Resumen

VILANOVA ARIAS, Javier. Petitio principii, ad ignorantiam y fundamentación del conocimiento. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2011, vol.43, n.127, pp.27-57.  Epub 06-Jun-2020. ISSN 0011-1503.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2011.851.

In this paper I examine the problem of circularity in the justification of knowledge from the point of view of argumentation theory. I introduce the expression founding argument for the arguments we use to try to prove that we know, and explain the classical account of the two fallacies that may be committed: ad ignorantiam and petitio principii. A new definition of both fallacies, based on recent work in the theory of argumentation, is used to show that not every founding argument is fallacious.

Palabras llave : argumentation; argument circularity; begging the question; epistemic justification.

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