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vol.52 número154Sometimes some things don’t (really) exist: pragmatic meinongism and the referential sub-problem of negative existentials índice de autoresíndice de materiabúsqueda de artículos
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Crítica (México, D.F.)

versión impresa ISSN 0011-1503

Resumen

RIZZO, Julio De. The ground of all negative existential truths. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2020, vol.52, n.154, pp.129-148.  Epub 06-Sep-2021. ISSN 0011-1503.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1177.

A natural proposal for the grounds of negative existential truths, such as that Vulcan does not exist, states that these truths are grounded in the totality truth affirming the existence of every existent thing together with the truth that they are all. In this paper I will put forward three objections to straightforward formulations of this idea, and argue that a change in the usual grammar of grounding claims, allowing for pluralities of sentences to express not only grounds, but also groundees, is effective in making the account immune to the objections raised.

Palabras llave : metaphysical explanation; many-many grounding; existence; relevance; totality.

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