Economic reproduction pattern and public policies

The pattern of economic reproduction showed some changes in the phase open in 2002 (^{Féliz and López, 2012}). The severe devaluation of labor force was complemented with a devaluation and suspending the payment of debt. For this result, state intermediation between the fractions of capital was key, at the same time that it produced political wear owing to its permanent explicit action. To the extent that wages recover, inflation erode the competitiveness obtained from the devaluation and payment debt resumed —after the 2005 negotiation—; the surpluses started to run out. The beginning of the global crisis added an external component to this scenario.

After the 2008 conflict, these tensions escalated. Regarding the political dynamic we are interested here, as of 2008 the mean real wage stagnated and employment stopped decreasing, limiting the structural improvements for the working class. Inflation, conversely, increased to stabilize in two digits.¹³Industry and construction, main sources of income, lost dynamism, being replaced by financial intermediation as the sector that grew the most in this new stage.

The primary trade surplus eroded, making it difficult to cover the industrial and energy deficit, payment of debt and its interests, sending revenues abroad and flight of capitals.

The main governmental interventions did not modify the structural determinants of the developmental model (See a discussion in ^{Cantamutto and Costantino, 2016}). An important exception is the reform to the organic letter of Banco Central in 2012, which subjected it to the official policy, recovering its control from the hands of financial capital. There were other relevant interventions: a) the nationalization of two enterprises, Aerolíneas Argentinas and Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, the recovery of the social security with the nationalization of Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones;¹⁴b) as of 2011 the financial market and the balance of payments were intervened with some novel innovations; c) the implementation of universal Assignation per child. Although these interventions do not close the state action in this phase, possibly they are the ones with the heaviest symbolical impact, particularly a) and b), as they are policies demanded for long by popular organizations.

In this phase activity regarding broadening of rights intensified. In 2009. The organic Law no. 23,298 of Political Parties, which regulated the compulsory open internal and Law no. 26,522 of Audiovisual Services, known as the media law. The latter championed the confrontation with Clarín multimedia group, recovering a project fostered by community media for long. The role of multimedia groups in the construction of the 2008 conflict made it evident the need of the government to modify the structure of the media system.

As a part of the same confrontation, the program Football for Everyone was set into motion, which took the transmission of local tournaments —a multimillion business— from multimedia groups. In 2010, Law no. 26,618 of Equal Marriage was approved, allowing the legal union of same-sex people. In May 2012, law no. 26,743 of gender identity was approved, which recognized the authority of each individual to decide on their gender and recognizing rights to the corresponding medical treatments. Moreover, it must be emphasized that in these years almost all the trials for crimes against humanity were conducted (^{Cantamutto, 2015}).

The set of public policies here referred became weighty in a cultural dispute of progressive nature. A common general characterization is that they did not affect the pattern of economic production, but oriented in a different way of disputing, and had a heavy symbolical impact (referred to by any Kirchnerist militant as foundation for support). Kirchnerism chose a series of fields that did not affect its alliances with the ruling classes, or specific confrontations with come fractions of BIP (certain multimedia groups, “the countryside”) as field of political dispute.¹⁵

Ruling classes

The core of the dispute inside BIP structured after the rejection of the agricultural fraction to accept its ambivalent position of lesser political power but of securing its structural power. This breach between the political and economic was only expressed with clarity by this fraction, whose recognition fostered the agricultural leaders to call to an impugnation to the political order hegemonized by the industrial capital (^{Cantamutto, 2016}).

This way, a new phase in the social conflict began, in which patronal organizations occupied the public space with repertoires associated to popular classes (^{Antón et al., 2011}). While for the agricultural capital the problem was to expand its interpellation to other social sectors, for the industrial capital the dilemma was up to which point the structuring mechanisms of public order were useful for it. This is to say, the intervention of the State to referee between the fractions of BIP and between them and the popular classes became very expensive, economically and politically.

As we said in ^{Cantamutto and Hurtado (2015}), the agricultural capitals intended to present themselves as referents for the broadest social sectors, concentrating wider complaints to the governmental policies as part of their claims. To do so, they appealed to historic differences rooted in the national imaginary; especially that of Argentina as the “world’s breadbasket”. The wide dissemination of this image of alleged wellbeing —transmitted for decades over the official history taught in the country’s schools— enabled a different reading of the past, seeking the promise of a nation that can fulfill its destination of greatness, but it is threatened from the inside.

The proposal was not novel: it was the liberal vision of the history utilized from the appearance of Peronism. In this vision of society, Argentina only has one possible destination and it is to accept that its prosperity depends on the agricultural sector responds to what the world expects from the country, permanent wellbeing threatened by the unnecessary and arbitrary State intervention (^{Panero, 2011}).

This interpellation made it easy for the middle urban sectors with no direct interests in the sector might accede to the claim, channeling their dissatisfaction as a part of the same conflict. Not in vain, one of the most massive and politically relevant acts was held on the Flag Monument in Rosario, on May 25^th (anniversary of the 1810 Revolution), singing the National Anthem as a main source of self-identification.

As clearly explained by ^{Panero (2011}), Mesa de Enlace understood that the interest of the countryside is the interest of the whole of society: “without countryside, there is no Argentina”. The event in Rosario was held in the center of the core soy-growing zone, producing a perfect image of what Mesa de Enlace understood by economy, politics and social welfare. But indeed, such narrowmindedness at the time of including other social demands in their own interests restricted the ability to respond to the call of the agro, as massive as it seemed. We should bear in mind that, at all times, the concrete comprising demand was to derogate resolution no. 125, always disregarding other claims.

The governmental response, as we explained, was to radicalize this polarization with its strategy: insisting on its legitimacy as a government elected by a broad majority before a particular group with corporative demands (^{Cantamutto and Hurtado, 2015}). If the pole options placed the agro and government at extremes, it is worth mentioning that the latter had UIA, CAC and ADEBA on its side, asking Mesa de Enlace to stop the protests (^{Cotarelo, 2008}; ^{Sanz-Cerbino, 2012}). Direct beneficiaries of the public policies that redistributed land revenues, these chambers expressed sincere and autonomous concerns in this regard.

As a set, the impugnation of the political order (the “story” and the public policies) from the agricultural fraction showed difficulties to subordinate its interests inside the very BIP. However, owing to the restricted character —corporative— of its demands, this impugnation was not sufficient to build a new order. During this period, BIP sought the minimum agreements that allowed reaching joint claims, among which predictability, property right protection, resolution of the debt problem, strengthening competitiveness (wage contention and exchange rate adjustments). These proposals add to those of respect to the rule of law, the need to preserve the division of powers, as expressed in Foro de Convergencia Económica facing the 2015 elections.

Additionally, the governmental criticism to the dismissing attitude of the agricultural boss association, which it was linked —not without reason— to the historical coups, produced a new “enemy of the people”, not mentioned before in the official discourse. Criticism to the media, which offered a coverage of the facts that the government considered distorted and partial, began (^{Aronskind and Vommaro, 2010}).¹⁶

President Fernández called a message “quasi criminal”, it was the cartoon published in Clarín newspaper, in which she was depicted gagged. From this conflict on, the media group became the par excellence personification of corporation. The “corpo” —as it was called— became the main enemy of the people, maybe becoming the strongest constitutive exterior of Kirchnerism: “what happens to you, Clarín? Are you nervous?” Kirchner spouted in March 2009.¹⁷

The conflict with the agro and Clarín group were the axes of the political antagonism in this phase. Inside BIP, such antagonism would produce increasing wear, however not stopping the support from some fractions of the capital for the government. Additionally, the evident approach between this and the fractions linked to financial activities must be emphasized.

Political parties

From the “countryside-government” antagonistic tension, not only were the government’s appeals fruitful in the mobilization of support, but also those of the agrarian capital. Some parties intended to promptly take this claims: Propuesta Republicana (PRO), Coalición Cívica (CC) and UCR were the clearest in this intention. Agro’s claim was read from liberalism (no State intervention) and from Republicanism (division of powers); this way, they were the main political-ideological currents from which the political parties tried to represent the claim and expand the interpellation horizon.

As a mirror, the government emphasized its national-popular component (^{Fair, 2009}). The electoral success of the official option led the major opposition political parties —with the exception of PRO, which served as an antagonistic pole— to combine liberal-republican criticism with progressive continuities.

Once Cristina Fernández took office, she focused on normalizing PJ and took advantage of the party presidency to support the government over the 2008 conflict. This tightened further the relations with the rest of PJ, the dispute took new impulse to define which the values and ideas that Peronism defended were, in which schematically —Federal Peronism emphasized features of order before the re-foundational nature of Kirchnerism. Kirchner’s efforts to maintain PJ united came into conflict with both the Peronist leaders, with their own projects, and the non-Peronist forces of FpV. BdP — Libres del Sur broke with the government by the end of 2008, expressing its discontent with the turn to the “PJism”. The radicalism that supported the government divided into those who returned to an opposing URC and those who remained as “K radicals”. Among the latter, Partido de la Concertación-FORJA was comprised, this alluded the historic radical group which was the ideological source of Peronism.

At the same time that old alliances split, new appeared. Early in 2009, there appears in Escuela Nacional Frente Nuevo Encuentro, which gathers the parties Encuentro por la Democracia y la Equidad, Espacio Solidaridad e Igualdad (SI), PC, Movimiento Libres del Sur and Instrumento Electoral por la Unidad Popular (the last two moved to Frente short after their creation).

The profile of this group, in the context of restrictive tension (^{Varesi, 2013}) of the polarization between the government and the center-right opposition, would be that of an independent force that supports the government. A sort of Kirchnerism outside FpV. This idea attracted various forces with presence in the congress, among which distinguishable were Partido Solidario (Carlos Heller) and the internal line of PS of Ariel Basteiro and Jorge Rivas, who in 2011 launched the party Unidad Socialista para la Victoria. In this same tendency, the formation of Movimiento Integrador Latinoamericano de Extracción Social (MILES), a political party launched by FTV leader, Luis D’Elía, early in 2011.

If the first phase of Kirchnerism was characterized by completing the populist rupture and this way attain hegemonic order, the moment so far analyzed supposes a displacement of the identity border that reinforces the bias of particularist reaffirmation (potency of the proper force). Before the liberal-republican discourse, the government emphasized its national-popular matrix as a source for substantive democracy. Before the stagnation of economic structural improvements, the government oriented its actions toward policies to recognize rights with heavy symbolical and political impact (see section: Economic reproduction pattern and public policies¹⁸).

The 2009 elections implied a setback for Kirchnerism in the congress, which went from 116 representatives to 87. The challenge of governing without a proper majority in the Legislative Power did not discourage the government, which in fact passed some of the laws that granted it greater legitimacy; this is to say, negotiating with the opposition. After the “liberal-republican” attack that accompanied the conflict with the agro, there was a “progressive radicalization” inside Kirchnerism (^{Varesi, 2013}), which allowed Cristina Fernández to win the 2011 presidential elections with 54.11% of the valid votes.

Clearly, Kirchnerism was turning into the majority political force, which forced the other parties to review their identities and strategies. Even in the 2013 legislative elections, the vote turnout regarding 2011 shrank, the renovation of posts corresponded to the poor choice in 2009. This way, 33.15% of the valid votes obtained granted a simple majority for its 132 representatives. Conversely in the senate, it experienced a slight setback (from 41 senators to 39), however, it also retained the simple majority; this is to say, in spite of the defeatist readings, the government consolidated its own majority in both chambers.

Such complete success in 2011 and relative in 2013 seemed to certificate the strategy to rest on own forces, avoiding the negotiation of alliances that did not recognized this absolute primacy. Kirchnerism more often than not supported itself on its own political teams, addressing its own voters. The expression repeated by president Fernández and senior officials to disavow the claims was: “if they don’t like what this government does, make a political party and win elections”.

The exclusion of allies from the emphasis on its very forces facilitated the creation of two fronts: Cambiemos (PRO, UCR and CC) and Frente Renovador (largely, Federal Peronism). These fronts alternated the policies of frontal opposition and recognition of some accomplishments (continuity and change) between them, however both emphasizing an alleged “willingness to dialogue” that distanced from the supposed Kirchnerist prepotency. They presented themselves as striped of ideology and focused on efficient public management to differentiate themselves from a government allegedly corrupted by excessive politization. In the 2015 presidential elections, these three forces gathered more than 92% of the votes; Cambiemos won in the second round with an exiguous 2.7% v. the official candidate Daniel Scioli.

Between social organizations

The confrontation with the “countryside” favored an active mobilization process by the organizations that supported the government. In fact, out of this, there was a sudden reaction of progressive artists and activists to defend the government, calling to defend the achievements. The importance of these supportive declarations from public figures had a very important role in the identity construction of Kirchnerism as a national popular force (^{Svampa, 2011}).

Particularly, Carta Abierta (which would continue publishing public interventions) asserted the politics and political discussion of differences as a democratic zenith, which it understood was the key point of the Kirchnerist project, and so pursuable. The progressive policies applied were recovered, in particular those linked to human rights.

The enumeration of accomplishments as an explanation for the support was not novel, but that a group of intellectuals burst into the public space willing to contribute to the construction of an identity and a story that contains such enumeration in a coherent manner, operating re-readings of history and disputing with the large media the interpretation of the conjuncture. Explicitly recovering Gramsci’s notions, Carta Abierta set off for a cultural battle, which supported the official project (^{Palermo, 2011}; ^{Pavón, 2013}; ^{Waiman, 2012}).

However, this was not enough to support the Kirchnerist process. In the context of this emphasis of identity on the proper force, La Cámpora became noticeable in the spaces of the Stata and in the media agenda making its leaders known and polemical figures.¹⁹ The youthful profile of the group’s base militants allowed restating the promise of political renovation in the horizon since 2001, and it worked as a call to a generation that incorporated into militancy over those years (^{Vázquez and Vommaro, 2012}). As a matter of fact, the group, which was not relevant at national level, received an unusual impulse from the conflict with the countryside, becoming one of the force mobilized to support the government in events of strong symbolical content.

In addition to La Cámpora, new Kirchnerist groups appeared. In July 2010, Corriente de Liberación Nacional (Kolina) appeared, it was created in the Ministry of Social Development by Alicia Kirchner. That year Corriente Peronista Descamisados was founded, it launched in 2011 a youth front, JP Descamisados “to deepen the changes”. That same year, by the hand of Labor Minister Carlos Tomada, the group Jóvenes de la Gestión Pública, and fostered by the Economy Minister Amado Boudou, La graN macrKo was created; its was a group of students and professors of social sciences (with the antecedent of Asociación de Economía para el Desarrollo de la Argentina, in functions since 2008). As it is noticed, there was an explicit effort to crate spaces to channel militancy from the State, with a vertical and centralized nature.

In order to avoid a growing dispersion of support, in April 2012, Unidos y Organizados was launched, it gathered the organizations that asserted as Kirchnerist. Inside this space, there were tensions between Peronist and non-Peronist forces. While the groups created by the Kirchnerism played a dual role between this space and PJ, the non-Peronist forces (FORJA, Convocatoria Popular, PC, MILES, Partido Humanista, SI) were restricted to dispute from Unidos y Organizados their place in FpV.

Kirchnerist militancy had a strong impulse after the sudden death of Néstor Kirchner in October 2010. The emotional impact of such event was strong, seen as the luck of a leader who gave his life for public commitment. The funeral of former president became a large public demonstration of support, which was transferred to President Fernández: for many it was the time to show explicit support to the project now led by Cristina Fernández, who otherwise “was alone”. That this event, totally fortuitous, had such political effect is not casual, but it was the retroactive reading of the accomplishments of the government that were part of the popular demands.

It must be underscored that this emphasis on the own militancy not only relegated other organizations and parties, but also various demands for the government in various moments. The effect of being supported on those who identified themselves as Kirchnerist as the only valid representatives of the people was to unveil the synecdoche: the people exceeded the government, militants and supporters, who appeared as if snatching what was common. This made room for the possibility of equivalent confluence between demands, making room for a populist of the populist sort… in the face of a populist government (^{Cantamutto and Hurtado, 2015}). This possibility was utilized by the parties referred in section 3.3 and the displaced fractions of BIP to offer interpretations that encouraged disenchantment with the government.

Union centrals

The growing weight of officialist groups generated tensions with other components of Kirchnerism. Unionism, being displaced, considered that it was disrespect for the support given. The growth of this groups in the official lists was severely questioned by Moyano before definitively distancing from the government in February, 2012. This distancing was motivated by the personal interests of the leader, by the base pressures on the deterioration of real wages (^{Inda, 2012}).

As we pointed out in ^{Cantamutto and Hurtado (2015}), the government instead of trying to solve this issues, worsened them by means of policies such as the application of taxes to workers and a constant discourse attack to the non-allied union directions, called them “working-class aristocracy”, unlike the “genuine industrious people” represented by the government (^{Castillo, 2012}; ^{Inda, 2012}).

It was the same strategy utilized in the conflict with Mesa de Enlace: the government assumed itself as the only legitimate representative of the people before corporations that attacked the community. This way, any attempt to retain them was abandoned. The political logic was to impose the primacy of the State as a representative of whole of society, before parties in conflict (capital-labor) and its representative corporations (^{Inda, 2012}).

CGT tolerated these tensions for some time; the first separation was in 2008, when the fraction linked to the neoliberal reforms of Luis Barrionuevo separates from the official leadership (^{Fernández, 2010}). In 2010, there is a division in the opposite direction, when a fraction of CTA (led by Hugo Yasky) moved to fully support the government. The fraction headed by Pablo Micheli remained in the opposition. Finally, the leadership of CGT (Moyano) distanced from the government to approach Micheli’s CTA and opposing Peronism. This way, years later, the opposing CTA and Moyano’s CGR converged in street demonstrations, asking for wage rises and complaining about the tax on revenues (^{Cantamutto and Hurtado, 2015}; ^{Tagina and Varetto, 2013}). A fraction of CGT (headed by Antonio Caló) remained in line with the government. As of 2012, the worker’s centrals are divided in five fractions: two of them with the government and three in opposition (^{Payo-Esper, 2013}).