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Diánoia
versión impresa ISSN 0185-2450
Diánoia vol.50 no.54 Ciudad de México may. 2005
Artículos
El concepto de lo innato en la psicología evolucionista
1Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. clga@servidor.unam.mx
Se revisa aquí la literatura correspondiente a algunas disciplinas cognoscitivas evolucionistas, y se muestra que existe por lo menos una connotación importante asociada al término “innato” como se usa en estas disciplinas; a saber, la que entiende lo innato como aquello que es producto de la evolución por selección natural. Después se examinan tres propuestas recientes que caracterizan lo innato usando conceptos e ideas de la biología y se concluye que, aun cuando las caracterizaciones de lo innato que proponen André Ariew y William Wimsatt recogen aquella connotación evolucionista, éstas deben rechazarse, puesto que tienen problemas conceptuales serios o bien son incompatibles con otras connotaciones importantes de lo innato en esas disciplinas cognoscitivas evolucionistas. Se expone que la tercera propuesta -la propia- no tiene los problemas de las anteriores y sí muchas de sus ventajas.
Palabras clave: ciencias cognoscitivas; biología; canalización; atrincheramiento generativo
Some of the literature pertaining to certain evolutionary cognitive disciplines is here reviewed.It is shown that there is at least one important connotation associated to the term “innate” as it is used in those disciplines; to wit, that an innate feature is one which is the product of evolution by natural selection. Then three recent proposals are examined characterizing innateness through concepts and ideas from biology -i.e., André Ariew’s, William Wimsatt’s and mine- and conclude that, although Ariew’s and Wimsatt’s proposals capture the aforementioned evolutionary connotation, they must be rejected since they either have serious internal problems, or else are incompatible with other important connotations associated to the term innate in evolutionary cognitive disciplines. It is also shown in this paper that my proposal does not share the problems that the previous ones had, but does share some of their advantages.
Key words: cognitive sciences; biology; canalization; generative entrenchment
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Recibido: 19 de Agosto de 2003; Aprobado: 01 de Febrero de 2005
Este es un artículo publicado en acceso abierto bajo una licencia Creative Commons
