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El trimestre económico

versión On-line ISSN 2448-718Xversión impresa ISSN 0041-3011

Resumen

MACIAS, Antonio J.  y  ROMAN, Francisco J.. Consecuencias económicas de la Reforma de Gobierno Corporativo en un mercado de capitales emergente. Pruebas de México. El trimestre econ [online]. 2014, vol.81, n.322, pp.357-412. ISSN 2448-718X.

We examine the efficacy of voluntary and mandated changes in the corporate governance of Mexican firms, which were part of a comprehensive set of governance reforms aimed at improving corporate governance, as well as accountability to outside investors. Such reform initiated with the enactment of a Code of Best Corporate Practices and was followed by legal mandates, which required fundamental changes in the structure of corporate boards. First, we investigate the extent of compliance with both the Code and legal mandates to determine if firms changed their governance systems. Then, we examine whether positive changes in governance (if realized) are associated with better firm performance and higher valuations. Our findings indicate that compliance with the Code and the legal mandates improved markedly over time. However, such positive changes in governance are not associated with an improvement in the performance (greater ROAs) or valuations (Tobin’s Q) of all firms. Firms with a lower concentration of insider ownership do exhibit some improvements in performance. We attribute these findings in large part to the inherent intricacies in the ownership structure of firms and the legal environment prevailing in Mexico. Our view is that the high concentration of insider ownership and the weak legal protection afforded to minority shareholders are major obstacles to any effective reform. Without a demonstrated commitment to make substantial changes in either, it is unlikely that there will be any discernible improvements in either corporate governance or in the investment climate in Mexico.

Palabras llave : gobierno corporativo; reforma de gobierno corporativo; mercados financieros internacionales; políticas y regulación de gobierno; protección a inversionistas.

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