Tourism Policy

Tourism is perceived as a critical activity to achieve socio-economic development (^{UNWTO, 2016}; ^{UN, 2017}). However, there are uncontrollable aspects, and its evolution can be affected by different influences (^{Almeida & Chahine, 2016}; ^{Garay & Cànoves, 2011}). Different authors have approached tourism policy (TP), and its definition varies indiscriminately, up to the point that some definitions oppose others (^{Enríquez, Osorio, Castillo, & Arellano, 2012}). To conceptualize it, this study uses ^{Velasco’s (2014, p. 293)} proposal, which defines tourism policy as “the set of governmental actions aimed at achieving objectives associated with phenomena and relationships resulting from a process of occasional citizen attraction and residence in a given territory.” Besides designing these policies, different instruments, including comprehensive evaluations, must be implemented in order to bring about change in society (^{Velasco, 2014}). Edgell and Swanson (in ^{Lohmann and Panosso Netto, 2017}) consider that TP, together with strategic planning, is vital for prosperity, sustainable management, and quality of life.

In the international context, the TP has historically experienced difficulties leading different actions in the right direction. The actions in the history of TP are so clearly marked out that three stages stand out (^{Enríquez et al., 2012}): pre-Fordism (elite tourism), Fordism (mass tourism), and post-Fordism (diversified tourism). These stages are characterized by the supply and demand regimes of the activity and by the regulatory models of tourism (^{Garay & Cànoves, 2011}). They also may be characterized by the institutional approach to key variables such as context, decisions, impacts, and policy implementation needs (^{Almeida & Chahine, 2016}) (Table 1).

In the international arena, different countries have adapted their TP objectives as the demand for tourism activities in each territory has evolved (^{Almeida & Chahine, 2016}; ^{Enríquez et al., 2012}; ^{Garay & Cànoves, 2011}). Therefore, it is a priority to bring the private and public sectors together to ensure competitiveness and promote goals associated with the sustainability of environmental, social, and economic processes (^{Reyes, 2014}). ^{Enríquez et al. (2012)} propose a new stage in the current direction of the touristic sector, the so-called New Tourism Policy, in which decisions are more complex, there is a decrease in the role of the state, and globalization controls decision-making about tourism. Additionally, the state begins to consider the opinion of society, and policies are directed towards ordering the physical space and the adequate use of resources.

Nautical Tourism

A megaproject works by articulating the country’s economic structure in terms of infrastructure development (^{Abedrapo, 2011}), since it modifies the geographical space at different scales, politically, socioeconomically, and environmentally. But the meaning of space is dominated by the Cartesian vision mentioned by ^{Ibarra and Talledos (2016)}, in which territories are projected by economic and political power to reproduce capital for the sake of the development of capitalism.

^{Abedrapo (2011)} acknowledges that there are two faces of political economy that allow for the emergence and development of megaprojects: on the one hand, they result from social needs and available options, always coherent with public policies and institutional management capacity (according to the magnitude and complexity of the project), as well as interactions with direct and mediated actors. On the other hand, they can be a consequence of political weakness when facing pressure from interest groups. ^{Flyvbjerg (2007)} characterizes megaprojects as highly risky because, while they are being developed, they often increase in scope or ambition, and the budget, among other aspects, becomes inadequate, causing excessive costs or a lack of benefits.

In Latin America, megaprojects have found space to develop due to the lack of existing physical and urban infrastructure. This situation leads to negotiations between multiple actors aimed at satisfying economic growth, while at the same time seeking to meet the criteria of social and environmental justice, aspects that up to now have been opposed (^{Domínguez, 2015}). In Mexico, megaprojects have been justified as a social necessity, when in reality, they have created spaces for capital development, such as leisure and entertainment mega projects for the upper-middle class and the rich (^{Ibarra, 2016}).

Coastal tourism megaprojects began in 1970 with the Comprehensive Planned Centers (CIP). During this period, tourism began an economic and political boom (^{Talledos, 2016}). The National Fund for Tourism Promotion (FONATUR) undertook to propose or implement the incumbent president’s ideas to promote, manage, develop, and continue these projects until they materialized (^{Vega, 2010}). In some cases, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (WB) were important in CIP financing (^{World Bank, 1977}).

Cancún, which emerged as a project in 1969 and developed in 1974, was born in this way. Almost consecutively, Huatulco, in Oaxaca, was created; and then Loreto and Puerto Escondido, in Baja California Sur, and Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo, in Guerrero (^{Talledos, 2016}). The initial version of the Maritime Tourist Ladder dates from 1981. Most of these large projects were developed or consolidated over the next two decades, and a new wave of Fonatur projects was born. The new projects were: Litibú, in Nayarit; Playa Espíritu, in Sinaloa; Costa Lora, in Tamaulipas (^{Vega, 2010}), and a second version of the EN, which was recovered as an idea by the 1994-2000 administration, but was developed as a presidential government project from 2000 to 2006.

The Mexican coasts have been the target of major tourism projects. Cancún was the first of the five touristic destinations in the country that were the basis of public policy to promote tourism (^{Espinosa-Coria, 2013}). Another example in the Northwest region is the project in Punta Colonet (2008), where a multi-modal port (^{González, Pombo, Méndez, Espejel, & Leyva, 2011}) was built but failed (^{Sandoval, 2012}). Or the Cabo Cortés mega touristic complex in Cabo Pulmo, Baja California Sur, a private investment project that was never implemented despite considerable insistence (^{Anderson, 2015}).

The northwest coast of Mexico is vast, un-urbanized, and close to the United States’ potential market (USA). It offers developers and the Mexican government the ideal conditions to promote a magnificent touristic development (^{Ramírez, 2018}). However, these same characteristics also promise enormous possibilities for the conservation of their exceptional nature (^{Wilkinson et al., 2009}).

The World Tourism Organization and Sustainable Tourism

Tourism projects are usually established in attractive, paradisiacal, and underdeveloped places, and although they comply with local environmental regulations, they trigger unpredictable changes. Some of the socio-environmental impacts generated are: 1) disorderly land use change, 2) unnecessary infrastructure development, 3) long-term loss of cultural identity, 4) unequal human settlement expansion, 4) fragmentation of natural habitats, and 5) loss of biodiversity (^{Blázquez Sánchez, 2012}). The latter is especially true if impoverished rural and indigenous areas whose subsistence depends directly on biodiversity and the environmental services provided by ecosystems are affected (^{OECD, 2012}).

To fight against environmental deterioration, the tourism sector developed a sustainable tourism approach:

Sustainability principles refer to the environmental, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of tourism development, and a balance must be established between these three dimensions to guarantee long-term sustainability. The guidelines and practices of sustainable tourism management apply to all forms of tourism in its different segments and all types of destinations ( ^{UNEP and UNWTO, 2005, p. 11} ).

This vision, promoted by the World Tourism Organization (WTO), a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN), recognizes tourism as the largest development force, since it considers the sector as being planned and managed. It includes the 12 objectives of sustainable tourism: economic viability, local prosperity, quality of employment, social equity, visitor compliance, local control, community well-being, cultural wealth, physical integrity, biological diversity, resource efficiency, and environmental purity. The goal is to promote sustainable social and cultural growth by minimizing negative social, cultural, and environmental impacts through a guide to identify and implement sustainable tourism interventions (^{UNWTO, 2013}).

Additionally, some models argue that tourism is a socio-economic phenomenon (^{Oviedo, Rivas, & Trujillo, 2009}) and a complex system with spatial expression, in which multiple elements are interrelated (^{Segrado, González, Arroyo & Palafox, 2010}). Both approaches make it possible to understand EN as an expression of the tourism sector, as well as a tourism policy that evolved in the interests of “regional development” “directed” toward sustainable development.

Therefore, this article means to show the evolution of the project before its implementation, analyzing the development of EN by its definition, spatial location, scope, goals, and its economic, political, socio-economic, and environmental contexts. This article intends to be an input for future research in different areas leading to the estimation of the impact on localities in the region.

Comparative analysis of the three versions of the megaproject

To understand how something as complex as the EN came to be, the three versions are compared (tables 2, 3, and maps 2 to 4). The Maritime Tourist Stairs (1981) represented a simple idea of connectivity for nautical tourism that never materialized (^{TURGOCAL, 1981}). Subsequently, Fonatur took up the idea and, presenting it as Nautical Ladder of the Sea of Cortez Region (1999), pushed it, managing to receive budget authorization by the end of the Ernesto Zedillo administration (^{FONATUR, 1999}, ²⁰⁰⁶). With the change of president and political party, FONATUR presented the project as Nautical ladder of the Sea of Cortez (2001) to the Vicente Fox administration. EN was authorized as a strategic government project from 2000 to 2006, and it was widely promoted at the national and international levels (^{FONATUR, 2006}).

Source: FONATUR (¹⁹⁹⁹, ²⁰⁰¹, ²⁰⁰⁶), ^{TURGOCAL (1981)}. Base map: ESRI, USGS, NOAA.

Maps 2, 3, and 4. Comparison of maps of temporal and spatial evolution of proposed nautical stops  

The project was modified conceptually and structurally during its implementation and became the project Sea of Cortez (2004).⁵ Besides the nautical stops, this project considered strengthening the development of the region by establishing ecotourism routes and circuits on land and sea (^{FONATUR, 2006}). This version also included the improvement of already existing touristic cities, some of them buoyant, such as Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, which has a real estate business (^{Valiente, Cariño, Corona, & Narchi, 2016}) and is in keeping with the functions of Fonatur, the agency that plans and develops sustainable investments in the Mexican tourism sector and is a “strategic instrument for investment development” (^{FONATUR, 2018a, s/n}).

Only two of the 12 arguments for the justification appear in the three versions (Table 2). These arguments are the following: natural tourist and recreational fishing attractions, and the lack of infrastructure and nautical services. Initially, the problem was a reduced nautical sector. However, in the Mar de Cortés version, it became very broad, nonspecific, and applicable anywhere (issues such as anarchic occupation of the territory, tourism as an instrument of economic reconversion, and deterioration of ecosystems and the environmentally fragile regions) (^{FONATUR 2006, pp. 31-32}).

Additionally, the original objectives of connectivity and nautical tourism became even more ambitious, getting more complex in order to meet the social and environmental demands of sustainable tourism (the post-Fordist stage), and so they lost coherence (Table 2). For instance, the objectives of the last project are no longer sectoral; they are alien to their original purpose (conceptually only) to “provide better life opportunities for indigenous communities and peoples, or to use tourism as a guardian of ecological balance.” (^{FONATUR, 2006, p. 2}). The main strategy, consisting in the development of infrastructure for nautical tourism, increased from one action to six, the number of stopovers of road kilometers changed, and mobile stops were added.

The secondary strategies shown in Table 3 show the transformation of the basic marine infrastructure project into a regional development megaproject. On the one hand, a nautical (sector) central axis is evident in the three versions, which coincides in some respects (nautical facilities, services, import procedures, and concession to the private sector) and keeps similarities in others (safety, charges, and administrative structure for imports and advice for investors or licensees). On the other hand, strategies differ in their incorporation of urban, cultural, and social aspects (environmental sanitation and urban image, and the strengthening of cultural values and identity in communities) (^{FONATUR, 2006, p.9}). This is called “greenwash” or painting companies with green (^{Weaver, 2009}).

Table 3 also shows that the first version would provide services to tourists with important social impacts (tourism protection system, technical and legal advice, maintenance, supervision and surveillance, permit assistance, and passenger transportation services). These services were lost in the following versions. However, other planning strategies belonging to the municipalities were added, for instance, the promotion of actions for social development and the creation of local development agencies, the reorganization of urban tourism, and financing of urban improvement and operation, maintenance, and commercialization of the works (^{FONATUR, 2006}).

Changes in the number of stops and sites were highlighted (maps 2 to 4). In 1981, 74 possible sites were identified geographically, although 50 were originally proposed. The choice was based on studies such as topographic surveys, maritime surveys, pre-feasibility studies, land tenure, and ground and air tourist routes, among others. This selection of stops and sites is in line with the economic criteria proposed in the first two versions, and the inclusion of social and environmental elements in the latest version does not follow from it.

In 1981 50 sites were proposed. The 1999 version kept 90 percent of those, while the 2001 version kept 79.2 percent and the 2004 version, 67.9 percent. Each project added “new” sites, ending with 62 possible nautical stops. Only 14.5 percent (San Felipe, Baja California; Santa Rosalía, Puerto Escondido, and La Paz, Baja California Sur; Mazatlán, and Topolobampo, Sinaloa; Puerto Peñasco, Sonora, and San Blas, Nayarit) were finished. Two of these already existed, and in seven, the existing infrastructure was complemented.

An interesting case of nautical stops happened in Altata, Sinaloa, where FONATUR did not carry out any construction works, but a stop was built by private investors (^{Industria y Análisis Ambientales del Noroeste, SC, 2004}). This marina had nothing to do with the government’s nautical megaproject since it developed a residential area with low environmental impact (^{Ornelas, 2018}). This is a clear example of the projects that clung to the promotion of the megaproject, adding an “environmental” strategy.

According to ^{Centro de Planeación S.C. (2003)}, the EN used three determinant selection criteria to select stops: a) refueling distance of smaller vessels, b) existing maritime infrastructure, and c) the presence of protected natural areas (PNAs). These criteria, more technical than touristic (now with the environmentalist vision incorporated), tried not to include land within ANPs. However, when it became inevitable not to include stops located in the ANPs, the former were defined as “mobile scales”, probably to reassure environmentalists.

Another confusing strategy by Fonatur was the inaccurate physical location of the sites. No site data were found in their technical reports, and the maps presented by them were very general, with place names referring to towns, municipalities, or nearby beaches. In the three versions, the same stop can appear under different names.

An example of this can be found in two studies that also failed to specify the locations because Fonatur never indicated them. These studies were: Bases for the Ecological Management of the Escalera Náutica Region (^{INE, 2002}) and the Ecological Management of the Mar de Cortés Region: Micro regional windows (^{INE, 2003}). In that study, each window showed the main bays or lagoons as the “most likely location” of the stop. Its precise location only appears in the Regional MIA (^{Centro de Planeación S.C., 2003}).

The lack of precision appeared to be caused by the blurry legal situation of several stops that did not have property titles or agreements with the municipality, sometimes modified or breached by the state (^{Centro de Planeación SC, 2003}; ^{FONATUR, 2006}). Sometimes, the vagueness was due to controversies about the environmental value of the sites; when the location was imprecise, the sites avoided environmental pressure. For example, the Coastal Northwest Sustainability Alliance (ALCOSTA)⁶ pointed out that most of the sites had no prior tourism vocation and were in important PNAs (^{Guido et al., 2006}).

It is rather strange that a project worth millions was proposed without having some land for sure. In the Mar de Cortés version, 53.6 percent of the stops were new; of these, 66.7% were located in places lacking the infrastructure to support nautical tourism or social activities. These places (villages, fishing camps, or isolated settlements) would start from nothing, which would involve large initial investments. Maybe for this reason, most of the installed stops already existed or were improved, and they were in already developed urban areas.

According to the Inegi 2010 census (^{SEDESOL, 2013a}), 35.7 percent of the locations near a nautical stop were rural, 89.3 percent had very poor social conditions, and 64.3 percent were highly or very highly impoverished (^{SEDESOL, 2013a}). The data show locations lacking vocation for nautical development, but rather meant nature conservation, given that 35.7 of the stops were located within an ANP (^{CONANP, 2012}), and 57.1 percent in priority sea regions (^{Arriaga-Cabrera, Vásquez-Domínguez, González-Cano, Jiménez-Rosenberg, Muñoz-López, and Aguilar-Sierra, 1998}).

The different versions of the project (maps 2 to 4) show a higher proportion of stops in the Sea of Cortez. In the Pacific, in the Escalera Marítima version (1981), several stops concentrated near the US border, including the islands, evidencing the border vision of the project and, at the time, a non-existent environmental policy to protect the Pacific islands, that now have become national protected areas. In the Mar de Cortés (2004) version, the criterion of distance for navigation prevailed, and a notorious spatial change took place by concentrating stops in Sinaloa and Nayarit, a state that joined the project in 2002, This version ends in Jaltemba, a bay located between the states of Nayarit and Jalisco.

Evolution: from onset to failure

From the first documented idea to its implementation as a project, EN evolved along with tourism planning in Mexico. Although in this country the planning of tourism took its very first steps with President Adolfo López Mateos (^{Magaña-Carrillo, 2009}), this first planning effort was taken up by the Gustavo Díaz’s administration. His administration was the first to present the idea, then called Mar de Cortés Circuit, with points of interest in Sonora, Sinaloa, and the Baja California Peninsula, as a part of the Gulf of California Tourism Development Plan of 1968 (^{Manzo, 1979}).

It was not until 1978 that the Maritime Tourist Stairs were formulated in a technical document published in 1981 (figure 1). The project was included in the National Tourism Plan (^{DOF, 1980}) and was complemented by the National Urban Development Plan, which prioritized the construction of roads and airports for connectivity in the region, the promotion of North American tourism, and the development of centers for tourism (^{SARH, Comisión Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano y SPP, 1978}). This project matches the beginning of a period (1980-1986) in which an attempt was made to correct the imbalance between tourism supply and demand (^{CESOP, 2006}), as well as a period of economic crisis and of change in the economic development model (1985) The loss of touristic competitiveness (1985-1994) with the development of the Caribbean and the south of the USA was another trait of that period (^{CESOP, 2006}). Therefore, alternatives to develop the tourism sector were sought.

The Mar de Cortés Circuit and all versions of the EN needed open and available policies, but above all, an economy that favored bi-nationality. Border projects are complex because “the border area itself is a great laboratory of relations between the two countries” (^{Valenciano & Ganster, 1992, p. 9}), and these are circumstantial to administrations. Medellín (2004) states that the actions of governments, as well as the observation and analysis of the political regime, make it possible to understand the public policies generated; therefore, the proposal of the Mar de Cortés Circuit and the inclusion of Maritime Stairs in the public agenda and the execution of the EN project coincide with Democratic administrations in the US, which favor relations with Mexico (^{LBJ Presidential Library, 2018}; ^{Pastor, 1986}; ^{Valverde Loya, 1998}).

During the incubation period of the EN (1981-1998), commercial and economic relationships were undermined by the tuna embargo (^{Portilla, 2008}). On the other hand, in the 1990s, the binational policy focused on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and when Bill Clinton (from the Democratic Party) took office in 1993, trade was prioritized among countries and “democratic solidarity and prosperity by means of commercial integration” were promoted (^{Valverde Loya, 1998, p. 238}). Later, Clinton supported Ernesto Zedillo during the 1995 crisis and in his electoral and political reforms aimed at increasing democracy in the country (^{Valentín, 2012}). In terms of border tourism, the need to identify new attractions and improve services was visualized (^{Valenciano & Ganster, 1992}). The NAFTA being signed and ratified, good binational relations prepared the ground for EN.

Public administration instruments in the tourism sector

The federal public administration was particularly relevant in the evolution of EN. According to ^{Ramírez Navarro and Ramírez Navarro (2013)}, the operative part of the state drives the country’s development, and its administrative framework includes instruments such as sector division, administrative reforms, inter-secretarial commissions, administrative units, and development plans. Although the EN was included in the public agenda as part of the public policy cycle, both instrument-based planning and the state-owned unit that promoted it (FONATUR), the administrative reforms carried out during the different versions, as well as the sector plans derived from the National Development Plan, were part of its administrative process.

The most important influence on the changes to the original project came from the administrative reform that focused on planning (figure 1). For instance, the creation of the Coordinating Committee for the Development of Tourism in the Gulf of California (TURGOCAL) was the result of reforms associated with regional planning. This agency presented the Escalera Turístico Marítima (1981) in collaboration with state governments, federal government secretariats, and in coordination with the Coplade (Committees for Development Planning for the Northwest Region) (^{TURGOCAL, 1981}). COPLADE is an element in the national planning stage. However, the subsequent version known as Sea of Cortez (2004) sought to be a more comprehensive plan with a long-term vision, whose objectives were more ambitious and therefore required more investment, characteristics that correspond to the stage of democratic planning.

The continuous transformation of public administration aims at improving the organization of the country, adapting itself to the national environment and to the international policies of each administrative period. Currently, reality is far from having obtained the desired results; there are contradictions and unforeseen short-term and long-term effects (^{Pardo & Cejudo, 2016}), or the results comply only with the letter of the law (^{García Moctezuma, 2010}). For instance, ^{Pardo and Cejudo (2016)} explain that the well-intentioned creation of the COPLADES failed to work, and they weakened over time,⁷ due to the lack of strong coordination mechanisms, which together with the 1976 crisis, did not allow for the development of the project. Long-term planning did not work for this project either. Even though it was part of democratic planning in 1982, in megaproject planning the six-year vision stood until 2000, more because of the dimensions and regulatory complexity of these projects (^{García Moctezuma, 2010}; ^{Pardo y Cejudo, 2016}) than for the sake of long-term permanence.

Division in sectors, which allows for the programming of activities and costs in order to achieve the purported objectives and goals, has been equally important as a limitation for projects such as EN. The complexity of tourism megaprojects, especially of the Mar de Cortés version, was inconsistent with sustainable development, as it was planned and developed with a partial vision, which made it difficult to foresee the impacts and externalities that would result.

Another important point in terms of planning in the different versions of EN is the limited involvement of municipalities. According to the law (^{DOF, 2018}, Art. 2), planning is made to strengthen the federal pact and the autonomy of county governments. For the same reasons, decentralization is promoted (^{DOF, 2018}). The Municipal Development Planning Committees (COPLADEM), which could have been the local coordination body, did not take part in the EN project. Environmental groups mobilized to ensure compliance with environmental regulations at the local level (^{Guido et al., 2006}). Even today, these groups have better results with sustainable development as a political argument.

Tourism policies in the Mexican northwest coastal zone

Historically, regional planning and tourism projects were justified through issues of comprehensive development (^{Manzo, 1979}), social development (^{DOF, 1980}), and regional development (^{DOF, 1996}, ²⁰⁰², ²⁰⁰⁸). Thus, since the 1970s, the government conceived tourism as the most promising sector for the social and economic development of the Baja California peninsula (^{World Bank, 1977}). However, in cases such as EN, its relevance and scope as a megaproject turned it into a policy in its own right (^{Abedrapo, 2011}). The regional project did not attempt to face a major social problem, but was the result of a regulatory need, with FONATUR as the administrative agent (in regard to real estate) and SECTUR as a public authority.

As government agencies, Fonatur and Sectur redefined the public problem, together with a comparative need (^{Meny & Thoenig, 1992}), in which an international social phenomenon such as tourism was envisioned as the trigger for economic growth in Mexico (^{Clancy, 2001}), which would allow the development of an entire region respective to the rest of the country. The obsession of these two agencies to develop this region may be closely related with ^{Medellín (2004, p.20)}, who speaks of “territorial control as a real referent of political power” rather than regional development.

As a development policy, EN is closely associated with the national and sector policies of three six-year administrations, that first included it in the public agenda, then implemented it, and finally cancelled the project (diagram 1). During these three administrations, from 1981 to 1998 a political incubation period took place. In 1999, the issue was again picked up, after making a public consultation focused on the need for competitive diversification, reconversion, and regional development focused on local investment and human capital capacities (^{DOF, 2002}). However, the public consultation only justified its inclusion in the 2000-2006 public agenda.

Source: DOF (¹⁹⁸⁰, ²⁰⁰², ²⁰⁰⁸), Presidency of the Republic (²⁰⁰¹, ²⁰⁰⁷), ^{SPP (1980)}.

Diagram 1. Political Components in the Development of Nautical Stairway Through National Planning with Objectives  

Besides including the megaproject in the tourism sector programs (^{DOF, 1980}, ¹⁹⁹⁶, ²⁰⁰², ²⁰⁰⁸), two communications and transportation sector programs (^{SCS, 2001}, ²⁰⁰⁷) defined actions, strategies, goals, and so on. However, there is a lag in policies. The policy behind the EN project largely matched the characteristics of projects from the Fordist or mass tourism stage (Table 1), but its evolution sought to harmonize with elements of the post-Fordist or diversified and sustainable tourism stage. As a consequence, we observed that, though justifications and objectives changed, strategies did not (Table 2).

In some cases, strategies to develop EN at the state and municipal levels were also included, for example, the Baja California Sur Port Development Master Program (^{API-BCS, 2007}) and the Baja California State Development Plan (1996-2001), which promoted the construction of nautical sports infrastructure (^{COPLADE, 1998}). However, in spite of the post-Fordist logic of the tourism sector program, which proposes competitiveness, diversified tourism, and regional development, during the 2006-2012 administration, the megaproject was not part of national planning. The program for the communications and transportation sectors also failed to include nautical tourism or areas such as small boat navigation.

Summing up, the project lapsed. Despite this, the government of the state of Baja California attempted to revive the project in Santa Rosaliíta (^{Hernández Karim, 2016}). In contrast, Baja California Sur focused on mass tourism development (Fordist) in the Los Cabos-San José del Cabo corridor, where EN fueled the change in activity (^{Ganster, Arizpe, & Ivanova, 2012}; ^{GeoAdaptative-IMPLAN Los Cabos, 2016}). In both cases, there were no diversified and sustainable (post-Fordist) tourism projects.

Environmental policies and environmental regulations in northwestern Mexico

As a tourism policy, the EN project was also a turning point in the country’s environmental policy due to the planning instruments it motivated.

The former Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources, and Fishing (Semarnap) (1997) -now the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat)-developed the first regional environmental regulatory framework (table 4) for the project, which included a section of coastline consisting of a band from the mean sea level up to 200 km inland and into the sea. Two other ecological arrangements were carried out in 2001-2003. The second one contained micro-regional windows: micro-regional (500 km²) and local (100 km²). Though this regulatory framework was not approved, in 2004, the federal government and the governments of neighboring states signed a collaboration agreement to implement two regional planning processes: of the maritime regulations and norms about the sea-and-land zones around the Gulf of California.

^{Gutiérrez, Pedroza, Solares, Arriaga, and Díaz de León (2008)} point out that the regional planning processes comprising the sea and the coast were administratively separated, leaving the marine ordinance as a federal faculty, lacking direct intervention from the states. These authors added that this division allowed for formality and the possibility of retaking efforts.

In line with the 2001 Framework Convention and its ratification due to changes in state governments and the modification of the project to Mar de Cortés, in 2004 (^{Fonatur, 2006}), the Secretariat of Environmental Protection of Baja California (SPA) provided the base for creating the general guidelines for urban development in Santa Rosaliíta, as well as urban development guidelines for the urban-touristic corridor Bahía de los Ángeles, in the municipality of Ensenada (^{Gobierno Municipal de Ensenada, 2007}). On the other hand, the Program for Environmental Protection Puertecitos-Paralelo 28 (^{POEBC, 2007}) was approved to give certainty to Vicente Fox’s presidential project.

The first Marine Ecological Management System (OEM) in Mexico was the OEM of the Mar de Cortés, that marked the beginning of an institutional policy for coastal zones in the country and the importance of Comprehensive Coastal Zone Management (^{Rosete Vergés, Enríquez Hernández, Córdova, & Vázquez, 2006}). In terms of environmental assessment, this regulation was the first in Mexico to include environmental management. The process was opened for consultation and public discussion (^{Quijano & Reed, 2006}). Although the EN project promoted the creation of such novel environmental policy instruments, the marinas, ports, and touristic cities are not entirely environmentally sound, since their scope is limited when they are implemented (^{Bravo et al., 2007}) and, together with the environmental impact assessment, authorities have failed to halt the impact of tourism projects (^{Uribe, 2009}).

The social and economic impacts of the EN project deserve separate studies under the logic of regional development or other points of view, in order to analyze the local impact of the projects at the specified stops, or even the impact of stops that were planned but not executed.