Resumo

MONTERO BAGATELLA, Juan Carlos. Equilibrios políticos en las entidades federativas. Estud. polít. (Méx.) [online]. 2010, n.21, pp.159-180. ISSN 0185-1616.

This article analyse the concentration and dispersion of political power in the Mexican states, indentifying the incentives to enforce real checks and balances over the executive. It analyzes the local legislative's integration, complementing the scope with the Effective Parties Number and the electoral results from the governor's elections. In conclusion it shows that the absence of checks and balances derives from the absence of the plurality in local congresses, reinforcing the incentives for not changing political institutions.

Palavras-chave : Political coalitions; checks and balances; political incentives; institutional change.

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