Resumen

RAMIREZ, José Carlos  y  ROCHIN RUIZ, Mercurio. ¿Existe una manera de competencia definida en el mercado de las Afore?. El trimestre econ [online]. 2014, vol.81, n.321, pp.133-162. ISSN 2448-718X.

This paper aims at modeling Afore’s strategies which are addressed to retain the largest number of pensioners with different income levels in a cost competition setting. In doing so, we simulate a non-cooperative static two stages game to model competition between M ≥ 1 leaders and N followers by using a generalized Nash-Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium (GNCSE). The main findings state that: 1) competition among Afore is not only defined by an GNCSE (which performs well at explaining Afores performance for intermediate income levels); 2) when dealing with extreme income levels, it is advisable to analyze agents as price-fixing competitors -in low income ranks- or as non-price-quantity competitors -in high income ranks- instead of as quantity Stackelberg oligopolists; and 3) there is no a direct relationship between the number agents and pensioner’s welfare in Mexico’s Afore market.

Palabras llave : Afore; estrategias competitivas; equilibrio generalizado de Nash-Cournot-Stackelberg; bienestar del afiliado.

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