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Tópicos (México)

versão impressa ISSN 0188-6649

Tópicos (México)  no.36 México Jul. 2009

https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v36i1.132 

Artículos

Deliberation and two concepts of mind: A Response to Martin Seel*

William Grundy1 

1Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas, UNAM, wpgrundy@cantab.net


Abstract:

The author considers the concept of deliberation as developed by Professor Martin Seel, and he tries to extract from that concept an underlying picture of mind. The author describes two pictures of mind that are historically and philosophically opposed. The first makes a sharp distinction between subject and object, and it construes experience in essentially epistemological terms. The second avoids sharp distinctions between subject and object, or between mind and world, and it construes experience in essentially practical terms. The author argues that there is significant evidence of both pictures in Professor Seel's discussion of deliberation.

Key Words: mind; subjectivity; Deliberation; Kant; Wittgenstein

Resumen:

El autor considera el concepto de deliberación, como el profesor Martin Seel lo desarrolla, e intenta extraer de ese concepto un modelo subyacente de la mente. Describe dos modelos de la mente que son históricamente y filosóficamente opuestos. El primero pone una distinción fuerte entre el sujeto y el objeto e interpreta experiencia en términos principalmente epistemológicos. El segundo evita una distinción fuerte entre el sujeto y el objeto, o entre la mente y el mundo, e interpreta la experiencia en términos principalmente prácticos. El autor aduce que hay prueba significativa de ambos modelos en la discusión sobre deliberación del profesor Seel.

Palabras Clave: mente; subjetividad; deliberación; Kant; Wittgenstein

Texto disponible solo en PDF

Referencias

Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan. R. Tuck (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [ Links ]

Nietzsche, F. (1996). On the Genealogy of Morals. D. Smith (trans.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. [ Links ]

Steel, M. (2009). The ability to deliberate: Elements of a Philosophy of Mind. En Tópicos, 36: 123-141. [ Links ]

Taylor, C. (1985). Self-Interpreting Animals. En Philosophical Papers: Language and Human Agency. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [ Links ]

Wittgenstein, L. (1997). Philosophical Investigations. G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.) Oxford: Blackwell [ Links ]

Received: May 14, 2009; Accepted: June 29, 2009

*

The original title of my response was ‘Language and Deliberation’. For the purposes of better reflecting the content of my remarks, I have changed the title for publication.

Creative Commons License This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License