Resumen

ZAVALA SCHERER, Demetrio. Apuntes en torno de la cuestión de la causalidad en el Tratado de la naturaleza humana de David Hume. Intersticios sociales [online]. 2011, n.2. ISSN 2007-4964.

The following text is an attempt to read the First Book of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature from a phenomenological perspective. The main purpose is to show that the link between impressions and ideas does not respond to ontological or empiricist criteria; it constitutes the phenomenological structure that allows the world to appear. This implies a certain reading of the so called “Copy Principle”: ideas are not “mere representations” of impressions; in the transit between the latter and the former there is a change of statute that opens the question concerning validity. In this context, causality operates as a principle of intelligibility that verifies the contents of perception in accordance with a criterion of coherence. In other words, causality (indemonstrable in itself, and yet unrenounceable in general) establishes the bridge between facticity and validity that constitutes experience. Indeed, the development of the structure, that is to say, the systematization of experience, leads to the constitution of science. Nevertheless, the text concludes aiming at that which Hume establishes as the core of the structure: the sentiment of unity of everything. The statement made here is, therefore, that the reading of Book I presents a hermeneutical demand: a reading of Book II and, in general, of the rest of the Treatise.

Palabras llave : Hume; impressions; ideas; causality.

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