Resumen

LARIOS FERRER, José Leonel. Political Stability and Instability in the LXII and LXIV Mexican Legislatures from the Perspective of Game Theory. Rev. mex. cienc. polít. soc [online]. 2022, vol.67, n.244, pp.457-495.  Epub 17-Abr-2023. ISSN 0185-1918.  https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2022.244.72754.

The present research analyzes political stability within two of the recent Mexican legislatures from a game theory approach. In order to achieve this, a new theory is developed in the field of the New Political Economy (NEP) and then applied to the study of these legislatures using data from the Parliamentary Gazette and simulations in Scilab. The formulation of the different dynamic games and the political stability index derived from them allowed for finding a weak political stability following the way in which the structural reforms discussed in the LXII legislature of the Chamber of Deputies (CdD) were voted. On the other hand, for the LXIV legislature low and high stability are foreseen in the non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios, respectively. The proposed models represent a new approach to measure political stability with a degree of mathematical complexity that leads to a very compact stability index. It is proved that elements such as absenteeism, abstentionism and political betrayal between parties and coalitions can define political stability within a legislature and thereby allow or not the approval of the various agreements.

Palabras llave : political stability; Chamber of Deputies of Mexico; coalitions; game theory; Scilab simulations.

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