2009}). Additionally, it can be out of the statement; it can be at the beginning of a paragraph or section. The Deontic varies because of the prescriptive force (^{Crawford and Ostrom, 1995}). For example, ‘have to’ and ‘must’ have not the same prescriptive force. These differences are essential when outlining the force of an institutional statement.

When analyzing the normativity, the form in which institutional grammar structures the different situations is handled, considering the editing of all the components. All statements have, as a minimum, components ABIC (attribute, object, purpose and condition). In some cases, there is a strategy, which imposes conditions for action with a minimum prescriptive force. In contrast, when the statement has a Deontic, there is an ABDIC rule, with prescriptive force. Having an ‘or else’, there is an ABDICO, with a higher level of prescriptive force than the rule’s. Thus, the strategies are ‘regularized plans that individuals realize inside an incentive structure’ (^{Ostrom, 2007: 23} ).

The degree of information that actors have over the situation’s interaction structure is essential in order to outline the necessary strategy. Teacher’s everyday interaction on the operative level allows them to get detailed information and deep knowledge about the action possibilities, this is, about the strategies to develop.

The rules are action or result prescriptions focused on no-material rewards. Rules constrain. Culturally inducted -more than punished by a Constitution-, their transformation is slow and subtle. Even though they can emerge from the individual, most of them are gained in a community where the individual frequently interacts (^{Ostrom and Basurto, 2010}).

To sum up institutional statements combinations structure action situation in the education system, that is, they set the possible actions or results suggested or mandatories for the actors. The punishments and penalties application to teachers, which leads to the termination (‘regular escape doors’), are analyzed on this framework. Therefore, this work thoroughly analyzes each institutional statement that relates to this action situation. In order to determine the force of all the statements it is necessary to know if they are: strategies, norms, or regulations; but there are other components that must be taken into account (attribute, component, and purpose) so that it is possible to determine the degree of contribution to the action situations.

Results

This section is divided in two parts. The first one analyzes the infringements referred in theRegulation; that is, penalties that might lead to the termination. This is a ‘slow rail’ that leads to the exit. As in every other organization, punishment application supposes the autonomy of the principals (schools directors) for authority, in this case, penalties application. TheRegulationadjusts a diversity of teacher’s behavior (punctuality, effort, attendance, etc.) that are essential for, among others, orders and functioning of the school. The punishments application relies on the director (on the attribute, according to IGT’s language). However, as previously said, this assumption turns out to be problematical because of the operative personnel’s dependence on the labor union for their promotion and other benefits.

Slow rail

Chapter XIV of the Regulation ‘Penalties and Rewards’ is analyzed here. The content of Chapter XII corresponds to some part of the LFTSE contents, which is why it is analyzed later. Articles 70 to 75 in Chapter XVI are the ‘conceptualization’ of the chapter. Article 70 says that ‘In all penalties and rewards cases no foreseen by the Statute, the preventions of this chapter will be applied.’ LFTSE has thus prevalence. Article 71 determines the infringements workers can receive, presented in a progressive way, from a minor infringement to a severe one; it starts with warnings, and verbal and written estrangements; then there are bad marks on their service record, the loss of the right to get a salary; employment, position or work suspension, and finally, the major infraction, the designation termination.

Article 72 states that the department head will make written estrangements, with a copy for the Personnel Department and the Hierarchy National Commission. For this particular case, the department head is the school’s principal, teacher’s immediate boss. Article 73 stipulates that three estrangements are equal to a bad mark. This is given by the Personnel Department, central administrative body that is not related to the field interactions (Table 2). Yet, as stated in Article 74, there must be two conditions.

Condition C1 refers to the accumulation of three estrangements mentioned in Article 73. The intervention of the Personnel Department occurs once they get the three estrangements notification. Condition C2, accumulative, is that it has to be legitimately requested by the Direction of the A2 campus. The director of the school must not only issue estrangements, but request the bad mark as well.

This supposition must be seen through interests and preferences affinity that structure the Regulation. The 11th Article of the Regulation, and LFTSE fraction III from the Article 15, say that the contracts the Secretariat can have with their workers can be permanent, temporal, for a set period, or for a certain work. LFTSE’s 6th Article defines base workers as irremovable. Therefore, we consider irremovability and base as synonyms.

The Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 from the Regulation are essential. Article 5 stipulates ‘SEP base workers will be subdivided into three groups: teachers, technicians and administratives.’ Article 6 defines who the teachers are, and Article 7 defines who the technical personnel are. Article 8 adopts a defining approach: ‘The personnel who do not execute teaching and technic activities is considered administrative. All the operative academic personnel with agent and principal roles are base workers.

Thus, labor irremovability is not only given to the lower positions in the academic hierarchy (teachers, for example), it is also given to the people in charge of supervising, controlling and monitoring that personnel. What ^{Tirole (1996)} mentioned relating the role of the supervisor gains importance here. ^{Calvo-Pointòn et al. (2002: 204)} explain that ‘the role of the sector head is the last base position a teacher can get through ranking promotion.’ In order to be able to get a promotion, it is necessary to be a base worker (Art. 38, LFTSE). It has also been said (^{Street, 1983}; ^{Ornelas, 2002} y 2008) that medium and high levels of education burocracy, are position that ‘belong’ to the SNTE. Because of this structuration, formal and informal, the possibilities of the head teacher automatically applying the infractions mentioned in the previous paragraph must be considered.

2. The quality and effort of the teaching work is little relevant if judged by the sanctions considered for its breach. Article 39 states that ‘work intensity will be determined by the set of tasks assigned to each employee in the internal regulations of each Secretariat Unit.’ It has to be clear that the labor union and officials must elaborate these regulations.

Besides, there is no special treatment (Table 3) when ‘the teaching activities are not executed as actively and appropriately as it is required’ (Article 77, fraction V); it is combined with lower responsibilities, such as acting intrusively, not being polite and diligent with people, denigrating government events and disobeying authority, and not reporting irregularities. The sanctions can be estrangements, verbal and written warnings, or bad marks. The one applied (this is relevant) will depend on the ‘department head’s judgment.’

3. Article 76, and subparagraph a to e from Article 80 are about delays. Article 76 states that being generally unpunctual, and not fulfilling the controls used for its measuring (Article 25, fraction II) will mean bad marks (Article 71, fraction II). It could also mean the loss of the right to get the wage corresponding to the unjustified absence. Subparagraphs from Article 80 explain the delays; it needs to be mentioned that there are infringements and delays scales.

These infringements start with bad marks, then the right of receiving a wage will be lost (if the worker appears at work after 30 minutes, that would be an absence), work suspension and, finally, the termination is asked to the Tribunal. The director of the school is responsible for monitoring the punctuality and attendance of the academic personnel, as well as their performance.

4. Article 78 regulates some of the conducts of the education workers. It is the article of the government’s operative level of the education system. We will not deepen into each one of the (un) expected conducts. What will be emphasized are the infringements worth verbal and written estrangements. These infractions can lead to more serious sanctions, depending on the gravity or reoccurrence.

If these are not worth (conditions and details are not specified), the Secretariat will be able to request the Tribunal the termination of the designation, which is the most serious sanction. The deontic “allow the SEP” does not force it, it just empowers it, but for this to happen, the Secretariat needs to have much information provided by the school’s directors. Though it is not mentioned, information flow has to upgrade the organizational operative hierarchy.

5. The only cases in which termination seems to not have difficulties are those described in the Article 79. In these, the worker has the initiative to set a foot out of the education system. The first refers to the resignation case. If the worker leaves work without his resignation being accepted, or without handing files, records, figures, or goods that are their responsibility, the worker will be ceased.

The second refers to a new attachment. If the worker does not transfer to ‘the new attachment’s place, indicated by the Secretariat, in no more than five days from the date of the pending concerns’ rendition of their previous work’ he will be ceased. Regardless of the responsibility the worker can have. Neither this article nor the Regulation’s give more details.

6. Absences can also lead to termination. Here, absences must be reported to the Personnel Department in order for the sanction to be effective. As said before, it is the director’s responsibility to monitor the attendance of the academic personnel. It can be difficult to assume the director will apply the norm just because it is established, especially if, as in this case, the sanctions to the base worker for breaching are not clearly specified.

7. Suppose the director -contrary to what has been said before- acts independently, giving estrangements to whom, according to their judgment, deserves it. Articles 75 and 81 (Table 4) weaken the II in Article 74 (Table 2). The first part of Article 75 has the same punitive tone that Article 74’s: ‘Bad marks will be permanent on the worker’s record’. Then the redemption opportunity appears in components D3, I2, A3 and C4 from Article 81.

Its structuration is simple and vague, compared to the (relative) precision of the infringements. C3 condition to make up for the bad marks, is the realization of ‘extraordinary services, praiseworthy actions or other motives that may justify such reward. But what makes an action ‘extraordinary or praiseworthy’? According to whom? There is no clarity about this neither in the articles nor in the Regulation.

This part highlights the two facts configuration. The first one refers to the attribute, a key component. The Regulation assumes the director (and other operative level directors)’s autonomy in order to apply sanctions. Without this automat intervention, infringements would have no disciplinary effect. Nevertheless, these positions are base works. The second element refers to the disciplinary effects established in Articles 75 and 81. The latter still about ambiguity and the lack of clarity in the institutional statements.

Fast rail

Chapter XII from the Regulation, and chapter VI and VII from the LFTSE are equivalents. These are about suspension and termination. Suspension does not mean worker’s termination (Art. 45, LFTSE). Suspension causes are similar for both norms. For the LFTSE, ‘the worker having an illness that could be dangerous for the people working with him’ (fraction I); ‘Temporary custody (…) followed by an acquittal or detention imposed by legal or administrative authority, unless, relating to an arrest, the Tribunal decides there must be termination’.

Lastly, ‘Workers in charge of handling of funds, monies or goods, could be suspended up to sixty days by the head of the corresponding department if there is any irregularity during their management, while there is an investigation and the termination is being decided’. The deontic ‘could’ only authorizes, showing the distinctive tone of the normativity.

No base worker can be ceased unless there is a fair cause. That is how the Article 46 from the LFTSE begins. Then the fair causes are listed, each fraction representing each kind of them. One of the causes from fraction I -the abandonment- is made by Article 60 from the Regulation. Fractions II, III, and IV are clear for the law, since they do not require more elaboration. These are the ‘regular escape doors’ that TB referred to, contrary to those from fraction V. Because of how the institutional statement is written, the Secretariat has to first -no later- ask the Tribunal for a resolution for the subparagraphs causes. This means five different action courses are required, which will be seen later.

Table 5 contains the action courses that need to be followed when those causes occur. The Regulation, contrary to the LFTSE, is older and primitive, short in details. That is why it is analyzed first. When it comes to the fraction V causes, Article 59 orders the Secretariat to file a claim before the Court of Arbitration to cease the worker. This Article’s statement is overwhelming. Besides, it makes clear that the Secretariat is not authorized to cease any worker. While the claim is still in process, fraction III from Article 58 forces the Secretariat to ‘previously and invariably’ ask for permission to the SEP to cease the worker. The other statement forces the labor union to allow the SEP when it shows that ‘the facts the worker is accused of are one of those mentioned in the fraction’ (C2). Therefore the only thing the SEP can and should do, is to demand and ask for permission.

The language of the LFTSE adopts a less punitive tone. This can be seen through the use of deontic. The action courses are not limited to suspension and termination, as it is in the Regulation. The option of relocating the worker is added. Thus, the organizational configuration becomes weak and simple when imposing sanctions. Some other actors get involved in the decision making as well.

C7 from Article 46 states that before any caused mentioned in fraction V, an administrative report must be filed. For obvious reasons, the ‘office’s superior head’ or the base personnel are responsible for filing it. The implicit deontic (D4) is clear: ‘must be filed’. For the act to be used subsequently as a ‘action’s base instrument’, it must be signed by various people: the sanctioned, the office’s head, the labor union representative, position witnesses, defense witnesses and attendance witnesses.

The administrative report is the only mandatory action this statement imposes. The last paragraph of Article 46 introduces C8 condition, which contravenes, or at least neutralizes the peremptory of Article 59 from the Regulation: ‘If according to the incumbent the claim proceeds’, then the claim is filed. It is no longer necessary as it is in the Regulation. Regardless of whether the cause is serious or not, the incumbent will be able to ‘suspend the effects of the designation’. But the corporatism gets involved even in such a weak purpose as the I2 (suspension), and for such a high level in the organization as the department’s head (A2). The same paragraph introduces C4 condition, which is not likely to occur: ‘if the corresponding labor union agrees with that’. Here, action courses branch, depending on whether the causes are serious or not.

The head has a resource in case the labor union refuses the permission to suspension. Besides C4 condition, a new condition (C5) appears to apply that resource: ‘when it has to do with any of the serious causes mentioned in subparagraphs a), c), e), and h); that is, when the causes affect the order and governance of schools. Only in those cases ‘the head will be able to ask for the termination of the designation,’ regardless of agreeing or disagreeing with the labor union. If the deontic is read in a literal way, the head will be only authorized to act, but not obliged to, not even in serious cases. The statement continues: the Tribunal ‘will provide the suspension separately (…) without continuing the procedure until finishing it during the corresponding term, in order to determine whether the termination of the designation proceeds or not.’

About the not serious causes (subparagraphs b, d, f, g, i, and j) it is not clear how the action will continue according to this institutional statement. We consider that the first paragraph of Article 46 offers an exit to both, the serious and not serious cause. This statement authorizes (D1: could) the superior head (the director, for example) to order the removal of the worker ‘to a different office from that where he is working, in the same state (…) until the conflict is solved by the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Tribunal’. However, it he claim proceeds, as mentioned before, depends on the head’s judgment and if there is an accurate events report.

The deontic is the key component of the statements previously analyzed, a component that shows if an action is required, allowed or prohibited. The deontic ‘could’ from LFTSE, innovative in relation with the Regulation, is a-directional: nor prohibits neither obliges.it allows other elements to incorporate in the decision formula. It creates a discretional framework for the actors to promote or not the referred action-purpose, depending on no-normative criteria. When it comes to a movement that leads to termination, the department’s head has to make the decision, which reinforces the discretional framework.

Thus, the SEP cannot cease any base worker. It can only temporary suspend them, as long as the labor union agrees. The only thing the ‘office’s head’ can do is to order the replacement of the worker to a different department. This is, the variety of sanctions widen, dissolving. With the deontic ‘could’, the decisive connotation of the action courses disappear.