Resumen

CRUZ BARBA, Evangelina. Loyalty filters and curriculum election in the tourism profession. Acta univ [online]. 2019, vol.29, e1950.  Epub 10-Ene-2020. ISSN 2007-9621.  https://doi.org/10.15174/au.2019.1950.

A game theory model is presented under the agency-principal approach in order to analyze the process of curriculum choice under the credit system schedule in the BA in tourism at the University of Guadalajara. Considering asymmetric information, the previous knowledge and the labor experiences, the students choose their academic pathway (academic option) in order to maximize their benefits. They have two options: option S, the traditional one; and option P, the alternative. However, the students have loyalty filters affecting their decision. The solution to this game is given by the signaling. The students choose the option with the best reputation considering the available information, their loyalty filters, and the way in which the cognitive maximization is given. It is assumed that the manifestation of the biases in the election may originate a rupture between the curricular choice and the labor market.

Palabras llave : Economics of education; agency theory; professional election; academic pathway; tourism.

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