Resumo

REYNOSO, Diego. Institutional and Party Actors in the Mexican Political Game. Rev. Mex. Sociol [online]. 2006, vol.68, n.4, pp.667-691. ISSN 2594-0651.

This article uses a game theory approach to analyze the impact of the current institutional structure of the Mexican political structure on the production of incremental changes and the high stability of the status quo. For this reason, the author holds that any government elected in the coming years, whether left- or right-wing, will have the same restrictions on modifying the status quo, if the electorates preferences, the institutional design that leads to a divided government and the parties' relative positions remain constant.

Palavras-chave : veto players; bicameralism; Mexican politics; game theory.

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