Resumo

VIDAL, Javier. Creencia de primera persona, conciencia y la paradoja de Eroom. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2014, vol.46, n.138, pp.37-64.  Epub 13-Jan-2020. ISSN 0011-1503.

This paper aims to show that there exists a necessary, non-contingent, relation between having a first-person belief and believing consciously: a first-person belief is necessarily conscious. From this, two major consequences can be drawn. First, a theory of consciousness claiming that a mental state is conscious when it is accompanied by a higher-order thought or belief about the state itself should be discarded. Second, an account can be given of Eroom’s paradox -the nonsense of asserting or believing something of the form “ p and I believe unconsciously that p”-.

Palavras-chave : first-person reference; quasi-indexical; higher-order thought; unconscious belief; unity of consciousness.

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