Abstract

VILATTA, Emilia. Intentional Ascription in Cases of Schizophrenia: A Davidsonian Perspective. Tópicos (México) [online]. 2017, n.53, pp.11-49. ISSN 0188-6649.

Currently, there is an ongoing discussion regarding the possibility to extend Donald Davidson's account of intentional ascription to cases of deluded subjects suffering different psychiatric disorders. Particularly, regarding to severe cases of schizophrenia, some authors have claimed that, due to the irrational thinking and behavior of these subjects, they cannot satisfy rationality constrains to be considered intentional agents. Therefore, in these cases, it cannot be even possible to identify mental contents of their delusions. In this paper, I will challenge this view and, by linking the debate about animal rationality and rationality in subjects with schizophrenia, I will argue that, once revised and qualified some principles of Davidson's approach, it can be gradually and legitimately extended to delusional subjects suffering schizophrenia, even in severe cases. In addition, I will propose two methodological strategies that are able to produce evidence in favor of the attribution of -at least-some simple beliefs to these subjects, without having stopped treating them as agents with some degree of intentionality.

Keywords : intentional ascription; Donald Davidson; delusions; schizophrenia.

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