Resumen

ARMESTO, Alejandra  y  OLMEDA, Juan C.. Legislative Opposition and political patronage. Public Sector Wages in Mexican States (2001-2012). Región y sociedad [online]. 2018, vol.30, n.71. ISSN 2448-4849.  https://doi.org/10.22198/rys.2018.71.a773.

This article argues that political patronage depends on the opposition’s bargaining strength in Congress. This hypothesis is tested by analyzing Mexican state governments’ public spending on salaries. Statistical information on public sector’s salary per capita for the period 2001-2012 is combined with data from the survey of state policy experts in Mexico, and which takes into consideration the opposition’s strength and influence on state legislatures. The analysis specifies linear hierarchical models and shows that the patronage level will be higher the more limited the executive branch by the legislative opposition. These findings contribute a hypothesis to studies concerning patronage and the relationship between the opposition in Congress and the Executive.

Palabras llave : political patronage; political competition; Executive-Legislative bargaining; subnational policy; Mexico.

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