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RAMOS-ALARCON, Luis. Two Concepts of Freedom and Two Concepts of Responsibility in Spinoza. Diánoia [online]. 2015, vol.60, n.75, pp.105-128. ISSN 0185-2450.

Spinoza sustains that the agents' decisions are necessary because they are causally determined. But then, are humans really moral agents? Is it possible that they are only passengers in a train of causes, whose course they cannot control and exempts them from the consequences of their acts, of reward or punishment? Is accepting whatever happens and quitting the aspiration of changing things the hallmark of the free man? This paper answers these questions by distinguishing two concepts of freedom, real freedom and free will, as well as two concepts of responsibility. Civil responsibility is grounded in free will, whereas moral responsibility is not grounded in true freedom, but in human power (potestas).

Palavras-chave : necessity; determination; decision; possibility; Ethics.

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