Resumo

RICCARDO MORGANTI, Paolo. Price Transparency and Tacit Collusion in the Gasoline Industry in Mexico. Anál. econ. [online]. 2020, vol.35, n.90, pp.221-228.  Epub 15-Abr-2021. ISSN 2448-6655.

Despite the introduction of new retailers in the Mexican gasoline industry in 2018, retail margins remain high regardless of the low international oil prices. This article introduces a theoretical model in which price transparency reinforces tacit collusion among retailers rather than favoring a competitive environment. Counterintuitively, the government should strive to implement price Obfuscation rather than Transparency, in order to promote socially beneficial price wars.

Palavras-chave : Transparency; Tacit Collusion; Competition Policy; Cartels; L13; L40.

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