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VIGO, Alejandro G.. The erroneous conscience: From Socrates to Thomas Aquinas. Sig. Fil [online]. 2013, vol.15, n.29, pp.09-37. ISSN 1665-1324.

In the realm of moral action, the socratic principle nobody errs willingly implies that the rational agent always chooses to do what he/she takes to be good or better for himself/herself: his/her choice is internally rational. Socrates' view of the connection between error and self-deception is a major contribution to western philosophy. The application of this view to the particular case of moral error has important consequences concerning the possibility of motivational conflict. Not only Plato and Aristotle but also Aquinas are strongly influenced by Socrates in their views concerning the structure of moral conscience.

Keywords : Self-deception; moral conscience; error; internal rationality.

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