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Summary:
I. Introduction. II. The possibility of the judge to appreciate supervening facts, incorporated by the passive subject, in the historical sources that influenced the Chilean civil procedural codifier. III. The possibility of the judge to assess supervening facts in Chilean civil procedure. IV. Conclusions. V. References.
I. Introduction
The procedural concept of new facts or of newly discovered events, recognized in some continental Procedure Codes -also known as Adjective Codes-,2 is not a modern legislative creation but rather the result of the institution’s gradual evolution within various procedural models, with roots in the post-classical Roman procedure of the Justinian era. However, the direct transmission of this legal figure to modern law comes from medieval Castilian legislation. In this sense, the Hispanic legislator established a tool that allows the judge to appreciate supervening facts throughout the process, mitigating the consequences of fatal deadlines. Bearing this in mind, we will observe the close relationship between the defendant’s opportunity for defense and the institution under consideration, which operates as an element that mitigates the effects of the general principle of the doctrine of lis pendens, allowing the judge to appreciate the factual substratum that has arisen during the process, thereby broadening the subject matter of the trial. In contrast to the above and considering the location assigned to the institution in some procedural codes, new or newly discovered evidence are addressed with from an evidentiary perspective,3 which causes some inconsistencies or difficulties in the application of the institution.
An example of this is Chilean Civil Procedural Law, in which the legislator establishes the institution in article 321 of the Código de Procedimiento Civil, causing procedural doctrine to study the matter from an evidentiary perspective, consistent with the rule’s within the title “De la prueba en general” of the Código de Procedimiento Civil. In this scenario, at first glance, there is no conscious relationship between the concept and the subject matter of the trial perhaps, as a possible mechanism to avoid the effects of the general principle of lis pendens.4 In this aspect, for some authors, the procedural figure operates in response to the occurrence of controversial facts during the evidentiary phase, perhaps motivated by the terms used by the legislator, that is to say, “[...] cuando dentro del término probatorio ocurre algún hecho substancialmente relacionado con el asunto que se ventila” (Casarino, 2009; Ramírez, 2019; Orellana, 2009). Similarly, the rule applies to the existence of disputed facts that arose previously, but were not alleged in a timely manner, due to ignorance of them (Anabalón, 2015; Rodríguez, 2010). The relevant aspect, from the perspective under examination are the disputed facts; in broad terms, adding elements to the judicial resolution that admits the case to its evidentiary phase. In a slightly different sense, Diego Palomo, an author who considers that after the judicial resolution that admits the case to the evidentiary stage, facts may occur or become known that are relevant (substantially related) to the object of the judicial process (Bordalí et al., 2014, p. 267). As we have pointed out, there is no counterpoint with relevant aspects such as the general principle of lis pendens,5 or the restrictions related to the definition of the subject matter of the trial. Moreover, does the Chilean rule allow the allegation of any disputed fact, or is it relevant if this factual element contributes to the resolution of the matter in dispute, or can the judge appreciate new factual background, despite the general principle of lis pendens, and procedural preclusion?
In contrast to the above, Sophia Romero considers that the procedural figure established in the cited article 321 (Romero, 2021, pp. 118-119), is one of the hypotheses that allows for the introduction of factual judgements that are relevant to the prosecution, which have occurred during the trial, either to alter the petitions or the grounds for them in the way they were originally formulated, or to highlight the lack of action in the process (Romero, 2021, p. 115).
According to the author, these facts usually occur outside the discussion phase, once it has been exhausted, which requires the parties and the judge to be attentive to the phenomenon of mutatio libelli, which is generally prohibited according to the effect of preclusion (Romero, 2021, p. 116).
The outlined difficulties become more complex in the Chilean labour courts, a judicial process in which the institution’s applicability (Cortez et al., 2021; Utman, 2011) is the subject of lengthy debate, considering the legislative silence on the matter. It is noteworthy that in the reflections made by those who defend its applicability, some justify the incorporation of new means of evidence into the process by applying the aforementioned article 321 in a supplementary manner, ruling out the possibility of incorporating new facts based on the strict application of procedural preclusion (Fernández, 2020, p. 493), departing from the wording of the aforementioned legal text (Fernández, 2020, p. 411). Similarly, Chilean case law addresses the issue diffusely, lacking uniformity. This has led to interpretations that allow the incorporation, based on the adjective norm, of new means of evidence aimed at proving facts that are already part of the subject matter of the trial (Bordalí et al., 2014, pp. 269 a 270). On other occasions, article 321 is interpreted restrictively, maintaining that this procedural figure, even in civil trials, is only applicable to witness evidence (Bordalí et al., 2014, p. 270).
In this scenario, it seems relevant to us to examine the new facts or newly discovered events, as a possible mechanism that allows the judge to appreciate supervening facts, considering the material reality relevant to resolve the conflict that is the object of the process, attempting to reconcile this idea with the general principle of lis pendens and procedural preclusion. In turn, once the above has been determined, perhaps we can contribute elements to the problem of the possible supplementary application of the Chilean adjective norm to the process developed in the labour courts in that country.
II. The possibility of the judge to appreciate supervening facts, incorporated by the passive subject, in the historical sources that influenced the Chilean civil procedural codifier
1. Roman law
The possibility for the defendant to allege supervening facts during the civil process is not an original creation of modern codifiers, but rather the product of a progressive evolution of various procedural models that influenced the legislative reception of some continental civil processes, such as the Chilean one. At first glance, this procedural system shows elements inherited from the medieval canonical Roman procedure, which transmitted the tradition of the post-classical Roman cognition procedure, departing from the rigidity of the formulary procedure. By way of contrast, in the formulary procedure, exceptions had to be incorporated into the formula at a defined procedural moment, the in iure stage, which prevented the judge from appreciating supervening facts that arose after this stage had been exhausted. This was the case, except in bona fides iudiciae, where the defendant exercised the in integrum restitutio (Arangio-Ruiz, 1986, p. 152; Kaser, 1982, p. 363; Scialoja, 1954, p. 382), or if the defendant opted to allege a mere defense, which could be raised later, without the need to include it in the formula (Palermo, 1956, p. 87).
In contrast, in the Justinian model, the formula disappears, impacting the classical notion of exceptio, (Savigny, 1879, p. 111; Lenel, 2007, p. 60) which departs from a technical conception based on the conditions of condemnation or that type of defense founded on an independent right belonging to the defendant (Savigny, 1879, pp. 108-109). This new conception is broad, encompassing everything that serves the defense of the defendant (Kaser, 1982, pp. 386 a 389; Savigny, 1879, p. 111; Arangio-Ruiz,1986; D’Ors, 2008, p. 132; Alsina, 2018, p. 15).
In this context, with the disappearance of the formula, it was no longer necessary to incorporate exception in the in iure stage, expanding the opportunity to raise exceptions, primarily peremptory, and the facts on which they are based, which may be supervening (Scialoja, 1954, pp. 383 a 384). In this context, the defendant is enabled to raise peremptory exceptions beyond the litis contestation without preclusion of the defendant’s rights. This allows the judge to appreciate supervening facts that support a mere defense or a peremptory exception, even if they are presented at the appeal stage (Scialoja, 1954, p. 385).
The substantive basis for the expansion of the objective of the trial is related to the primacy of the substantive aspects of the obligation over formal aspects, with the focus being more on the debtor satisfying the creditor, regardless of when this occurs. This allows the debtor to fulfill the obligation during the course of the process, before the final judgment is issued (Cannata, 2001, pp. 67-68).
2. Castilian legislation
The post-classical Roman cognition procedure influenced the medieval Castilian procedural design, as reflected in various Alfonsine legislative sources. Thus, the Fuero Real establishes the defences that conclude the entire lawsuit (De Castilla, 1781, pp. 269-273), inspired by the Roman peremptory exceptions. Regarding the defendant’s defense, this source chooses to establish the response to the claim, without setting formal requirements for its submission or the timing for doing so.6 This allows us to argue that the defendant, in this model, had the freedom and flexibility to raise substantive exceptions at any stage of the trial, being able to base his defense on supervening facts.
The Espéculo, like the Fuero Real, distinguishes between defenses that delay the proceedings and those that completely resolve the lawsuit (Pérez, 2018, p. 307). Regarding the opportunity to assert the latter, Law 9° states:
Quales defensiones otras pueden poner despues que el pleito es contestado fasta que el juyzio sea dado, e como aquel que se alza puede mejorar en su defension antel juez del alzada, e poner otra de nuevo maguer non la aya primero puesto (Pérez, 2018, pp. 312-313).
From the transcribed passage we can highlight that substantive defenses can be asserted throughout the entire process, just as in the Fuero Real. Specifically, the opportunity extends from the beginning of the lawsuit with the response until before the judge issues a ruling, and it can even be asserted before the Court of Appeals. This allows the judge to consider the factual background that has arisen during the process. From a substantive perspective, the model is fully compatible with the defendant’s late compliance, allowing the avoidance of a fulfilment process with an uncertain outcome, which is also reflected in the Partidas, as we will see below.
Thirdly, Las Siete Partidas, while retaining the term defensiones, resort to Roman terminology, distinguishing between dilatory and peremptory defenses (De Castilla, 1843, pp. 78-80). Regarding the opportunity to assert substantive exceptions, Law 8° states:
Conocen a las vegadas los demandados, lo que les demandan en juyzio. Pero ponen luego defensiones ante si, que han pagado, o fecho aquello que les demandan, o que los demandadores les fizieron pleyto, que nunca gelo demandassen. E porende dezimos , que en tales razones como estas, o en otras semejantes dellas, que deue el Julgador dar plazo al demandado, a que prueue la defension, que ouiero puesta ante si. E si la prouare, deuel dar por quito de la demanda, e fazer que el demandador peche las costas, que ouiesse fecho el demandado en esta razon. E si al plazo que fuere puesto, non pudiere prouar la defension , denel dar por vencido de la demanda. (De Castilla, 1843, pp. 73-74)
Thus, like the previous sources under examination, the aforementioned law allows for the assertion of substantive exceptions at any stage of the process, with the judge bearing the duty to give the defendant time to prove such a defence, which can be based on supervening facts. We believe that this construction was aimed at achieving the defendant’s acquittal, intending to fully satisfy the claimant, thereby creating a mechanism to avoid the negative consequences of a slow and uncertain subsequent executory proceedings.
The defendant’s freedom to raise peremptory defences is restricted starting with the Ordenamiento de las Leyes de las Cortes de Alcalá de Henares -Ordenamiento de Alcalá de Henares, from now on-.7 This legal text, without altering the substantive aspects established in the Partidas, specified the procedural opportunity to respond to the lawsuit and to allege peremptory defenses. Regarding the latter, from Title 8, the sole law of the aforementioned Ordenamiento, is clear that the Castilian legislator limited the procedural opportunity to assert peremptory defences. Such defences must be alleged within 20 days following the response to the law suit and cannot be asserted afterward. This limitation is not absolute, allowing the legislator to assert them later if the said defense for some reason once again belongs to one of the parties, or if they have newly come to the attention of the one asserting them, making an oath that they were not known during those twenty days or earlier (De Castilla, 1847, p. 11).
This restriction is one of the measures adopted by the Castilian legislator, aimed at curbing the delay in processes, caused by the malpractice of litigating lawyers.8 Nevertheless, the legislator preserved a tool that allowed the judge to consider substantive exceptions based on real supervening facts, enabling the judge to acquit the defendant, on the basis of the examination of new factual backgrounds.
The laws of the Recopilación and Novísima Recopilación maintain the idea of limiting the procedural opportunity to assert substantive exceptions, although they broaden the cases of exception, defining a competent body to grant extensions of the aforementioned deadline.
Regarding this point, it follows from Law 1 of the Recopilación that peremptory exceptions will always be admitted if the defendant swears that they are asserted without malice. In this respect, the deadline will be extended by the Consejo or Oidores whenever, considering the quality of the case and the persons involved, or for any other reason, the justice for the defendant might otherwise perish (España, 1775, p. 573). This allowed the judge to consider supervening facts that support a substantive exception raised at any stage of the trial.
The examined model, oriented towards the expansion of the subject matter of the trial and compatible with the debtor’s late satisfaction of the claimant, does not change with the imposition of fatal deadlines. The legislative restrictions aimed to prevent the delay of processes caused by the abuses of judges and lawyers, although always preserving a mechanism that allowed the judge to consider supervening facts.
The Castilian model under examination is replicated by various forensic literary sources, such as the Curia Philipica or Febrero Novísimo, texts that guided the learning of the first South American jurists (Guzmán, 2005, pp. 362 a 363; González, 1954, pp. 171 y 172). Regarding the first text, by Juan de Hevia y Bolaños, it merges the ideas of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá and the laws of the Recopilación, estimating that peremptory exceptions must be raised within the 20 days that run after the nine days to respond to the claim, and not later, except if it is with an oath that they have newly come to the attention of the one who asserting them. In this case, the judge may admit them if they are asserted without malice, just as the same judge may order the party who asserting a peremptory exception in the specified case to pay costs if the said exception is not proven within the pertinent term (De Hevia, 1790, p. 74).
José Febrero, echoes the same ideas held by de Hevia, without major innovations (Febrero, 1829, p. 200).
3. The opinion of José Bernardo Lira
The Chilean jurist, who was the drafter of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th books of the draft Código de Procedimiento Civil of his country (Guzmán, 1991, pp. 347-348), expressed his opinion on the procedural opportunity to raise substantive exceptions. At first glance, the Chilean author breaks with the Castilian tradition, allowing peremptory exceptions to be raised only in the response to the lawsuit or within the following 20 days. If they are not raised within the specified time, the exceptions expire (Lira, 1895, pp. 143 y 144). However, the jurist retains a tool that makes his model more flexible, stating:
Las excepciones perentorias deben proponerse en la contestación misma de la demanda, como ordinariamente se hace, o hasta veinte días después de ella. Pero, si bien, pasado este término, no pueden ya oponerse formalmente, todavía es permitido, antes de la sentencia definitiva, aducir hechos nuevos que extingan el derecho del actor y justificarlos con la confesión del mismo o con documentos presentados en la forma legal y aun con testigos, si este medio de prueba es admisible en el juicio y no ha pasado todavía su período. Así lo exigen la justicia y la equidad; así lo practican también los tribunales, siguiendo el precepto de la ley, que anteponiendo el fondo a la forma del juicio, les manda atender en la decisión de los pleitos más a la verdad probada en autos que a las meras formalidades del Derecho.
Pueden también reservarse estas excepciones para aducirlas en segunda instancia (Lira, 1895, pp. 210-211).
In other words, Lira preserves the spirit of the rule that allows the defendant to present his peremptory exceptions, even after the specified deadline, before the final judgment is issued, provided a new fact arises that extinguishes the claimant’s right. This can even be materialized at the appellate stage appeal. In this case, the jurist explicitly mentions new facts as the basis for a new substantive defense aimed at extinguishing the plaintiff’s right.
From the sources examined, we can see that in the historical procedural models, which influenced some procedural codifiers, such as the Chilean one, the opportunity to oppose substantive defenses was broad, and could be justified by supervening facts. Despite the legislative restrictions on the said opportunity, the Castilian legislator retained a suitable mechanism for the defendant to incorporate new factual backgrounds that would justify a substantive defense aimed at extinguishing the claimant’s right, consolidated in an acquittal judgement. This conception, transmitted by forensic sources and recognized by José Bernardo Lira himself, influences the reception of article 321 of the Chilean Código de Procedimiento Civil, a text which, despite its location, retains the Castilian tradition, conceiving new facts or newly discovered facts as a mechanism to add factual background that support a new substantive defense, expanding the institution, adding the plaintiff of the trial as the petitioner. From a substantive perspective, the tradition inherited from post-classical Roman law is preserved, retaining a mechanism within the process that allows the debtor to satisfy the creditor. In this way, it avoids reaching an executory process, which is slow and uncertain in its outcome.
III. The possibility of the judge to assess supervening facts in Chilean civil procedure
1. The general principle of lis pendens, and the immutability of the subject matter of the trial
The judge’s ability to assess supervening facts must be studied from the perspective of the general principle of lis pendens. This principle creates a fiction of immutability of the trial once the discussion period has been exhausted. In this scenario, the parties cannot alter the subject matter of the trial afterward, and the sentencing judge is prevented from assessing facts that have subsequently arisen. By virtue of the above, the judge must limit his assessment only to the facts debated by the litigants in the discussion period with the aim of resolving the conflict with the aim of resolving the conflict9; an idea taken up by the adagio lite pendete nihil innovetur.10
In this context, one of the effects of this immutability is the perpetuatio obiectus, which requires the invariability of the factual account provided by the litigants, thus preventing the process from failing due to extra-procedural changes avoiding possible violations of the right to defense as a result of such alterations.11
This immutability is not rigid and insurmountable, as the legislator retains certain mechanisms that allow the judge to assess supervening facts. In this regard, Giuseppe Chiovenda posits that in modern law, the judge not only evaluates the extinctive or impeding facts existing at the time of the filing of the lawsuit but also considers the facts that have arisen subsequently. Accordingly, the judge must acquit the defendant if the plaintiff’s right has been extinguished during the litigation, basing this solution on the Roman adage omnia iudicia absolutoria esse (Chiovenda, 2005, p. 171).
Despite the absence of Chilean legislation that explicitly includes the principle of lis pendens, there are certain rules that embody the concept of process immutability (Gonzalo Cortéz, 2022, p. 165). In this context, according to the Adjective Code, the parties present the factual substrate that define the subject matter of the trial during the discussion period.12 The legislator restricts the possibility of subsequently altering the principal facts of the trial, in accordante with the principle of lis pendens and the prohibition of mutatio libelli, a rule that is implemented in the process through the effect of preclusion, as established in article 64 of the aforementioned legal body.13
2. Exceptions to the immutability of litigation or dispute. The role of article 321 of the Adjective Code
The aforementioned immutability is not rigidly enforced in Chile. Similar to the Castilian legislator, the Chilean procedural legislator retains mechanisms that allow the parties to introduce supervening factual elements into the process, thereby expanding the scope of the trial. Among the exceptions to the principle of lis pendens is the rule established in Article 321 of the Código de Procedimiento Civil, which states:
No obstante lo dispuesto en el artículo anterior, es admisible la ampliación de la prueba cuando dentro del término probatorio ocurre algún hecho substancialmente relacionado con el asunto que se ventila.
Será también admisible la ampliación a hechos verificados y no alegados antes de recibirse a prueba la causa, con tal que jure el que los aduce que sólo entonces han llegado a su conocimiento.
The transcribed rule, which applies to the written procedural model of extensive knowledge, determines that when facts substantially related to the matter in dispute arise, the judge shall decree a special evidentiary term, allowing the judge to evaluate supervening facts. In this case, the legislator establishes two categories of facts, recognisable from the Ordenamiento de Alcalá de Henares, new facts and newly discovered facts.14 The first category of facts15 arises after the discussion period has closed, within the evidentiary term. If these factual elements are substantially related to the main issue, the judge may consider them, thus expanding the scope of the trial. Newly discovered facts, on the other hand, are not new factual elements, although they were unknown to the party alleging them during the process. In this scenario, although these factual elements were not alleged before the case was as admitted for evidence, the judge may assess them, if the party alleging them swears that they only then came to their knowledge.16 In both cases, the preclusive effect does not apply.
In Spain, the mutatio libelli does not operate with absolute rigidity in civil proceedings, allowing new or newly discovered facts to be alleged in accordance with article 286 of the LEC. In this regard, Castillejo notes:
Hoy la mutatio libelli no rige en el proceso civil con una rigidez absoluta. Ya fue excepcionada durante la vigencia de la derogada LEC, que permitía en el procedimiento civil ordinario la alegación de hechos nuevos en la comparecencia del juicio declarativo de menor cuantía -artículo 691.2.º-. Por su parte, el legislador de 2000 introduce la posibilidad de alegar hechos que no pudieron ser aducidos en la demanda o en la contestación, bien por tratarse de hechos nuevos, es decir, hechos acaecidos con posterioridad al momento procesal oportuno para introducir la pretensión, o bien por tratarse de hechos anteriores de los que las partes no habían tenido noticia en el momento de formular sus pretensiones en la demanda o contestación. (Castillejo, 2006, p. 62; De Miranda, 2017, pp. 28-30)
In Chile, the rule under examination expands the scope of the process, allowing for the inclusion of new factual elements that the judge can assess in the final judgment, despite the exhaustion of the discussion period, thereby mitigating the rigidity of the general principle of lis pendens. This allows for the incorporation of new facts into the process that are relevant to the resolution of the conflict. This approach is compatible with the debtor’s late fulfillment of an obligation, preventing such facts from forming the basis for a future exception in a subsequent enforcement process, thereby making the declaratory process, despite its slow pace, more efficient. Furthermore, despite the location of the provision under examination, given the supplementary nature of the ordinary trial of major claims, this mechanism allows for the expansion of the scope of the trial in other proceedings, enabling the inclusion of new factual elements, particularly in trials with reduced timelines for raising substantive defenses.
3. The factual substrate that the defendant can introduce into the process under article 321 of the Adjective Code
Considering the role of Article 321, which operates as one of the hypotheses of exception to the principle of lis pendens, allowing the judge to assess new factual backgrounds relevant to resolving the conflict, what type of supervening facts can the court consider under article 321? From the defendant’s perspective, we believe that the legally relevant facts for resolving the conflict are the extinctive facts,17 which are typically studied by procedural doctrine concerning the subject and burden of proof. De la Oliva, Díez-Picazo and Vegas address this category of facts as follows: “C) Hechos extintivos son aquellos que, acaecidos con posterioridad a los hechos constitutivos, suprimen o extinguen la eficacia jurídica de éstos. Por ejemplo, el pago de la deuda” (De la Oliva et al., 2021, p. 69).18
In the Chilean legal system, both constitutive and extinctive facts are contemplated in article 1698 of the Chilean Civil Code -also known as Substantive Code- (Bravo, 2013, p. 37), which establishes that the burden of proving the existence of obligations or their extinction falls on the party alleging them. Another category of facts, such as impeditive or modificatory facts, lack legal recognition, notwithstanding their penetration through the work of jurisprudence.19
This factual substrate determines the content of substantive defenses, a category of defense that may include extinctive, impeditive, or excluding facts.20 Given the above, and once the opportunity to raise substantive defenses has been exhausted, can we introduce new or newly discovered extinctive facts under article 321 of the Adjective Code?
As we have stated, the invariability of the factual substrate of the subject matter of the trial is not absolute; the legislator establishes some exceptions that allow the judge to consider supervening facts (Romero, 2021, p. 117). In this context, article 321 of the Código de Procedimiento Civil permits the incorporation of new facts or newly discovered facts, provided they are substantially related to the main issue, thus excluding the possibility of incorporating facts that justify a procedural exception or merely accessory matters. Conversely, we believe that extinctive or excluding facts that are substantially related to the matter at hand21 can indeed be alleged by the defendant under the aforementioned rule. If we deny this possibility,22 and strictly apply the principle of lis pendens, the court, by virtue of a legal fiction, cannot evaluate the new factual substrate, thereby upholding a claim whose basis23 has been extinguished during the course of the proceedings due to the loss of its objective element,24 causing the material essence of the claim to dissipate and leading to an unjust outcome.
4. The projection of article 321 of the Adjective Code in Chilean labour courts
The Chilean Código del Trabajo -also known as Labour Code- lacks specific regulation regarding the judge’s authority to assess new factual elements that emerge after the discussion period has ended. In this regard, Raúl Fernandez rejects this possibility, arguing that the assertion of facts requiring evidence must be made at the appropriate time as established by the legislator, in accordance with procedural preclusion (Fernández, 2020, p. 411). From an evidentiary perspective, the few Chilean authors who have addressed this issue focus on a different approach, omitting explicit references to the Adjective Code and opting to conduct a comparative exercise with the Código Procesal Penal or Law no. 19.968, texts that, while adopting a similar procedural design by hearings, are not a supplementary normative sources for the Código del Trabajo. Following this line of argument, the doctrine highlights the problems arising from rebuttal evidence (Cortez et al., 2021, p. 247), and new or newly discovered events, scenarios that lack labour regulation, this latter institution is understood in a different sense than previously examined, “entendiendo por tal a aquella que no pudo ofrecerse en la oportunidad procesal pertinente por ignorarse su existencia por las partes”.25 In other words, in this case, the focus is on the means of evidence not timely presented, which differs from the meaning established by the Adjective Code, which allows the judge to assess supervening factual backgrounds.
Regarding the possibility of admitting evidence not timely offered, there are authors who support the affirmative thesis. On this point, Felipe Utman believes that new evidence is admissible in cases of the parties’ unawareness of facts, as well as in the case of unawareness of the means of evidence, operating only in the context of serious and exceptional cases, in accordance with Articles 429 paragraph 1, 454 No. 9 paragraph 2 of the Labour Code, and Article 432 of the same text, which refers to Articles 321, 322, and 326 paragraph 2 of the Adjective Code on new evidence, as well as Article 159 of the same Code on measures to better resolve, among others (Utman, 2011, p. 643). In this line of reasoning, Diego Palomo believes that denying the possibility of incorporating evidence not timely requested, when its existence was unknown to the party seeking its incorporation, hinders the effective exercise of the right to evidence as part of due process. Therefore, he considers it necessary for the legislator to fill the aforementioned legislative gap (Cortez et al., 2021, p. 248). Raúl Fernandez, an author who rejects the option of the judge assessing supervening facts in the labour court, uses article 321 of the Adjective Code to justify the incorporation of new means of evidence, thereby distorting the institution under examination (Fernández, 2020, p. 493).
Conversely, it has been argued by some that the amendment to Law N° 20.260, which addresses specific cases in which evidence is admitted out of the hearing, excludes the possibility of admitting evidence other than that offered at the appropriate procedural moment (Cortez et al., 2021, p. 248). Similarly, the issue related to the procedural model by hearings is highlighted, which aims for both parties to be able to refute the evidence presented and properly exhibited, a capability that is compromised if new evidence is admitted during the process (Corte Suprema, 2011, p. 12). In this line of reasoning, non-uniform jurisprudence has rejected the admissibility of ev idence not timely offered, as it is not provided for by law. Additionally, it is considered impossible to apply the rules of the Adjective Code supplementarily, as they are deemed contrary to the principles governing labor proceedings (Cortez et al., 2021, p. 248). Corte de Apelaciones de Valparaíso has indicated on the matter:
Sexto: Que, en este marco, el legislador dispuso que la prueba en estos procedimientos judiciales debería ofrecerse en la audiencia preparatoria (Código del Trabajo, artículo 453), precluyendo el derecho de la parte si no se ofrece en esa oportunidad, sin disponer de otra instancia para ello.
Ello es, evidentemente, contrario a lo que ocurre en otros procedimientos judiciales, por ejemplo, en materia penal, en que el legislador estableció esa posibilidad en ciertas circunstancias especiales (Código Procesal Penal, artículos 278 y 336).
Séptimo: Que, lo anterior no se controvierte por lo dispuesto en el artículo 321 del Código de Procedimiento Civil, ya que, si bien el artículo 432 del Código del Trabajo establece la supletoriedad de las normas dispuestas en los Libros I y II de aquel Código, ello se sujeta, evidentemente, a la compatibilidad de los principios de éstas a aquellas, cuestión que evidentemente en este caso no acontece. Aún más, lo dispuesto en el artículo 321 se refiere a una cuestión diversa de lo planteado por la recurrente en este caso, ya que esta norma regula los supuestos de ampliación de la prueba, en el marco de un procedimiento escrito, rígido y de doble instancia, elementos que no concurren en la especie.26
The Court of Appeals of Valparaíso itself, citing Felipe Utman, has resolved in the opposite direction, stating:
3°) Que, para dilucidar el problema planteado, en primer término, cabe consignar la seguidilla de errores jurídicos contenidos en la resolución trascrita.
En primer lugar, yerra el tribunal al señalar que el Código del Trabajo no permite la incorporación de la institución de la prueba nueva al no estar consignada en dicho cuerpo normativo, olvidando lo dispuesto en el artículo 432 del referido código, que expresa “En todo lo no regulado en este Código o en leyes especiales, serán aplicables supletoriamente las normas contenidas en los Libros I y II del Código de Procedimiento Civil, a menos que ellas sean contrarias a los principios que informan este procedimiento”.
La prueba nueva se encuentra consagrada en el artículo 321 del Código de Procedimiento Civil que asienta “No obstante lo dispuesto en el artículo anterior, es admisible la ampliación de la prueba cuando dentro del término probatorio ocurre algún hecho substancialmente relacionado con el asunto que se ventila”, disposición que se encuentra ubicada precisamente en el Libro II del referido cuerpo normativo y, consecuentemente, de aplicación directa a los supuestos fácticos que nos convocan, debiendo colacionarse, además, los artículos 322 y 326 inciso segundo del mismo cuerpo normativo.
Por otra parte, no se advierte de qué manera la aplicación de la institución en examen podría vulnerar los principios formativos de la jurisdicción laboral puesto que, si existen antecedentes que permiten a una de las partes probar sus pretensiones, resulta inadmisible que se le impida ejercer sus derechos, máxime si el ordenamiento jurídico lo ampara.27
To resolve this issue, we believe it is necessary to refer to the meaning of Article 321 of the Adjective Code, distinguishing between the essential and accessory aspects of the provision. As we have argued, the provision in question is one of the legislator’s corrective mechanisms, allowing the judge to assess new facts relevant to resolving the conflict, thereby escaping the strictness of the principle of lis pendens and the preclusive effect established in Article 64 of the Chilean Código de Procedimiento Civil. In other words, the primary purpose of the text is related to expanding the scope of the trial, with the emergence of a special evidentiary term being accessory. Based on the preceding assertion, we first discard the possibility that the institution under examination can be used as a legal basis to justify the late admission of evidence in the labour process, unless such evidence aims to prove a supervening fact. It must be noted that the institution under study, unlike Article 336 of the Código Procesal Penal and Article 63 bis of Law 19.968, requires the emergence of new facts or newly discovered facts, with the means of proof to substantiate them being accessory. In contrast, the cited criminal and family regulations do not address the emergence of supervening facts; for their operability, the existence of previously unknown evidence is relevant, a situation not regulated in Article 321 of the Adjective Code. Secondly, we believe that the Chilean labour court can indeed assess new or newly discovered facts, supplementarily applying Article 321 of the Adjective Code, by virtue of the referral in Article 432 of the Labour Code. In this regard, it has been argued that it is impossible to apply the norms of the Adjective Code supplementarily, as they are considered contrary to the principles governing the Chilean labour procedure (Cortez et al., 2021, p. 248). The incompatibility lies in the supposed irreconcilable differences between procedural systems regarding the presentation of evidence, ignoring the essence of the institution established in Article 321 of the Adjective Code. This rule functions as a legislative tool aimed at overcoming the fiction of process immutability. This mechanism allows the addition of new factual backgrounds to the trial, which will be assessed by the judge in the final judgment, with the means of evidence and the manner of presenting the evidence being accessory.28 Otherwise, from the defendant’s perspective, the court, by virtue of a legal fiction, would be unable to assess the new factual substrate provided by the defendant, which might contain new extinctive or excluding facts aimed at extinguishing the claimant’s right. In this case, the judge would uphold a claim whose basis was extinguished during the proceedings due to the loss of its objective element (Guasp, 1952, p. 41; Silva, 2017, p. 172), causing the material essence of the procedural claim to dissipate and resulting in an unjust outcome (Guasp, 1952, p. 43). This is similarly applicable to the plaintiff, who can introduce new or newly discovered facts, provided their actions remain within the boundaries of the prohibition of mutatio libelli.29 In this scenario, we believe that the parties can allege new or newly discovered facts in labour proceedings, although not in identical terms to those established in the Adjective Code, considering the differences related to the handling of incidents and the presentation of evidence, derived from the obvious discrepancies between a written procedural model and one conducted in hearings. These matters, unlike the evidence of supervening facts, are expressly regulated in the Código del Trabajo, governing the implementation of the aforementioned institution; the judge must determine the manner in which the pertinent action will be carried out, in accordance with the said labour regulation. In this sense, and according to Article 443 of the Código del Trabajo, the party seeking to introduce a new or newly discovered fact into the process must preferably raise the matter during a hearing, including the trial hearing. In such a case, the judge must give notice to the opposing party and immediately resolve the incident. Subsequently, if the petition is granted, we consider it necessary for the court to schedule a new hearing to allow the parties to offer and present the means of evidence aimed at substantiating the new or newly discovered facts. This is intended to preserve each party’s ability to refute the evidence presented by the opposing party in the trial.
IV. Conclusions
Based on the examined evidence, we consider that the possibility for the judge to assess new or newly discovered facts is, from its origin, closely related to the defendant’s defense, allowing the court to consider facts that justify a substantive exception aimed at extinguishing the plaintiff’s right and pronouncing an acquittal.
This conception, transmitted by forensic sources and recognized by José Bernardo Lira, the drafter of Books 2, 3, and 4 of the draft Código de Procedimiento Civil Chileno, influences the reception of Article 321 of the Adjective Code. Despite its location in the title of general evidence, this text preserves the Castilian tradition, which conceives new or newly discovered facts as a mechanism for adding factual backgrounds that support a new substantive defense. The legislator expands the institution by including the plaintiff of the trial as a petitioner.
The immutability of the process, derived from the general principle of lis pendens, is not absolute. The concept of new or newly discovered facts operates as a tool for adding new factual substrates, thereby expanding the scope of the trial. From the defendant’s perspective, the nature of these facts includes extinctive or excluding facts that are substantially related to the matter in dispute.
The aforementioned points are compatible with the late fulfilment of an obligation by the debtor, preventing such facts from supporting a future exception in a subsequent enforcement process, thereby making the declaratory process more efficient. Furthermore, the mechanism provided in the aforementioned Article 321, considering the supplementary nature of the ordinary trial of major claims, allows for the expansion of the subject matter of the trial in other proceedings, enabling the incorporation of new factual elements, especially in trials with reduced timelines for raising substantive defenses.
In Chilean labour courts, we believe that the judge can indeed assess new or newly discovered facts, supplementarily applying Article 321 of the Adjective Code, by virtue of the referral in Article 432 of the Código del Trabajo. In this context, considering the purpose of the aforementioned Article 321, a provision that functions as a legislative tool aimed at overcoming the fiction of process immutability by adding new factual backgrounds to the process that are relevant to resolving the conflict, we do not perceive any incompatibility with the formative principles of labour proceedings. In this regard, we believe that the judge, in accordance with Article 432 of the Código del Trabajo, can determine the manner in which the pertinent action will be carried out, adapting the method and timing of presenting the evidence to the rules established in the Código del Trabajo, in conformity with a process conducted through hearings.
