Resumo

VIDAL, Javier. Reply to Sebastián: in Defense of the Conscious Nature of First-Person Beliefs. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2018, vol.50, n.150, pp.65-89.  Epub 12-Maio-2020. ISSN 0011-1503.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.16.

In this journal, I argued for the conscious nature of first-person beliefs (2014). In a more recent paper, Miguel Ángel Sebastián (2017) tried to show that such an argument is unsound. Here I address his three core criticisms. Firstly, I maintain that my argument is valid if to know a first-person belief consists in believing one has it. Likewise, I defend that no damaging infinite regression of conscious higher-order beliefs is involved. Further, I argue that the notion of consciousness at stake is the relevant notion for discussion about the nature of consciousness and the unconscious. Finally, I examine the justification for the principle (SC*) in order to show that it does not beg the question.

Palavras-chave : consciousness; accessibility; higher-order belief; unconscious belief; cognitive dynamics.

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