Resumo

ATILANO-ROBLES, Edwin. Legislative cooperation between opposition and government in Mexico. A time-series análisis. Perf. latinoam. [online]. 2022, vol.30, n.59.  Epub 28-Abr-2023. ISSN 0188-7653.  https://doi.org/10.18504/pl3059-010-2022.

Why do opposition parties vote in favor of presidential bill initiatives when they apparently have no incentive to cooperate? Scholarly literature has suggested that opposition cooperation in a presidential regime is unlikely, especially when there are not portfolio coalitions. However, empirical evidence shows that opposition parties in Mexico tend to approve presidential bill initiatives extensively. To explain this dynamic, I argue that opposition cooperation may depend on when the initiative is approved and whether it is an initiative that increases redistribution. This is tested through several time-series models and the results point in the direction of my argument.

Palavras-chave : cooperation; legislative opposition; Mexico; Cámara de Diputados; time-series; presidential initiatives.

        · resumo em Espanhol     · texto em Espanhol     · Espanhol ( pdf )