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FERNANDEZ, Miguel Ángel. Are the Nature and Value of Understanding Problematic for Veritism?. Diánoia [online]. 2010, vol.55, n.65, pp.151-173. ISSN 0185-2450.

This paper examines a series of recent objections to veritistic epistemology that aim to show that it cannot account for the nature and value of understanding. Section 1 formulates the central tenets of veritistic epistemology and makes a few more preliminary remarks. Sections 2 and 3 discuss objections that attempt to show that cognitive states implicated in understanding have a sui generis nature which makes the veritistic model of evaluation inapplicable to them. Sections 4 and 5 examine objections that aim to show that there are aspects of understanding which are epistemically valuable, whose value cannot be explained in veritistic terms. Section 6 sums up results of the discussion: none of the objections discussed succeeds in revealing any explanatory deficit of veritism with respect to the nature and value of understanding.

Palabras llave : veritistic epistemology; epistemic value; cognitive ability; explanation; sistematicity.

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