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Diánoia

versão impressa ISSN 0185-2450

Resumo

ZINGANO, Marco. Aristotle and the Proof that Being Is Not a Genus (Metaphysics III 3). Diánoia [online]. 2010, vol.55, n.65, pp. 41-65. ISSN 0185-2450.

In this paper, my aim is to investigate some features of the way in which Aristotle argues for his basic tenet that being is not a genus in Metaphysics III 3. The argument proves to be rather restricted, as it operates with premises specifying very special conditions for a good definition in accordance with the genus-plus-differentia pattern. It is argued then that this strong dependence on premises stemming from very specific philosophical schools accounts for its rather mitigated reception already in Antiquity, beginning with Alexander of Aphrodisias.

Palavras-chave : homonymy; genus; being; general principles.

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