Resumen

BONILLA, David; AXON, Colin J.  y  BISHOP, Justin D.K.. Resource Rents, Democracy & The Eight Policy Lessons. Rev. mex. econ. finanz [online]. 2020, vol.15, n.4, pp.599-620.  Epub 12-Feb-2021. ISSN 2448-6795.  https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v15i4.556.

We examine if resource revenues are likely to be managed more effectively with strong (or lack of) institutions and if so to contribute to economic development in resource abundant countries. We estimate a general model using evidence for the resource booms of the 1970-2012 period, resource rents, natural capital, socio-economic indicators and for institutions. Results show on the one hand 1) countries with ample natural capital and subsoil wealth levels are associated to a healthier democracy which potentially mitigates the resource curse; while on the other 2) high resource rents are negatively associated to weak institutional quality deepening the curse. Long run economic growth is positively associated to natural capital but negatively associated for those countries that receive high resource rents. We recommend stronger transparency for revenue allocation, for sales of oil production, for the allocation of licences, and for revenue collection. One limitation is the lack of information: (energy) laws inducing economic growth. This paper contributes to explaining the long run impact of democratic change on managing resource revenue.

Palabras llave : Oil revenues; subsoil wealth; institutions; Mexico; China.

        · resumen en Español     · texto en Inglés     · Inglés ( pdf )