Where are we Heading?

The U.S.-Mexico border in the last few decades has experienced a dialectical process of deterritorialization and re-territorialization (^{Fuentes & Peña 2010}) typical of globalization (^{Brenner, 1999}; ^{Harvey, 2006, pp. 9-68}; ^{Sassen, 2007, pp. 45-96}). This is, while capital and goods flow across borders more freely; flows of unskilled labor and people, from poorer neighbors, are more restricted in general by wealthier receiving countries (^{Boehmer & Peña, 2012, pp. 274-277}). At the same time that infrastructure such as bridges, port facilities, etc. are upgraded and expanded to facilitate cross-border trade; fences as well as more sophisticated surveillance technology (^{Boyce, 2016, pp. 255-257}) to detect unauthorized crossing (e.g. undocumented migrants and illicit goods) are deployed at the border (^{Slack et al., 2016}). ^{Sohn (2014)} points out that globalization was an important driving force for states to give up some sovereignty to “transnational bureaucracies” to implement some deterritorializing process (i.e. make borders more fluid and seamless) in order to ensure the accumulation of capital. ^{Bauman (2007, pp. 5-26}; ^{Bauman, 2012, pp. 1-15}) argues that globalization is a process of “liquefying” old “solid” institutions, a process that creates negative outcomes such as uncertainty, unsafety and insecurity described as the “unholy trinity” of “modern liquidity.”

The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 09/11/2001 reinforced the sense of insecurity and brought back the nation-State by reasserting its police power (^{Foucault, 2004, pp. 311-361}) as a key function for protecting population safety; thus, accentuated more restrictive territorial policies at the U.S.-Mexico borders to manage uncertainty and insecurity (^{Slack et al., 2016}). The terrorist attacks have undone the limited attempts of transnationalism and cross-border multi-level governance in favor of a more traditional neo-realist approach (^{Morgenthau, 2014}) based upon the notion of using police power to maintain control of the territory and its borders (^{Foucault, 2004, pp. 311-361}). The U.S.-Mexico border has become one of the sceneries where security policies materialized, by making the border physically more visible and harder to cross; this is, power has been exercised to reinforce differences and separation; as ^{Newman (2003}) points out, borders are processes of differentiation and exist as an institution to protect those “inside” from the dangers of whatever is “outside” the border.

The U.S.-Mexico border, though, never conceived in pure spatial relational terms, has reinforced the Euclidian conception of border government. According to ^{Harvey (2006, pp. 119-148)} a Euclidian conception of space emphasizes the geographic and physical attributes of demarcation; thus the border becomes a container of processes that codifies what is “in” and what is “outside” (^{Taylor, 2003, pp. 102-108}). Differentiation policies and actions by the U.S. at the border are aimed to protect, what ^{Bourdieu (2003, pp. 220-228)} calls, the symbolic power (e.g. hegemonic language, identity, etc.) of those in control from “outside” threats (culture, terrorism, undocumented migration, drugs, undemocratic values, etc.).

The border policy, particularly after 09/11, is heading towards an emphasis of border as a differentiation or a “mixophobia” (^{Bauman, 2007, pp. 86-93}) defined by power holders in Washington and some states such as Texas and Arizona. Border reality is being shaped and defined by power holders and particularly by the “surveillance-industrial complex” (^{Hayes, 2012}; ^{Lyon, 2010}). Using ^{Bauman’s (2007, pp. 86-93}; ^{Bauman, 2012, pp. 182-184}) concepts, I would add that the idea of a border wall is a “mixophobic” response by a segment of American society affected by the three negative aspects of globalization -uncertainty, unsafety and insecurity. Donald Trump has exploited and reinforced successfully, through social media, the anxiety of a segment of U.S. society. The narrative, that has succeeded in rationalizing the border, is that the southern border is the source of those “unholy trinity” effects; therefore it is necessary to build an “armor” to maintain the “…island of homely and cosy tranquility in a sea of turbulence and inhospitality” (^{Bauman, 2012, p. 182}). In summary, we are heading towards a material border that separates, differentiates, expels and denies entry to those labeled as a risk (^{Newman, 2003, pp. 19-20}) to the symbolic power, portrayed as national values; ^{Heyman (2017)} equates this policy as a “border Apartheid” in the sense that some segments of borders residents are banned from entering into the U.S. space. Trump’s executive orders have identified two main groups considered a risk to the symbolic power; first, undocumented immigrants coming through the southern border (Mexicans and central Americans), and that is why a border wall is needed. Second, nationals of seven majority Muslin countries (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Libya, Yemen and Sudan) considered being at the forefront of radical Islamism and a threat to the U.S. national security. The Trump administration recently has exploited and portrait as an “invasion” asylum seeker from Central American countries; thus, using the executive power to declare a “national emergency” at the border. Disrupting border flows and sensationalizing the problem, through mass and social media, is a way to reinforce its political message that will carry on to the next election. The democratic system and the media again will be a medium to debate and settle beliefs that cannot be settled through objective means.

Who Wins and who Loses, and Through Which Means of Power?

The goal in this section is to illustrate Foucault’s idea of how power is deployed to the production of knowledge that becomes the driving force of policy-making. The knowledge that is employed to rationalize actions that at the end served some powerful interests and the reinforcing borders narrative.

This question is answered by first looking at some key actors and asking who benefits and who loses with the implementation of the security-surveillance policies at the border. ^{Heyman (2012, pp. 267-269)} analysis is an important key to provide an answer in regards of who the winners are of the differentiation policies and reinforcing of the material border. The author explores something that is puzzling to many border scholars-why border expediency of flows, which works in favor of global capitalism, is severely undermined; ^{Heyman (2012, pp. 263-265)} concludes that resources are allocated in favor of “between-port-enforcement” over “port-operation.” In other words, resources are spent in favor of interdiction operations against the “illicit economy” (^{Andreas, 2004, p. 648}) such as drugs and human trafficking, that crosses in non-authorized locations (i.e. “between ports” of entry), instead of facilitating the flows of goods and people vetted to cross at authorized ports of entry.

I argue that global capitalism at the border in the form of maquiladora output is still profitable despite costs incurred by border crossing delays; in other words, the marginal gains from speeding flows at the border are not enough to invest in more aggressive lobbying for more efficiency at the border. A different story is the prospect of imposing a 20% “border adjustment tax” or tariff, which could have a substantial impact, particularly, if Mexico retaliates which could disrupt the entire chain of global production. Trump even had to backtrack when in March 29, 2019 threaten to close the “damn border”. However, there is another actor that profits from “between-port-enforcement” refer throughout the analysis as the “surveillance-industrial complex” (^{Hayes, 2012}). The “surveillance-industrial complex” is defined by ^{Hayes (2012)} as a “marriage of technology and security” that links governments, state agencies and corporations along the same lines of liquid surveillance. According to ^{Hayes (2012, p. 170)}, citing Visiongain report, in 2010 global expenditures in national security topped $178 billion dollars; border security in the form of perimeter surveillance and unmanned ground and aerial surveillance accounted for $15.8 billion; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. spends over one billion per year in R&D related to security (^{Hayes, 2012, p. 173}).

In the U.S., agencies related to the “surveillance-industrial complex” such as the DHS, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), among others and contractors associated with putting in place surveillance technologies are the big winners. In order to put things into perspective and to have a dimension of the issue here are some facts in monetary terms. The budget for the 2016 fiscal year authorized for the DHS was $64 858 484 000 (^{Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2016}); the proportion of the DHS budget assigned to the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is equal to 21% (13 565 294 000). Applying back-of-the-envelope calculations the entire spending budget of four Mexican border states -Baja California, Sonora, to CBP Chihuahua, Coahuila and Tamaulipas is roughly equivalent (96%) to the entire budget allocated.¹ The budget allocated to CBP from 2000 to 2009 increased by 230% from 1.06 to 3.50 billion and almost fourfold to 13.5 billion in 2016. Border patrol manpower doubled in a decade reaching 17 499; in 2015 reached 20 183 border patrol agents; at the southern border in 1992 there were 3 555 agents and in 2008 there were 15 442 (334% increase). The other side of the story is that apprehensions of undocumented migrants reached their highest point in 2000 with 1.65 million, and since then there has been a steady decline (^{Nunez-Neto, 2008, pp. 13-19}; ^{U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2015a}). According to the Pew Research Center, Mexican net migration to the U.S. has steadily declined from 2009 to 2012; there were 5.9 million in 2012 compared to 6.4 in 2009; the explanation is that there is an increase in departures and a decline in arrivals (^{Passel & D’Vera, 2014, p. 9}). However, Mexico’s border continues being a bridge to other migrants, particularly Central American unaccompanied children, reaching a crisis in 2014 with 68 541 apprehensions of minors (^{U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2015b}). In 2018 and 2019 another big wave of Central American is taking place in the form of caravans; the big difference is that those migrants are families fleeing violence and seeking asylum in the U.S. instead of young, mostly males, looking for work. The “surveillance-industrial complex” such as CBP as well as those engaged in providing consulting and technology services will be greatly affected if the U.S.-Mexico border becomes seamless or “liquid” and there is not as greater a need for border surveillance; this is an important reason why narratives and discourses coming from this group of power holders will be that the border is a dangerous place, and therefore there is a need to allocating more resources in order to reinforce and make the border secure. The Trump administration is following the same policy by trying to increase manpower at the border; it has set the goal of hiring 5 000 additional border patrol agents and 10 000 ICE officers, in addition he wants to relax vetting hiring procedures such as polygraph test to speed up the process.

Shifting our focus to the issue of knowledge and power, I argue, that the “surveillance-industrial complex” has been successful in steering knowledge produced at academic institutions to serve its interest and validate and solidify its power grip. Traditionally, it is thought that scientific knowledge is objective and value free, however as ^{Bourdieu (2014, p. 163}) argues, symbolic power has the characteristic of being “exercise in such an invisible way that people are unaware of its very existence and those subject to it are the first among these, since the very exercise of this power depends on this lack of awareness”, while academics still believe in the objectivity and value free of their knowledge, it is clear that some academic knowledge serves power.

Thus, academia and universities in the U.S. are on the winning side with research grant money. Universities have jumped into the national security regime wagon by making applied research and scientific knowledge available to the “surveillance-industrial complex”. DHS has certified 15 programs in universities as Centers of Excellence (COEs) on homeland security science and technology, some right at the border (^{Hayes 2012, pp. 173}). For example, the University of Arizona with the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) co-lead the National Center for Border Security and Immigration; the National Security Studies Institute at UTEP is part of that initiative (^{U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015}). A newly created center that also deals with border issues at the University of Houston is the Center for Borders, Trade, and Immigration Research (CBTIR); the others COEs focus on a variety of topics related to national security such as coastal resilience (University of North Carolina), critical infrastructure (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), Artic domain awareness (University of Alaska, Anchorage), visualization and data analytics (Purdue and Rutgers), localization of explosives related threats (Northeastern University), zoonotic and animal disease defense (Texas A&M and Kansas State University), food protection and defense institute (University of Minnesota), maritime security (Stevens Institute of Technology), risk and economic analysis of terrorism events (University of Southern California), study of terrorism and responses to terrorism (University of Maryland), maritime, island and remote and extreme environment security (University of Hawaii and Stevens Institute of Technology), microbial risk assessment (University of Michigan, Drexel University, and Environmental Protection Agency), coastal hazards (UNC-Chapel Hill and Jackson State University), preparedness and catastrophic event response (Johns Hopkins University), the national transportation security center of excellent composed of several institutions such as Long Island University at Riverhead, University of Arkansas, University of Connecticut, Rutgers University, Texas Southern University and Tougaloo College.

In the opposite side the research centers that focus on broader border topics such as border governance, inequality, human rights, and “human security” (^{Slack et al., 2016}) etc. are far fewer on the U.S. side. Mexican academic institutions pay more attention to non-security and integration issues. These institutions represent what ^{Foucault (1980, pp. 78-108)} denominated “subjugated” knowledge, or in terms of power are examples of counter narratives, that have far less power to induce change and policy actions at the border, or influence a narrative and discourse at the national and binational level. A few centers on the U.S. border states such as UC-San Diego Center for US-Mexico Studies focusing on US-Mexico relations; San Diego State University had a binational public administration program, that was not able to survive beyond its first cohort of binational students; the School of Transborder Studies at Arizona, which is perhaps the only one offering a doctoral degree in transborder studies; centers which focuses on borderlands studies per se, Udall Center at University of Arizona focusing on environmental issues including transborder natural resources, New Mexico State University Center for Latin America and Border Studies, University of Texas at Austin LBJ School of Public Affairs; University of Texas at El Paso Center for Inter-American and Border Studies to mention some; Texas A&M International in Laredo, Texas has the Global Initiative and a program in international nonprofit excellence. On the Mexican side El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, a think tank with presence along the Mexican border, focusing on a variety of border topics and publishes an academic journal Frontera Norte; the Universidad Autónoma de Baja California (UABC) with its journal Estudios Fronterizos; and Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez are among the universities located in border states and cities that produce knowledge about the border. It is important to mention the Association of Borderlands Studies which publishes the Journal of Borderlands Studies.

So far the analysis has focused on how power and knowledge where the border becomes an object that is socially constructed through the power of deliberation. Thus, it is important to reflect on the issue of communications power, using ^{Castells (2007}; ^{Castells, 2013, pp. 10-53}) theoretical framework, to explain how knowledge is produced and facts are being deliberated and disseminated to shape a border reality; in short, the border is a socially contested object. Barack Obama was one of the first to show the power of social media as a tool to build an organization and raise money capable of electing a president. The election of Trump, as the U.S. president, just reaffirmed the role of social media (tweeter) as an important deliberation instrument and communications power to shape a border narrative; and the electoral arena is a way to settle which one is more convincing.

Social media has changed the rules of the game of political communication; traditional media outlets now face a counter power in social media. As stated before, traditional mass media (TV, radio, newspapers) were considered the fourth branch of power, and a free media was considered necessary to speak not only truth to power but make power holders accountable by fact checking about the truth. Mass media was an important intermediary of facts and true between politics and the public; if the mass media did not report it an event or fact did not exists in the public opinion. However, social media has changed dramatically the role of mass media as an important filter of truth and facts; truth and facts are now deliberated not only in mass media but in the social networks. Trump succeeded making NAFTA, the border wall, undocumented migration, and drugs topics in the election using social media as a channel to deliberate and bypass traditional media. One of the criticisms is that social media facts are not accurate or truthful “knowledge”; thus calling this era post-truth politics, to the point that the Oxford Dictionary named it the 2016 international word. Social media articulates a network of people that not necessarily looks for facts to form an opinion, but rather a network that reaffirms already made opinions regardless of accuracy or lack of.

The fact of the matter is that social media vis a vis academic outlets have more power and influence in shaping people’s views; the median voter does not look facts in an objective way to shape his or her opinion, the median voter rather selects facts or opinions that validate or support his or her already held beliefs about the “truth” about the border that helps him or her to act-that is practical wisdom. The U.S. election shows that almost half of the American voters and regions such as Midwestern states, where the rustbelt is located and affected by globalization forces, do indeed hold negative views of Mexico in general and NAFTA and the border in particular. Then they are willing to support policies reinforcing borders in the form of walls and fences to protect and/or regain their symbolic power and identity.

Is it Desirable? And what can be Done?

This section combines the two questions because they cannot be look at separate; the answer to whether the trend and direction is desirable or no is linked to the strategies and actions that need to follow. The answer to the question of whether is desirable is a matter of deliberation as Aristotle would suggest. Desirability, in addition to perception and reason, is one of the three aspects associated with the “soul” that leads to action, and “the origin of action is choice and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end” (^{Aristotle, 2009, p. 103}).

Trade and environment were important elements of the border narrative and policies, from the 1980s until the events of 09/11, providing some cohesion and galvanizing action based upon cooperation and a common end. NAFTA and the creation of environmental institutions such as the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) are examples of the border governance based upon agreed goals and ends. However, since 09/11 it has become more difficult to reach an agreement about goals and ends; the border and its symbolic meaning is an example of a “wicked” problem (^{Blanco, 1994, pp. 21-25}), where neither the goals are agreed to nor social technologies to solve the problems are known; therefore, the only way out of the dilemma is through deliberation. The fact of the matter is that the narrative that has prevailed is the one advanced by the “security-industrial complex” that the border is a threat and out of control (^{Slack et al., 2016}). Therefore, the desirable action would be to create a narrative that becomes a counter power (^{Foucault, 1980, pp. 134-145}) to be able to compete successfully in the arenas (government bureaucracies, legislatures, congress, courts, elections, etc.) where truth about the border is being deliberated and settled.

There is a need to create an alternative narrative that will lead us toward a state where the border is seen as an asset or resource (^{Sohn, 2014}) important for capitalism and capital accumulation under globalization, therefore, emphasizing “port-operation” rather than “between-port” interdiction operations (^{Heyman, 2012, pp. 263-264}), and where civil and human rights of people are respected (^{Pallitto & Heyman, 2008, pp. 327-329}). In summary, a seamless border based on relational spatial relations and spaces of flows that produced shared symbolisms; instead of a material Euclidian border that emphasizes geographical physical barriers and separation. How can this desire be reached?

One strategy is to make knowledge produced in academia more relevant; not only based on sound scientific principles, but also useful in the arenas of deliberation. It is imperative to create an alternative discourse. Science and research centers can be important resources to deploy to create a different narrative; the Centers of Excellence can be employed not only to study security issues but ways to cooperate. Mexico, in the last decades, has built considerable human capital through academic institutions such as El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Universidad Autónoma de Baja California (UABC), Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez (UACJ) among others located at the border. Mexican and U.S. institutions along border’ states need to be not only centers of knowledge production but also part of the discussion in the deliberation arenas in order to influence narratives. Border research needs to be based on partnerships and intersubjective research strategies that would allow border researchers to hear and learn from other perspectives and each other.

Another strategy is to explore and replicate the Erasmus program implemented by the European Union to promote cross-border and transnational education programs, so citizens in both countries can learn from each other, and find that there are more things that bring us together than separate us. I am not aware of dual degree programs related to public policy making that would allow professionals across the border to learn how things work on both sides of the border. There is an online program offered by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte about U.S.-Mexico Border Studies whose goal is to train people that understand the border and can offer policy solutions. Therefore, there is a lack of understanding of policy process by both sides; this kind of knowledge is needed to advance a coherent agenda by binational and bicultural border people. There have been some efforts of dual degree programs that have not been sustained; for instance, a program between UABC and San Diego State University to offer a joint degree on border planning and administration. It is important to develop binational degree programs to train future leaders and policy specialists that would offer new narratives. An intermediate stage perhaps could be to increase academic exchange among faculty and students, dual credits, etc. It is important to develop cross-border human capital that would be the means not only to build a transnational professional bureaucracy but also to facilitate and influence action in the deliberative arenas.

Last strategy but not for that least important is what Mexico can do in alliance with other powerful actors. I argue that Mexico’s view on sovereignty needs to be reconceptualized and stop acting as a “sensitive porcupine” (^{Davidow, 2004}, pp. xi-xvii) that reacts to any minor action, and move beyond victimization discourses towards a more pragmatic approach and exercise whatever soft power (i.e. positive views the world holds of the country) it holds (^{Meyer, 2016}). It is necessary to move beyond the Estrada’ Doctrine based upon the notion of sovereignty respect and rights to self-determination of each nation and non-intervention. It is important to lobby and offer a different narrative, in the deliberation arenas where truths are formed, to the one portrayed by the “security-industrial complex”. Mexico can learn a great deal from Israel. ^{Silva-Herzog (2016}) in an editorial puts the topic in a very eloquent way, regarding Trump’s narrative, saying that the: Mexican government [previous to the election] has not been capable of defending an association, that is beneficial for both nations, and that also poses complex challenges. Calling names or adjectives to the aggressor [Donald Trump] is not what it is about.

In order to defend this beneficial association is necessary to form partnerships with multinational corporations, congressmen pro-Mexico and pro-NAFTA, state governors, etcetera; all the stakeholders around NAFTA and more fluid borders to become a counter power to the “security-industrial complex.