Scielo RSS <![CDATA[PAAKAT: revista de tecnología y sociedad]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/rss.php?pid=2007-360720190001&lang=en vol. 9 num. 16 lang. en <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.mx <![CDATA[Eurekadabra: Sciencie, technology and Magic]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumen Cuando presenciamos un hecho que se califica como mágico o sobrenatural, estamos frente a un acontecimiento donde, en apariencia, se violan reglas mediante fuerzas desconocidas. La tecnología nos ayuda a romper las barreras de las capacidades del ser humano, las amplifica, hasta el punto de acercarse a lo inexplicable. El presente artículo pretende reflexionar sobre cómo los avances de la ciencia y la tecnología han generado eventos considerados mágicos, y cómo se han utilizado históricamente para redefinir lo sobrenatural y, finalmente, de qué manera los resultados son el motor de la innovación tecnológica.<hr/>Abstract When faced with an event considered as magical, we are facing an event in which natural rules are apparently broken by the use of supernatural forces. Technology, on the other hand, helps us to break down the barriers of the human being's capacities, amplifying them to the point that they seem supernatural. This article aims to reflect on how advances in science and technology have made possible those events considered as magical and supernatural, and how they have been used historically to redefine the Word supernatural, and finally how magical effects can serve as a driving force for technological innovation. <![CDATA[Every individual is collective: how can we save cinema’s future?]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100002&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumen En el ecosistema audiovisual contemporáneo, uno de los temas recurrentes es el uso de drogas. La película El Congreso (director Ari Folman, 2014) retrata este tema de un modo muy particular, al ofrecer una reflexión desde la ciencia ficción sobre la relación individuo-drogas-sociedad en un filme cuyo tema es el futuro del cine. Este texto presenta un análisis de la película, retomando categorías propias del campo de la teoría psicoanalítica de cine planteada por Slavoj Žižek (sutura, real, interfaz), reflexiones del futurólogo Jacques Attali, así como algunas ideas propias del marxismo y el psicoanálisis clínico para establecer la importancia de salvar al proceso cinematográfico desde la colectividad antes que la exaltación de la experiencia individual.<hr/>Abstract In today’s audiovisual ecosystem, one of the recurring themes is that of drug use. The Congress (dir. Ari Folman, 2014) is a film that deals on this topic in a particular way, by offering a reflection from science-fiction on the relation between individual, drugs and society in a movie about the future of cinema. This text presents an analysis of this piece, taking categories from the psychoanalytic theory of cinema proposed by Slavoj Žižek (suture, Real, interface), reflections from futurologist Jacques Attali, and some ideas from Marxism and clinical psychoanalysis to establish the importance of saving cinematographic process from collectivity instead of the exaltation of individual experience. <![CDATA[The Eternal return: analysis of the temporal conception in the Dark series of Netflix]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumen El presente trabajo analiza la conceptualización del tiempo tratada en la serie para televisión Dark (Daran bo Odar y Jantje Friese, 2017), transmitida por la plataforma digital Netflix. El argumento presenta la concepción del tiempo como algo cíclico, fundamentada en la idea del eterno retorno, recogida por Friedrich Nietzsche en sus obras La gaya ciencia (1882) y Así habló Zaratustra (1883). A diferencia de la idea filosófica, Dark plantea la posibilidad real del funcionamiento del tiempo como un bucle eterno, lo cual produce la eliminación de las concepciones clásicas de pasado, presente y futuro, debido a que los personajes pueden moverse entre estos tiempos e influir sobre los hechos que suceden antes o después. A través de los capítulos la serie fundamenta esta idea, se apoya en elementos de la ciencia ficción como los viajes en el tiempo, los agujeros de gusano y las invenciones humanas orientadas a cambiar y alterar el curso de los hechos en una sola línea temporal para demostrar cómo las acciones de una persona en diferentes estados configuran la realidad en la que vivimos.<hr/> Abstract This work analyzes the conceptualization of the time treated in Dark TV series (Daran bo Odar, Jantje Friese, 2017), broadcasted by Netflix digital platform. The argument presents the conception of time as something cyclical, based on the idea of the eternal return, collected by Friedrich Nietzsche in The Gay Science (1882) and Thus spoke Zarathustra (1883). Unlike the philosophical idea, Dark states the real possibility of time functioning as an eternal loop, which produces the elimination of the classical conceptions of past, present and future, since the characters can move between these times and influence the facts that happen before or after. Through the chapters, the series bases this idea based on elements of science fiction such as: time travel, wormholes and human inventions aimed at changing and altering the course of events in a single timeline, to demonstrate how the actions of a person in different temporal states configure the reality in which we live. <![CDATA[Memory restlessness. Technology and amplified memories in Black Mirror series]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100004&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumen Una de las temáticas recurrentes en la ciencia ficción audiovisual contemporánea ha girado en torno a las relaciones entre memoria y tecnología. En este tipo de relatos se han abordado con relativa frecuencia las implicaciones sociales e individuales de una memoria transhumana, es decir, tecnológicamente mejorada o aumentada. En este trabajo, se analizan cómo se ha representado la relación entre memoria y tecnología en la exitosa serie de ficción televisiva Black Mirror. Desde un enfoque basado en los estudios sobre memoria cultural y ficción televisiva, y a partir del análisis de contenido cualitativo, examino específicamente dos capítulos que tematizan de manera explícita las relaciones entre memoria y tecnología: The Entire History of You (2011) y Crocodile (2017). Los resultados del análisis muestran cómo, en estos episodios, la irrupción de innovaciones mnemotecnológicas conlleva a un descentramiento en torno a los conceptos mismos de recordar y olvidar, trastornando los límites entre el registro y el recuerdo, entre el archivo y la memoria, entre lo personal y lo público e incluso, entre pasado y presente. En estos capítulos, los alcances sociales y humanos de la amplificación mediante prótesis tecnológicas de las capacidades biológicas de registro, almacenamiento y recuperación de la memoria se delinean críticamente a partir de dos ejes fundamentales: por una parte, la memoria como objeto de consumo compulsivo, y por otra, la memoria como objeto de control social.<hr/>Abstract One of the recurring themes in contemporary audiovisual science fiction has revolved around the relationship between memory and technology. In these types of stories, the social and individual implications of a transhuman memory, that is, technologically improved or augmented, have been approached with relative frequency. In this paper, I intend to analyze how the relationship between memory and technology has been represented in the successful television fiction series Black Mirror. From an approach based on studies on cultural memory and television fiction, and from the analysis of qualitative content, I specifically examine two chapters that explicitly thematize the relationships between memory and technology: The Entire History of You (2011) and Crocodile (2017). The results of the analysis show how, in these episodes, the irruption of mnemotechnological innovations leads to a decentering around the very concepts of remembering and forgetting, upsetting the limits between registration and recall, between the archive and memory, between personal and public and even between past and present. In these chapters, the social and human reaches of the amplification by technological prostheses of the biological capacities of registration, storage and recovery of memory are delineated critically from two fundamental axes: on the one hand, memory as an object of compulsive consumption, and on the other, memory as an object of social control. <![CDATA[Digital rights: an approximation to discursive practices on the Internet from virtual ethnography]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumen El siguiente trabajo es una aproximación a un caso de estudio que busca comprender y dar seguimiento a prácticas discursivas online relacionadas con los derechos digitales. Se trata de un estudio exploratorio realizado con técnicas etnográficas de observación en línea, el cual propone un análisis sobre la concepción de los derechos digitales en el contexto mexicano. En este sentido, el propósito de la investigación es conocer, clasificar y entender las prácticas discursivas en el entorno digital sobre los derechos digitales para conocer los intereses, los actores, los discursos y los contextos que se abordan en relación a esta temática.<hr/>Abstract The present paper aims to provide an approach based on a study case for the understanding of online practices related to digital rights. It is an exploratory research done with ethnographic techniques of online observation that proposes an analysis on the conception of digital rights in the Mexican context. In this sense, the main objective of the study is to know, classify and understand the discursive practices in the digital environment about digital rights, so it can be possible to know the interests, the actors, the speeches and the contexts related to this subject. <![CDATA[Wikipedia and social sciences: free access to knowledge in specialized fields]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100006&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumen Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre en línea, es un ejemplo de colaboración masiva entre pares a nivel global. Fue creada en 2001 y se mantiene vigente hasta la actualidad. Esta enciclopedia incorpora numerosos proyectos y ediciones en diferentes idiomas. Este artículo se enfoca en señalar la producción de investigaciones en ciencias sociales, analiza el caso del área de sociología (en la edición en español). A partir de allí se profundiza en la evolución de los artículos y algunas de sus principales dinámicas comunitarias, incluida la conformación de un portal y wikiproyecto sociología; el crecimiento de volumen de los editores y las ediciones; la cobertura regional y las controversias respecto del contenido. El método empleado se basa en el análisis de los datos encontrados en el contexto de una investigación etnográfica virtual. La indagación retoma consideraciones sobre los principios y las reglas que orientan el funcionamiento de la plataforma, así como esfuerzos de comprensión desde las ciencias sociales, en vinculación con iniciativas recientes de comunidades académicas. Los resultados permiten ponderar potencialidades de modelos emergentes de producción, divulgación y uso del conocimiento, así como sus contribuciones hacia una ampliación de públicos.<hr/>Abstract Wikipedia, the online free encyclopedia, is an example of massive collaboration among peers globally. It was created in 2001 and deployed to date incorporating many projects and idiomatic editions. The article focuses on the production of knowledge in social sciences, analyzing the case of the sociology area of the Spanish edition. From there, it delves into the evolution of its articles and some of its main community dynamics, including: creation of a portal and sociology wikiproject; volume, editors and editions growth; regional coverage and controversies regarding content. Methodologically, it is based on aggregate data analysis in a context of virtual ethnographic research. The inquiry takes up considerations about the principles and rules that guide the operation of the platform, as well as efforts of understanding from the social sciences, in connection with recent initiatives of articulation with academic communities. Results allow to weigh potentials of emerging models of production, dissemination and use of knowledge, as well as their contributions towards an expansion of audiences. <![CDATA[Technology and its relation to design, as students understand them when choosing Graphic Design as a career at Universidad Nacional de San Juan, Argentina (National University of San Juan - Argentina)]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100007&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumen Este trabajo expone los resultados de una investigación llevada a cabo en la Facultad de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño de la Universidad Nacional de San Juan (FAUD-UNSJ) durante el período 2016-2017. Su objetivo fue develar y comprender las concepciones acerca de la tecnología y su relación con el diseño gráfico de aspirantes al ingreso e ingresantes a la carrera de Diseño Gráfico de la FAUD-UNSJ en 2017. El propósito fue valorar la coherencia de estas concepciones con los marcos teóricos donde se sustenta la propuesta académica de la institución y con un enfoque crítico frente a la tecnología. Para indagar en las concepciones de los estudiantes se recurrió a la Teoría de las Representaciones Sociales (Moscovici, 1979) y, en particular, al enfoque estructural de J. C. Abric (1994a). La aproximación metodológica conjugó métodos de los enfoques cualitativo y cuantitativo, mientras que el diseño de la investigación fue de tipo descriptivo y de carácter no experimental. Para la recolección de los datos se emplearon dibujos y técnicas interrogativas y asociativas. La población fueron los 336 aspirantes al ingreso y los ingresantes a la FAUD UNSJ en 2017, y sobre esta se definieron dos muestras intencionadas con aquellos estudiantes que planeaban elegir la carrera de Diseño Gráfico. Los resultados develaron concepciones ingenuas y reduccionistas acerca de la tecnología, así como una escasa conciencia del carácter tecnológico del diseño gráfico.<hr/>Abstract This work presents the results of a research conducted during the 2016-2017 academic period in the School of Architecture, Urban Planning and Design, National University of San Juan - Argentina (Facultad de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño de la Universidad Nacional de San Juan - Argentina). Its aim has been to know and understand the main conceptions that aspirants to admission to this School have about technology and its relation with graphic design. The research has also focused on the evaluation of the coherence among the conceptions above mentioned and the theoretical framework that supports the academic proposal of the School, and at the same time, a critical focus on technology has been considered. A population of the 336 students, who attended the common entry course to start a career in the School of Architecture, Urban Planning and Design in 2017, constitutes the subject matter of this research. Two purposive non-probability samples were studied, formed by students who attended the entry course and who asserted, at the beginning and at the end of the course, that they were convinced of choosing the career of Graphic Design and during the first course. The Social Representation theory and its structural approach were applied to identify the students’ conceptions. Results revealed that conceptions of the students about technology were at the same time, ingenuous and reductionist, as well, they consider that very little relation between graphic design and technology exists. <![CDATA[Artificial intelligences and the problem of consciousness]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100008&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumo Uma das maiores dificuldades dos engenheiros e projetistas de sistemas dotados com Inteligências Artificiais (IA) é replicar a faculdade-propriedade da consciência, pois a mente consciente só parece possível em seres biológicos. Nesse artigo, investigaremos como acontece a consciência no mundo biológico, quais as condições necessárias para sua manifestação, correlacionando-a (consciência), enquanto fenômeno genuinamente biológico, com a dificuldade de instanciar inteligências conscientes e intencionais em sistemas cibernético-informacionais complexos e artificiais, o que vale dizer, inorgânicos e não-biológicos. Mais especificamente, referimo-nos a tentar fazê-lo - como defende o cognitivismo ortodoxo e a própria IA forte - em computadores, androides e robôs, por meio de arranjos de IA. Vale destacar que esse problema da consciência se vê intimamente relacionado com problemas que já discutimos em trabalhos anteriores (Inteligências artificiais e o problema da intencionalidade; Inteligências artificiais e os limites da computação), no sentido de que, apenas um sistema ou ser biológico vivo pode ser capaz de possuir essa característica chamada consciência.<hr/>Abstract A major difficulty for the engineers and designers of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has been to replicate consciousness. After all, it has always been assumed that only living beings may be conscious or not. The paper examines the nature of consciousness in the biological world and the conditions that must be fulfilled before consciousness can be attributed to some organism. States of consciousness in organic systems are compared to states of artificial cybernetic information processing systems, such as computers, androids and robots, to which consciousness might be or has been attributed. The claims of orthodox cognitive scientists and the advocates of a “strong AI” with respect to consciousness are examined in detail. The paper gives continuity to the author’s previous studies on the limits of computation, in particular, on intentionality in the context of artificial intelligences. Its main argument is that consciousness presupposes life. It is a state that can only attributed to living systems. <![CDATA[Recensión Ruidos en la web. Cómo se informan los adolescentes en la era digital]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100009&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumo Uma das maiores dificuldades dos engenheiros e projetistas de sistemas dotados com Inteligências Artificiais (IA) é replicar a faculdade-propriedade da consciência, pois a mente consciente só parece possível em seres biológicos. Nesse artigo, investigaremos como acontece a consciência no mundo biológico, quais as condições necessárias para sua manifestação, correlacionando-a (consciência), enquanto fenômeno genuinamente biológico, com a dificuldade de instanciar inteligências conscientes e intencionais em sistemas cibernético-informacionais complexos e artificiais, o que vale dizer, inorgânicos e não-biológicos. Mais especificamente, referimo-nos a tentar fazê-lo - como defende o cognitivismo ortodoxo e a própria IA forte - em computadores, androides e robôs, por meio de arranjos de IA. Vale destacar que esse problema da consciência se vê intimamente relacionado com problemas que já discutimos em trabalhos anteriores (Inteligências artificiais e o problema da intencionalidade; Inteligências artificiais e os limites da computação), no sentido de que, apenas um sistema ou ser biológico vivo pode ser capaz de possuir essa característica chamada consciência.<hr/>Abstract A major difficulty for the engineers and designers of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has been to replicate consciousness. After all, it has always been assumed that only living beings may be conscious or not. The paper examines the nature of consciousness in the biological world and the conditions that must be fulfilled before consciousness can be attributed to some organism. States of consciousness in organic systems are compared to states of artificial cybernetic information processing systems, such as computers, androids and robots, to which consciousness might be or has been attributed. The claims of orthodox cognitive scientists and the advocates of a “strong AI” with respect to consciousness are examined in detail. The paper gives continuity to the author’s previous studies on the limits of computation, in particular, on intentionality in the context of artificial intelligences. Its main argument is that consciousness presupposes life. It is a state that can only attributed to living systems. <![CDATA[Recensión. Reflexiones de un replicante legal]]> http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2007-36072019000100010&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Resumo Uma das maiores dificuldades dos engenheiros e projetistas de sistemas dotados com Inteligências Artificiais (IA) é replicar a faculdade-propriedade da consciência, pois a mente consciente só parece possível em seres biológicos. Nesse artigo, investigaremos como acontece a consciência no mundo biológico, quais as condições necessárias para sua manifestação, correlacionando-a (consciência), enquanto fenômeno genuinamente biológico, com a dificuldade de instanciar inteligências conscientes e intencionais em sistemas cibernético-informacionais complexos e artificiais, o que vale dizer, inorgânicos e não-biológicos. Mais especificamente, referimo-nos a tentar fazê-lo - como defende o cognitivismo ortodoxo e a própria IA forte - em computadores, androides e robôs, por meio de arranjos de IA. Vale destacar que esse problema da consciência se vê intimamente relacionado com problemas que já discutimos em trabalhos anteriores (Inteligências artificiais e o problema da intencionalidade; Inteligências artificiais e os limites da computação), no sentido de que, apenas um sistema ou ser biológico vivo pode ser capaz de possuir essa característica chamada consciência.<hr/>Abstract A major difficulty for the engineers and designers of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has been to replicate consciousness. After all, it has always been assumed that only living beings may be conscious or not. The paper examines the nature of consciousness in the biological world and the conditions that must be fulfilled before consciousness can be attributed to some organism. States of consciousness in organic systems are compared to states of artificial cybernetic information processing systems, such as computers, androids and robots, to which consciousness might be or has been attributed. The claims of orthodox cognitive scientists and the advocates of a “strong AI” with respect to consciousness are examined in detail. The paper gives continuity to the author’s previous studies on the limits of computation, in particular, on intentionality in the context of artificial intelligences. Its main argument is that consciousness presupposes life. It is a state that can only attributed to living systems.