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Diánoia

Print version ISSN 0185-2450

Abstract

VIGO, Alejandro G.. Aristotle's Conception of Practical Syllogism: In Defense of a Restrictive View. Diánoia [online]. 2010, vol.55, n.65, pp.3-39. ISSN 0185-2450.

This paper presents a new set of textual and systematic arguments for a restrictive view of Aristotle's conception of the so called practical syllogism. According to this view, the aristotelian practical syllogism constitutes a structure aiming to explain the production of voluntary animal movement and human action, in terms of a specific version of the desire-belief schema. Consequently, practical syllogism should not be confused with other forms of practical reasoning like deliberative syllogism or deontic syllogism. The examples used by Aristotle are discussed, showing how they are best understood according to the proposed interpretation.

Keywords : Aristotle; practical syllogism; voluntary movement; action.

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