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On-line version ISSN 2007-9869Print version ISSN 1870-6622


ACCINELLI, Elvio; LONDON, Silvia; PUNZO, Lionello F.  and  SANCHEZ CARRERA, Edgar J.. Complementariedades dinámicas, eficiencia y equilibrio de Nash en un modelo de firmas y trabajadores. EconoQuantum [online]. 2009, vol.6, n.1, pp.165-184. ISSN 2007-9869.

In this paper we show the evolution of an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (high-skilled and low-skilled). Workers' decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and depend on the initial distribution of the firms. There exists a continuous of high level steady states and only one low level state which is asymptotically stable. There exists a threshold number of the initial firms, which once overcame leads to the basin of attraction of one of the high level equilibria. We show that at each high level equilibrium, there exists a mix of innovative and non-innovative firms, as well as a combination of high-skilled and non-skilled workers. Instead, if the initial percentage of innovative firms is lower than the threshold value, then the economy evolves towards a low level equilibrium wholly composed of non-innovative firms and low-skilled workers.

Keywords : Comportamientos imitativos; trampas de pobreza; complementariedades estratégicas; juego normal de dos poblaciones; valor umbral.

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