versión impresa ISSN 1665-1324
TRUEBA ATIENZA, Carmen. La teoría aristotélica de las emociones. Sig. Fil [online]. 2009, vol.11, n.22, pp. 147-170. ISSN 1665-1324.
Strictly speaking, Aristotle did not formulate a theory of the emotions, but we find indications of one in several of his treatise. Many studies about his conception of the emotions lose sight of the fact that the Aristotelian analysis of the passions or emotions in every theoretical context responds to a particular philosophical interest and to a specific problem, and they tend to reduce the Aristotelian concept of pathe to one of its components without taking into account the many approaches to the issue, which offer up a very rich and complex perspective of the passions or emotions. My purpose is to reconstruct the core of the Aristotelian theory of the emotions based in the diferent approaches to the issue that are dispersed throughout the corpus, and the analysis and discussion of the more current interpretive positions. I analize the different components of the emotions, particularly the physiological processes and sensations of pleasure and pain, as well as diverse states and cognitive processes, and I discuss the main interpretative positions, specially the extreme cognitive perspective of Martha Nusbaum. Lastly, I offer a moderate cognitive interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of the emotions.
Palabras llave : emotion or passion (path); sensation (aisthsis); impression (phantasía); belief (doxa); cognotivism.