Introduction

In late October 2019, Colombia held local and departmental elections. More than 30 million Colombians went to the polls to decide who would govern the destinies of their cities and departments, as well as who would serve on municipal councils and departmental assemblies to support new leaders and/or perform a political watchdog role.

The mayoral elections in Bogota were particularly noteworthy, as the Colombian capital sets the stage for the political battles leading up to the next presidential election or where the effects of the most recent presidential election are felt -in this case, the 2018 election-.

The four political sectors that competed for the presidency presented their candidates for the mayor’s office of Bogota, either to consolidate power obtained in the previous presidential contest or to act as a counterweight and opposition to the central government in the capital.

The candidate representing the government bloc, Miguel Uribe Turbay, ended up receiving fewer votes than Carlos Fernando Galan, a supporter of liberal movements; Holman Morris, a member of Colombia Humana; politician Gustavo Petro’s Movement; and Claudia Lopez, Partido Alianza Verde’s candidate, who came out victorious.

The election of Lopez was a milestone not only in Bogota politics, but also nationwide. Lopez, who openly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ community, came to power with a platform anchored by an anti-corruption discourse built with political initiatives and discourse aimed at capturing an electorate that ascribes more to a “post-materialistic” perspective (^{Abramson & Inglehart, 2009}) in which issues such as the environment, animal rights and guarantees for sexual minorities took on the same level of importance as the city’s historical structural problems: transportation, safety, employment, among others.

A trend of generational change in political behavior also can be glimpsed behind these transformations, revealing a particular electoral behavior that, in the background, may be caused by different ways to construct political identity and the rise of new agendas in the city’s political debate.

In the background of the electoral process, the commonplace of apathy, disaffection or unease regarding politics that is always referenced in Colombian society is called into question, harbored by high levels of voter abstention, low civic participation and other types of protests and public mobilizations. In the 2019 elections, abstention among eligible voters in the city increased to 44.94%.

Along with these transformations, the famous November 21^st national strike, better known as 21-N, took place nationwide a month after Lopez’ victory, with thousands of Colombians taking to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with the national government. The strike was part of and a reflection of a change in the political behavior of Colombians and more specifically the people of Bogota.

The national strike was characterized by a strong component of “deinstitutionalized” citizen participation that continues to prevail today in popular mobilizations, where the classic institutions that served as vehicles of political representation such as parties, unions, and industry associations take a back seat and are displaced by citizens who represent and organize themselves in public spaces.

As stated by ^{Saint-Upéry (2020)}:

November 21^st, 2019 (known as 21-N) was a collective awakening with partial and dispersed leaderships that made multiple aspirations, especially among the youth of the country, visible. There was novelty, diversity, strength, and much joy. 21-N also was a “that’s enough” against the fact that Uribism continues to shape the political situation and the future of the national debate. It is also a staging of ruptures and the search for new leadership, new forms of expression, disobedience against the establishment, but also against the classic opposition of the more organized left (p. 155).

At the same time, this particular feature of the mobilization was a prelude to what ended up being the social expression of a transformation that had already begun in October at the polls in Bogota.

When questioned about that specific feature, historian Jorge Orlando Melo preferred the concept of disenchantment, defining the situation as a scenario of “rejection of politics, discontent with the government, with economic results, with life prospects” (in ^{Ortiz, 2019}).

Regarding the protestors and their motivations, Melo (in ^{Ortiz, 2019}) argues that:

Their protagonism is due to the fact that unionism in Colombia is very weak today; there are no longer any unions that are capable of mobilizing large populations. They are young people who, in addition, certainly are not members of any political movement. And they are not organized, which leads to there not being any single agenda of the marches. They are united by a complaint about many things: the quality of education, pension reform, environmental causes, corruption. It is a wide-ranging agenda (s.p.).

This institutional distrust is a phenomenon that has been growing stronger over time, as shown by data from a Latinobarómetro survey (see Table 1). When asked, “Would you say that you have a lot, some, little, or no confidence in…,” the majority of those surveyed said they had no confidence in institutions such as the national congress, government, judiciary, and political parties.

Another social institution that has lost credibility is the traditional mass media, which have been overshadowed and questioned by information circulating on social networks and the growing role of independent digital media that have achieved legitimacy and credibility through rigorous fact-checking, reconstruction of facts, and investigative journalism.

According to the Barómetro de la Reconciliación (^{ACDI/VOCA, 2019}), 83.9% of Colombians did not trust the media in 2019. Likewise, in the latest wave of the World Values Survey (2020), the lack of trust in television was 65% (“not much trust”) and 62% for radio (“not much trust”).

Based on this dual scenario of transformation and perpetuation of certain political behaviors, this study seeks to investigate the presence of political disaffection or, on the contrary, the existence of a new political culture that combines electoral and non-electoral participation framed in a more active and less apathetic citizenry. This article presents the descriptive results of the study and a series of correlations that aim to support the evidence of the phenomena described in this introduction.

Prior to the elections, Universidad de la Sabana’s Media Observatory took into account opinion polls and campaign proposals and conducted a political culture survey to a representative group of Bogota residents to identify their patterns of participation, information, socialization, and political identification.

Political disaffection, information and socialization

The study of citizen behavior regarding political and electoral processes is a very relevant phenomenon to examine from different perspectives. With participation and political representation as the pillars of democracy’s legitimacy, the sustainability of democratic systems and the governability of their institutions is increasingly questioned by growing political disaffection in many corners of the world.

^{Torcal and Montero (2006)} define political disaffection as a:

Subjective feeling of impotence, cynicism, and a lack of confidence in the political process, politicians and the democratic institutions that create distance and alienation, and a lack of interest in politics and public affairs, but without questioning the democratic regime (p. 6).

Along the same lines, the authors maintain that political disaffection can be evidenced in two different dimensions. The first is defined as the absence of political commitment, understood as “a set of attitudes related to a generalized distrust of politics with a consequent lack of commitment to the political process” (p. 6). The second, institutional disaffection, refers to “the belief in the lack of accountability of political authorities and institutions and the lack of citizen confidence in the political institutions of their countries” (pp. 6-7).

In this line, ^{Megías (2020)} defines political disaffection as a “negative feeling toward politicians, politics and its processes, and toward a system that is incapable of tackling the demands and needs of citizens” (p. 104). ^{Picos Bovio (2018)} posits that disaffection “is an emerging and multivariate term that seeks to describe the growing distrust and distancing between the citizenry and its representatives, the political elites” (p. 116). The author characterizes the typical features of the phenomenon as the people’s distrust in public institutions, in particular political ones, electoral abstention, and a general criticism of the political system that is characterized by inefficiency (p. 116).

Likewise, it is possible to identify a relationship between disaffection and political participation in two ways. As ^{Torcal and Lago (2006)} assert:

People who do not have confidence in institutions, who feel left out of politics, or are incapable of comprehending it, will be reluctant to participate in democratic processes, creating a general apathy. It is equally possible that political disaffection could encourage citizens to search for alternative ways to express their political opinions and their frustrations with the functioning and performance of democratic institutions (p. 309).

A bad perception or a predominant imaginary on politics can act in these two ways, making apathy widespread or encouraging other responses. In this regard, political information and socialization processes take on greater relevance as they are spaces where citizens receive information input to make decisions, adopt behaviors and construct a set of attitudes on objects, subjects, and political processes.

As stated by ^{Strömbäck and Shehata (2010)}, fewer and fewer people directly experience politics and “even those who are politically active obtain most of their political information through traditional media or new media such as the Internet. Mediated political information and experiences also permeate interpersonal political discussions” (p. 576). This leads one to think of politics that are “increasingly becoming mediated or mediatized” (p. 576).

Amid this context, there are theoretical approaches on the effect of media exposure on political engagement and collective imaginaries on politics and politicians. On one hand, there is a group of authors who maintain that it is a negative relationship. In other words, the greater the exposure to news, the greater the decline in political engagement and legitimacy of political systems. This postulate is based on the concept of media malaise (^{Holt et al., 2013}; ^{Robinson, 1976}; ^{Van Aelst, 2017}), which suggests that the way in which the media cover public issues has a negative impact on society as a whole, influencing the decline in trust, the disruption of the public sphere and encouraging “political cynicism” (Cappella, 2002). It is argued that this concept focuses on the absence of trust and defines the behavior of a political cynic as someone who believes that “political leaders and the groups they represent are not trustworthy, even in the absence of evidence in favor or against. The cynic begins with distrust and must be persuaded by the opposing party for it to disappear (p. 231).

One of the reasons for this distrust is media coverage of public affairs. The way in which the facts are framed, the attribution of responsibility and the interests associated with the actors who are the main focus of the news is a determining factor in the judgments that citizens make of their politicians and their institutions. ^{Capella and Jamieson (1997)} argue that:

When [news media] report on politicians and their policies are repeatedly reported as self-interested and self-serving in terms of the common good, whether the characterizations are right or wrong, the public representation of leaders is skewed toward attributions that induce distrust (p. 142).

On the other side are contributions such as those of ^{Norris (2001)}, who proposes the existence of a virtuous cycle in relation to the effects of political information and civic engagement. ^{Norris (2001)} suggests that:

Contrary to the media malaise hypothesis, news media consumption is positively associated with a wide range of indicators of political knowledge, trust, and mobilization. People who watch more television news, read newspapers, surf the web, and pay attention to campaigns are consistently more knowledgeable, participatory, and trusting of government (p. 112).

Likewise, ^{Slater (2007)} asserts that there is a positive feedback loop between media consumption and involvement in public affairs. In this regard, the author indicates that media consumption influences beliefs and behaviors, such as political engagement, and in turn, beliefs and behaviors influence media consumption. Additionally, ^{Kruikemeier and Shehata (2017)} posit that this virtuous cycle can be even stronger on social networks to the extent that information is obtained at lower cost and almost accidentally. In this regard, the authors argue that users have greater control, information processing and interactivity, and that “the online environment offers greater opportunities for user control and opportunities to easily find, share, and discuss news of personal importance, strengthening user engagement” (p. 225).

Political socialization, or the lack thereof, can also be a factor that encourages political disaffection among the citizenry. The places, frequency, people or social groups with which people interact in the different environments of their daily lives, and the context in which these interactions take place, can serve as a basis for the emergence or erosion of a civic culture or apathetic behavior towards democracy and political processes.

It’s not politics, it’s the institutions?

Another line of analysis is based on the idea that, rather than facing a state of political disaffection, many democracies are going through a process of institutional disaffection. This can be reflected in the high levels of institutional distrust, continuous corruption scandals, and political crises that have led to the removal of presidents and changes of leadership. Behind this phenomenon there is evidence of a crisis of political representativeness that has increased the distance between citizens, institutions, and political leaders (^{Del Tronco, 2013}).

^{Mora Heredia (2017)} suggests that what a large portion of Latin American democracies may experience is a “state of disaffection oscillating between clear respect for democracy and its institutions, but associated with growing frustration regarding its achievements and actors” (p. 85). In the same vein, ^{Rodríguez-Virgili et al. (2011)} state that “rejection of politicians is not necessarily synonymous with disinterest in politics; on the contrary, criticism of politicians can be a way of becoming interested in political activity” (p. 16).

This entire discussion can be framed within the concept of political culture (^{Almond & Verba, 2013}) in order to understand the collective and individual, and in turn, cognitive, emotive, and evaluative factors that determine the relationship of political subjects with political objects.

Insofar as the referents of legitimacy associated with political culture enter into crisis, it is part of a crisis of institutional trust that can generate political disaffection, which can be reflected in a decrease in political participation or the emergence of new leaderships that reorient participation around new referents, agendas, or public causes.

Methodology

A quantitative correlational study was conducted, which has “the purpose of knowing the relationship or degree of association that exists between two or more concepts, categories or variables in a particular sample or context” (^{Fernández Collado et al., 2014, p. 93}). This public opinion study was conducted from September 9^th to 16^th, 2019 in 19 of the 20 localities of Bogota. The population of the sample was 6 091 367 people in the city who were over 18 years of age in 2019, according to a projection of the Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística-dane). The margin of error of the survey was 3.5%.

A total of 781 people were surveyed, distributed proportionally by place of residence (see Table 2), gender and age range to ensure the most representative sample possible.

A descriptive and correlational analysis was performed to establish patterns of political behavior and relationships between variables that may help to examine the presence or absence of elements of political disaffection within the Bogota electorate.

Results

In the search for elements that allow us to identify political disaffection within the society of Bogota, we worked on three dimensions based on the variable of interest in politics.

Initially, we examined the relationship between interest and organizational membership and the resonance that a series of causes have within the citizenry. In this section we initially made an exhaustive list of types of social organizations so that respondents could express their membership or non-membership in each of them. Subsequently, a series of “public causes” visible within the city’s political agenda were mentioned, against which a Likert scale was used to determine how much affinity respondents felt or did not feel for each of these public causes.

Moreover, all the aspects related to political participation and institutional trust were studied. In this study, we looked at the levels of interest in politics using a Likert scale that went from “not at all” to “a lot” and those surveyed selected the option that was closest to their level of interest. Subsequently, participants were shown a series of political institutions that are relevant to the citizenry and were asked, initially, to indicate whether or not they knew of the institution and then to evaluate on a Likert scale how favorable or unfavorable their image of these institutions was. Lastly, questions related to information and political socializing were asked. This consisted of revising the information process and socializing, starting with the existence or not of a habit of informing themselves, going through a list of media and the frequency of such behavior. Subsequently, we reviewed whether people talked about politics with other people, with whom they did so, and how often. The following are the main findings and significant correlations that contribute to the analysis that will be presented later in the discussion of the article.

Affection/disaffection, electoral participation and institutional trust

When participants were asked if they currently belong to some type of social organization, only 8% said they did. 92% stated that they did not belong to any type of social organization. The 65 people who said they belonged to an organization were distributed as follows (see Figure 1).

Source: The author.

Figure 1 Organizational Affiliation 

When we examined the correlation between interest in politics and organizational affiliation, we found a significant correlation χ2(4,N=781)=92.537, p<0.005. On the one hand, citizens who reported having low, medium and high levels of interest are not affiliated with organizations, while 42% of those who report having a high level of interest are (see Table 3).

Aware of the progressive deinstitutionalization of the processes of construction of political identities, we inquired about the support for a series of “public causes” that in many cases transcend organizational membership and constitute thematic affinities that mobilize citizens to participate in electoral and non-electoral spaces.

On a scale measuring affinity for causes, with 1 being having no affinity and 5 having a lot of affinity, the highest scores were related to issues such as women’s rights (4.70), human rights (4.67) and defense of the environment (4.66) (see Figure 2).

Source: The author.

Figure 2 Support for Public Causes 

The causes with the least support are the defense of traditional and religious values (3.60) and the right to organize to guarantee the security of the community (3.96).

The relationship between having or not having interest in politics and being in solidarity with one of the public causes surveyed is significant in most cases. It is not necessary to have high levels of interest to have high levels of support for public causes (see Table 4).

Affection/disaffection, electoral participation and institutional trust

In order to look at the levels of political affection/disaffection, variables such as interest in politics, the habit of participating or not in electoral processes, the prevailing imaginary on politics, and the levels of trust in a series of political and social institutions representative of the city and the country were considered.

Regarding the relationship to interest in public issues, 34% reported not having any interest, 18% reported little interest, 24% said they had some interest, 16% quite a bit and only 7% said a lot. At first glance, it is evident that most people report having little to no interest. However, this is not supported due to a low percentage of electoral participation (see Figure 3). Fifty-seven percent said they always participate in elections, followed by 13% who almost always do so. Only 12% say they never do so, and 8% rarely. Also, when looking at the relationship between interest in politics and voting, the correlation was not strong (see Table 5).

Source: The author.

Figure 3 Electoral Participation 

Even 42% of those who say they have no interest whatsoever in participating in politics always vote and 10% do so almost always; 51% of those who show little interest in politics always vote, and 22% almost always vote. There is no clear determination between the level of interest and participation.

In regards to the perception of politics, which can affect the relationship of citizens with political issues, an experimental exercise was carried out asking people to define politics in one word. Forty-eight percent associated it with corruption, a far cry from other definitions that also largely had a negative view of politics as being associated with bad practices and behaviors.

To further explore the degree of affection/disaffection, the level of institutional trust was examined (see Figure 4). Only two institutions, the armed forces, and the media, had an average rating greater than 3 out of 5.

Source: The author.

Figure 4 Institutional Trust 

The rest of the institutions, including those directly related to political administration such as the presidency, the Bogota mayor’s office and the municipal council have an average trust rating below 2.5 out of 5.

Finally, when exploring the relationship between interest in politics and its importance in people’s lives (see Table 6), it is evident that, regardless of the interest shown, politics is not an issue that most people consider relevant, χ2(4,N=781)=62.862, p<0.005.

Conclusions

Electoral processes in Colombia have historically taken place amid a series of common factors that have been somewhat changing in recent years. Bogota’s elections were an outlier, with high levels of abstention and, in this case, volatility, which have allowed the city to be in the hands of administrations from across the ideological spectrum.

At the same time as the evolution of these political-electoral particularities, there is evidence of a process of cultural transformation that is beginning to have a strong impact on the agendas, actors and mechanisms of social, political, and electoral participation and mobilization.

The 2019 elections in Bogota can be analyzed, considering these transformations, trying to generate a series of reflections on the postulate of political disaffection and its possible relationships with variables such as interest in politics, the habit of informing oneself about public affairs and talking about politics with other people.

The poor perception and negative imaginaries of politics could be encouraging younger generations to become more involved in public affairs, especially within the context of bifurcations between traditional, institutionalized and mass mediatized politics and another that is characterized by disruption, themes and with a greater motivation for non-traditional participation, social mobilization and the use of new repertoires and tactics of collective action and protest. Even in strictly electoral terms, disaffection or apathy to traditional institutions does not exclude solidarity with public causes (new forms of participation and mobilization), in addition to new sources of information (digital, networks).

The habit of voting is not accompanied by the habit of being informed and socializing in some cases, which rather than speaking of political disaffection shows us a dangerous scenario of electoral distortion, a breeding ground for disinformation, instrumental motivations and electoral corruption.

Furthermore, there is evidence of a general institutional crisis that could contribute to the development of aspects of political disaffection; however, in Bogota’s case, this growing mistrust is having the opposition effect to the point that it has mobilized a lot of people in public spaces who weren’t participating before as they saw how the decisions of elected leaders negatively impact their quality of life, especially amid the pandemic and economic crisis.

Lastly, it is pertinent to ask whether the Bogota electorate is not only experiencing political disaffection, but also institutional disaffection, understanding institutions from a traditional perspective. These institutions are being replaced by new political practices, new social identities and new habits of information and political socialization, where the digital ecosystem has a high degree of responsibility.