Resumo

CALVENTE, Sofía Beatriz. [David Hume and the Distinction between Speculative and Experimental Philosophy]. Diánoia [online]. 2018, vol.63, n.81, pp.109-131. ISSN 0185-2450.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704913e.2018.81.1574.

Abstract: A persistent criticism of the distinction between empiricism and ra-tionalism has provoked the emergence of new distinctions in order to under-stand modern philosophy in a more adequate way. One of those distinctions is that between speculative and experimental philosophy. My aim is to evalu-ate the validity of this distinction for eighteenth-century experimental moral philosophy in general and for Hume’s thought in particular. I will show that if this distinction is understood in exclusive terms, then it cannot be adequate because Hume himself states that speculation is what defines philoso-phy. Hume also proposes a reconciliation between experimental practice and theoretical activity instead of considering that they are mutually exclusive. Finally, I will make clear that what Hume condemns as “false philosophy” is not a synonym for speculative philosophy.

Palavras-chave : early modern philosophy; experimental method; empiricism; experience; false philosophy.

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