Resumen

ARRIETA, Agustín  y  VICENTE, Agustín. David Hume’s Moral Pluralism. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2013, vol.45, n.134, pp.17-42.  Epub 17-Abr-2020. ISSN 0011-1503.

In this paper, we argue for an objectivist pluralist interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy. We begin by approaching the pluralist/relativist distinction in aesthetics. Then we move to ethics, and present some reasons which justify considering Hume a normative pluralist, and, in particular, an objectivist pluralist. Our argument will make use of Hume's idea that there are four sources of value, and of his notion of artificial lives/moralities.

Palabras llave : objectivist pluralism; relativism; artificial/natural morality; sources of value; aesthetic relativism.

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