INTRODUCTION

Internal forced displacement (IFD) in Mexico is a dramatic reality that increasingly affects households and communities in a growing number of regions in the country.³ In a study by Consejo Nacional de Población [National Population Council], ^{Díaz Pérez and Romo Viramontes (2019)} estimate that about three million households (2 805 708), which comprise slightly more than 10.1 million members, changed residence to protect themselves from crime between 2011 and 2017. For its part, a study by Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos, CMDPDH [Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights] estimates that the number of people who changed residence within the country due to violence or insecurity may range between 185 thousand and more than eight million between 2005 and 2019 (^{Pérez Vázquez, Barbosa Magalhães, & Castillo Portillo, 2019}).

In the face of a problem as large and humanitarianly relevant, the answer from State institutions and governments has been belated, based on governmental assistance and inefficacious. This problem was not recognized as such by Mexican authorities until recently (^{Díaz Pérez & Romo Viramontes, 2019}; ^{Pérez & Castillo, 2019}). Likewise, actions undertaken to offer a solution for IFD victims have been fragmentary, lack suitable regulatory instruments for the specificity of the problem, and are usually reactive and episodic (^{Mestries Benquet, 2018}; ^{Peguero Moreno & Rubio Díaz-Leal, 2019}; ^{Pérez, 2014}; ^{Pérez & Castillo, 2019}).

However, over the most recent decade, some States have passed laws aimed at addressing IFD in their territories—Chiapas in 2012, Guerrero in 2014, and Sinaloa in 2020. How much have these laws been able to transform governmental actions and the behavior of political and social actors object of the legislation in a congruent manner with the regulatory endeavors? That is to say, how much is a proposed law able to change the state of affairs so that internal forced displacement is addressed?

The goal of the present article is to analyze how state institutions appointed to offer solutions for IFD are built and perform. To reach this goal, we resorted to the theory of institutional strength (^{Brinks, Levitsky, & Murillo, 2020}; ^{Levitsky & Murillo, 2009}, ²⁰¹²). According to the theoretical perspective, institutions, laws, and formal policies have varying degrees in their ambition, enforcement and stability. Many new institutions are limited by the characteristics of the process that created them and the political circumstances in which they have to be applied, regardless of the ambition of their regulatory framework.

It is important to underscore there is no intention to explain the problem of IFD (^{Díaz Pérez & Romo Viramontes, 2019}; ^{Durin, 2019}), but to contribute to understand the way the State addresses this phenomenon. It is taken for granted that the Mexican State has the obligation to protect and defend human rights and so is assumed that it is not a monolithic entity, but a structure of rules, organizations, and power where disparate and opposing interests concur. Because of this, it is important to analyze the construction of public institutions capable of providing the populations which had the need to flee or escape from their residence places with solutions, even if among the determining factors of IFD is coaction directly or indirectly propitiated by governmental or State agents such as local security forces, the army, etcetera.

The analysis is supported on the case study of the implementation of Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno [Law on Prevention and Attention to Internal Displacement] promulgated in Chiapas in 2012 (^{Decreto 158 [Decree 158], 2012}). The case of Chiapas is particularly relevant, as it is a state in which internal forced displacement has been a problem as of the 1970’s, due to political-territorial disputes and the actions of military groups backed by local authorities (^{Carrasco, Benítez Manaut, & Rodríguez Luna, 2007}; ^{Mestries Benquet, 2018}; ^{Pecker Madeo, 2020}). Ethnical-religious diversity has also been a factor that in conjunction with territory triggers conflicts that end up in displaced communities (^{Rivera, 2013}). The problem of displacement became acuter in the context of the Zapatista uprising in 1994 because the federal government promoted military counterinsurgency actions (^{Chamberlin, 2013}). This configuration of conditionings persists up to the present, now in a context of public security militarization and contention of Central American migrants.

The article divides into four sections. The first offers a general panorama of the State response to the problem of IFD in Mexico. The second exposes the relevance of resorting to the theory of institutional strength variation to analyze the laws and programs that offer solutions for IFD. The third part presents the case of Chiapas and examines the components of institutional strength. The fourth section argues that the implementation of the law promulgated in such state is characterized by high institutional weakness. Finally, conclusions offer a general recapitulation of the analysis, discussing its scope and limitations.

ATTENTION TO INTERNAL FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN MEXICO

Internal forced displacement is a mass movement of people defined by two attributes: its involuntary or coerced nature, and its permanence within national borders (^{Cohen & Deng, 1998}; ^{Mooney, 2005}). The causes for displacement are diverse: environmental disasters, armed conflicts, systematic violations of human rights of social groups, generalized violence, among others (^{Naciones Unidas, 1998}). The involuntary nature of this sort of migration comes from the need of individuals or human groups to suddenly flee or escape, leaving their homes and places of residence behind. The component of coercion or immediate risk that defines forced displacement is important as it serves to distinguish this sort of migration from others caused by extreme poverty or economic precariousness (^{Mooney, 2005}). Likewise, this conception considers the possibility that populations are forced to migrate not only after experiencing the reasons for displacement, but to avoid the consequences (^{Mooney, 2005, p. 13}). Moreover, as it takes place inside the national State borders, IFD is distinguished from groups that migrate to other countries and now are refugees.

In Mexico, mass migrations caused by the general violence unleashed in the country more than a decade ago has forced to rethink the concept of forced displacement. In this sense, ^{Salazar Cruz (2014, p. 54)} conceives IFD as “the forced mobility of civil population that leaves temporarily or permanently their spaces of life (…) because of regional violence and the subsequent coaction system against individuals, families, inhabitants, and resources”. On the other side, it is not appropriate to use the term forced displacement to refer to people who migrated to the US due to violence and are not refugees; owing to this, ^{Durin (2019, p. 30)} speaks of forced migration or “migration of people who are forced to leave their homes for the purpose of protecting themselves in other place because their integrity and their relatives’ is at risk because of the armed violence deployed by legal and illegal actors”. In this way, forced displacement may be internal or international.

IFD has become an increasingly pressing problem in a growing number of regions in the country (^{Durin, 2019}). Academic studies and research works by social organizations agree that the triggers of internal forced displacements are multiple: political and religious conflicts, development projects, exploitation of natural resources, natural disasters, armed conflicts and more recently, criminal activities such as extorsion, kidnapping, racketeering, identity theft, robberies and disappearance of relatives (^{Díaz Pérez & Romo Viramontes, 2019}; ^{Pérez & Castillo, 2019}; ^{Salazar Cruz & Castro Ibarra, 2014}).

The problem, however, is not only forced displacement events; more so, the victims seldom find due attention or the mechanisms to demand redress. The governmental support the victims have received has mainly been assistential and lacked continuity. One of the factors that explain failures in the attention and protection to victims is the poor definition of regulatory frameworks appropriate for the problem. With the promulgation of ^{Ley General de Víctimas [General Law on Victims] (2013)}, the creation of a system entitled Registro Nacional de Víctimas [National Registry of Victims] was considered. In like manner, in 2014, Comisión Ejecutiva de Atención a Víctimas [Executive Commission for the Attention of Victims] created Fondo de Ayuda, Asistencia y Reparación Integral [Fund for Help, Assistance and Comprehensive Redress]. Article 5 of such law, by means of the “differential and spaced approach” recognizes people in internal displacement situation (^{Ley General de Víctimas, 2013, p. 3}). However, in practice, social organizations have experienced difficulties and resistance by the agencies appointed by the law to recognize displaced people and the assertion of their rights (^{Pérez & Castillo, 2019, pp. 125-126}). Ley General de Víctimas was promulgated after a convoluted and tense process as a response to the public visibility acquired by the social demand “Paz con justicia y dignidad” [Peace with justice and dignity], as expressed by the movement headed by Javier Sicilia (^{Gordillo García, 2020}; ^{Monsiváis Carrillo, Pérez Torres, & Tavera Fenollosa, 2014}). By contrast, the problem of internal displacement, as pointed out by ^{Pérez (2014)}, has not been accompanied by a nationwide movement that demands decisive actions by the authorities.

To sum up, at national level there is no specialized regulation approved regarding IFD. The most significant advancements in attention to IFD, in legal terms, have occurred at subnational level. Over the last decade, some federated states have promulgated laws specifically aimed at offering protection and attention to forced displacement. In Chiapas, this law was published in 2012; two years later, Guerrero passed a similar legislation; while in 2020, Sinaloa followed suit.

Even if displacement is a humanitarian problem, other states have not passed any similar law⁴ (^{Pérez & Castillo, 2019}).

The approval of state laws that answer the problem of IDF is an undeniable advance to address a humanitarian crisis that continually aggravates. However, it is important to wonder to what extent these laws define formal objectives that intend to solve the problem, and to what extent such goals are complied with, modifying the behavior of agencies and public functionaries as well as that of social and political actors.

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH

The questions above may give rise to the analysis of the design and implementation of public programs (^{Howlett & Lejano, 2013}; ^{May, 1991}). What’s more, even considering the multiplicity of meanings and weak points each of them has, a “governance” standpoint may be adopted to approach this issue (^{Fukuyama, 2016}). Although a great deal can be learnt from social interactions, the need to give an account of the social interactions or contextual factors that influence the way authorities respond to the victims’ demands still persists. As an alternative to approach this issue, we resorted to the theory of institutional weakness (^{Brinks et al., 2020}). The premise of this standpoint is that the weakness of institutions is built over the political process as a consequence of the interaction between actors with interests and incentives, the governments’ capabilities and various contextual conditionings.

It is important to bear in mind that the analysis of the strength or weakness of an institution is not equivalent to assess the efficacy or effectivity of a policy or public program. The analysis of institutional strength implies focusing on stability and compliance with the formal rules of institutions (^{Levitsky & Murillo, 2009}). Even stable rules that are followed may produce unsatisfactory or poorly efficacious results. Therefore, by focusing on the strength of rules designed to provide attention to the victims of forced displacement, this study examines the rules’ stability and enforcement through the established channels.

THE CASE OF CHIAPAS: LAW ON PREVENTION AND ATTENTION TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

BUILDING WEAK INSTITUTIONS

The promulgation of Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Forzado en el Estado de Chiapas in February 2012 was a specifically significant event. On one side, it is the first of its kind, not only at local, but national level. On the other, it is law characterized by a high statutory ambition that establishes an integral regulatory framework to coordinate the governmental actions to prevent forced displacement and attention to victims abiding by international standards to protect human rights.

However, the difference between governmental action to address IFD before and after the law was decreed is minimal. While the problem of IFD persisted in the state, the effort and actions of the government did not make any substantive change in the problem. The main characteristics of governmental assistance to IFD were still assistentialist. More than six years passed before the warning to institute the organism in charge of enforcing the law was issued, but even so, the State Program decreed by the law was not published, nor a public official record of the population in internal displacement condition was revealed. Beyond the focalized and episodic humanitarian assistance actions, there are no official reports of the actions to prevent or implement long-lasting solutions for IFD.

The institutional construction after the promulgation of the law, on the basis of the elements described, may be classified as high weakness. It would be a very strong institution if the dispositions in the transitory articles had been literally met and within the stipulated terms, or publicly informed about the creation of the State Council, its periodical functioning and the design, implementation and assessment criteria of the State Council. It would be a strong institution if the installation of the State Council, the elaboration of a State program and other functions in the law had been carried out, even if the implementation of actions to prevent, assist and durably solve were partial. Furthermore, it would be a weak institution to the extent the operation of the State Council or the elaboration of the State Program were inconsistent, deficient or had major omissions. Moreover, it is a very weak institution since the regulation has not been integrally and authoritatively fulfilled.

Even in a context of high institutional weakness, it is important to notice the high level of statutory ambition of the law. This is a significant event itself: Why are there no similar laws in other states? Why to pass a formally ambitious law? To answer these questions, it is necessary to bear in mind the pressure from social organizations and national and international human rights advocates that took up the task and offered humanitarian and legal assistance for the displaced population, mainly after the irruption of Zapatista movement, in the mid 1990’s. Besides, social demands for governmental assistance to IFD acquired international visibility, since a number of international organizations, among them UNHCR became involved by promoting solutions for the armed conflict and its humanitarian consequences. Particularly, the Law created in 2010 to be published in Chiapas received a decisive boost from an infrequent process, though enormously transcendent as it retrieved experiences from a program developed from 2009 to 2012. In this “multi-actor” process, several social organizations, representatives of UN agencies, academic institutions and experts in attention to internal displacement participated, as accurately told by ^{Mercado Mondragón (2018)}.

However, the construction of institutions requires alliances with political actors in the local executive and legislative organs, which are both willing and capable of pushing new laws. In Chiapas, the conditions to push law initiatives to gather the highest international demands in this regard occurred by the end of Juan Sabines Guerrero’s administration (2006-2012). Sabines had been a PRI militant, though he changed to be postulated by Coalición Por el Bien de Todos [For Everyone’s Wellbeing Coalition], headed by Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD [Democratic Revolution Party], Partido del Trabajo [Labor Party] and Convergencia [Convergence]. Back then, the coalition represented an opposition with greater capacity to articulate with organizations and movements demanding attention to IFD abiding by human rights. A key role to approve the new law was performed by PRD legislator, Zoé Alejandro Robledo Aburto, president of the Board of Directors of the Representative Chamber of the State of Chiapas. Robledo had promoted a legislation regarding IFD in the State and presented in Congress an initiative that would be unanimously approved afterwards. Years later, Robledo would carry on pushing an IFD law at national level.

Although building the political opportunity to design an ambitious legislation is key, what is different is to be able to monitor the enforcement of the regulation. This difference is one of the main factors that explain the appearance of weak institutions (Brinks et al., 2020). The political preferences of the creators of a new institution do not always agree on their own preferences nor with their organizational capabilities; this allows understanding the difficulties that the implementation of a Law regarding IFD in Chiapas faced right after its promulgation. Though it was published in February 2012, Sabines’ administration was negligent to comply with the legislation. Shortly after, “pre-electoral” and “electoral” campaigns began in the state, the election was held on July 1^st that year, and the winner was Manuel Velasco Coello, from Partido Verde Ecologista de México, PV [Green Party], in coalition with PRI. In 2012, at national level, PRI returned to the presidency with the election of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). Neither the incumbent executive nor the coalition of governing parties in the congress had been previously aware of the demands of the organizations that defended people in displacement condition, on the contrary, some paramilitary groups in the conflict areas had been linked to PRI. For as long as Velasco was in power and the local legislature under the control of PRI and PV, the implementation of the IFD law remained suspended.

In 2018, the configuration of local power in the government and the congress rearranged. The elected governor, Rutilio Escandón Cadenas, postulated by Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional, Morena [National Regeneration Movement], whose presidential candidate had also won. Escandón had been a PRD militant and its government, just as Morena at national level. At first, greater convergence was expected for the defense of reasserting the victims’ rights. One of the earliest actions of the new local congress was to issue a warrant for the setting up of the State Council, the design of the State Program and taking urgent measures to address the problem. This warrant, it is important to underscore, was issued as a response to a recommendation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, after a favorable sentence for IFD victims (H. Congreso del Estado Libre y Soberano de Chiapas, 2018).

The renewed political will was insufficient, though, to enforce the regulation over the two following years, in which besides the Covid-19 pandemic took place. Even with the change of government, the institutionalization of the law to prevent and assist IFD has been weak. The government only reacts when social organizations demand attention to the problem. For example, Coordinadora de Personas Desplazadas del Estado de Chiapas [Coordination for Displaced People in the State of Chiapas] has demanded to resume the session of the State Council to ask for attention to its demands (^{Natarén, Aquino, Leyte, & De los Santos, 2020}). To explain the behavior pattern, it is necessary to bear in mind that public administration in Chiapas lacks professional bureaucracy with sufficient resources. The governmental capacities of the State are limited. Furthermore, the operation of the regulation was appointed to the Secretariat of Civil Protection, a governmental office with no “muscle power,” in terms of political influence, technical capacity and financial resources. The secretariat above might at first instrument a humanitarian assistance plan, however, it lacks “political capital” and resources to devise a plan to prevent and offer durable solutions for IFD, apart from coordinating the implementation.

In a context where there is broad margin for divergence of political preferences of those who designed the law and those who have to enforce it, and where resources are scarce and governmental capabilities limited, both financially and territorially, the role of key social actors— international agencies, entrepreneurial groups, social movements—becomes fundamental, since their demands and decisive accompaniment is essential to move the government (^{Brinks et al., 2020}). Nevertheless, in spite of the central role of human rights social organizations and international organisms, the mobilization of society to promote the implementation of the law regarding IFD has been scarce. The task of vigorously enforcing the law faces, besides, the

resistance different social actors may pose. In Chiapas, IFD originates in political-territorial conflicts in which local caciques, paramilitary groups and other individuals with little interest in changing in the name of justice, peace and human rights, are involved. The implementation of long-lasting solutions for IFD does not simply entail searching for negotiation and agreement, but to force various actors who take the role of “State challengers” (^{Eaton, 2012, p. 648}), who defend their interests by means of corruption, weapons and violence.

The construction of institutionalism that prevents, addresses and offers long-lasting solutions for forced displacement in Chiapas has an ambitious legal support, though it does not have much more than that. Likewise, as it was the case of the legislation aimed to combat violence against women in Mexico, the result of this political process of institutional construction was an “aspirational” institution (^{Htun & Jensenius, 2020}) for a transforming regulatory order in harmony with the international regulations in this regard “expecting it to be complied with in the future” (^{Brinks et al., 2020, p. 26}). However, those who pay the price of the lack of implementation are still displaced people. Institutional weakness has as a consequence that the population is still vulnerable to violence and the violation of their rights.

CONCLUSIONS

Internal forced displacement is a persistent and growing problem in Mexico. On the basis of an analysis of the Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno en Estado de Chiapas, the first of its kind in the country, this study shows how weak institutions regarding attention to IFD at subnational scale are produced. The political process in this state has produced a weak institution, as it establishes a formal ambitious expectation, but the governmental behavior to face the problem of IFD has changed very little, despite the legislation. Even if it may be considered a case of “aspirational” institutional weakness, in practice this means that the rights of displaced people are still violated.

The analysis shows that the law of Chiapas is formally ambitious, as it was produced following the highest international standards. This is explained by the strategic role which local and international social organizations have carried out to reassert integral attention to the problem for long time. However, the key for its approval was the change in the local government and the individual commitment of politicians familiarized with influence and decision capability. This allows conjecturing that both the likelihood of approving similar laws and their regulatory capability depends on the concurrence of similar circumstances.

At once, we found that a weak institutional construction is associated to a combination of factors: the ascension to power of political groups with divergent preferences and little commitment to the topic; limited resources and capabilities in the government; lack of accompaniment by a majority of society, at local and national scale; and the power of social, political groups, and even criminal organizations that reject the rule of law. In Chiapas, IFD is linked to a series of long-standing political territorial conflicts. Not only do these conflicts have an ethnic-religious component, but are the consequence of all the territorial disputes among indigenous communities, insurgent groups, paramilitary groups and cacique leaderships affiliated to political parties.

Even if this article focuses on the case of Chiapas, we consider that the findings here may be revealing to understand the dynamics of law formation and enforcement related to IFD in this and other states in the country. In the analysis of this case, the intention is to offer elements that contribute to research the development of institutions that respond to forced displacement in other states in the country. In this task, the study of the variation of institutional force may be strengthened with gathered and systematized information resorting to various methodologies from ethnography to tracking processes, to mention a few.

Above all, we want to underscore the importance of studying the way in which the Mexican State—with all its complexity and internal differentiation—responds to a grave problem of humanitarian and human rights nature. Certainly, a crucial determinant of the current IFD crisis is the role performed by State and governmental agents in prompting forced displacement. In this sense, the persisting militarization of public security and an erratic policy to fight organized crime might aggravate further the problem. However, this does not mean that the Mexican State lacks obligations, regulatory faculties and the organizational instruments to act in consequence.

Further research is needed to assess how subnational governments respond to IFD, as limited or as weak as those responses might be. This study shows that IFD is a problem that requires the construction of strong and innovative institutions, capable of articulating multisectoral efforts at all State levels. We consider it necessary to study the circumstances that propitiate and the actors that promote new rules and organizations that protect and ensure the respect of the human rights of people forced to abandon their homes or places of residence.