THE PROBLEM OF THE FINALITY OF WORSHIP AND THE STANDARD THOMISTIC ACCOUNT

Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo*
Universidad Panamericana,
Guadalajara, México.

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to introduce the issue of the finality of religious worship into the analytical Thomist tradition. It aims to develop a response, based on an analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas’s texts, to the following questions: What is the end of worship? Why do we worship God? What benefit does God derive from our worship? Alternatively, perhaps, is it not ourselves, rather than God, who are the beneficiaries of our own worship? The paper aims to develop what may be called the ‘Standard Thomistic Account’ as a solution to this problem. In the first part (II), the paper examines the problem of the finality of worship within the context of Classical Theism. Part II presents the current state of the problem in the contemporary secondary literature concerning this issue. In the third part (III), the paper focuses on Cajetan’s version of the Standard Thomistic Account,
and shows in which aspects it is in need of more nuance to be able to portray Aquinas’ complete solution. Finally, Part IV proposes a careful and faithful reading of the texts and lays out the foundations for a new and more nuanced solution to the problem.

Key words: finality, worship, God, Thomistic account.

Resumen

Este artículo introduce el tema de la finalidad del culto divino dentro de la tradición llamada ‘tomismo analítico’. Tiene como meta desarrollar una respuesta, basada en un análisis textual de Santo Tomás, a las siguientes preguntas: ¿Cuáles son del culto? ¿Para qué le damos culto a Dios? ¿De qué le sirve a Dios nuestro culto? ¿O acaso no es Dios, sino nosotros mismos, quienes somos los beneficiarios del culto? El artículo intenta desarrollar lo que se podría llamar “la solución estándar tomista” a este problema. En la primera parte (I), el artículo examina el problema de la finalidad del culto dentro del contexto del teísmo clásico. La parte II expone el status quaestionis según se encuentra en la literatura contemporánea. En la tercera parte (III), el artículo se enfoca en la solución estándar tomista, según la expone Cayetano, y demuestra en qué aspectos a la misma le falta ser más matizada para incluir la solución completa de Santo Tomás. Y finalmente, la parte IV propone una cuidadosa y fiel lectura de los textos y expone los fundamentos de una nueva y matizada solución al problema.

Palabras claves: finalidad, culto, Dios, tomismo.

Introduction: Worship, A Philosophical Issue

Within the analytic tradition, and especially within the so-called ‘Analytical Thomism’, one hears much talk in the philosophy of religion of the existence of God and the divine attributes, the problem of evil, the epistemic value of faith and its relation to reason, the experience of God, God-talk, the possibility of the afterlife, the possibility of morality without religion, etc.¹ Yet, surprisingly, there is little discussion on the nature and finality of religious acts, that is, of

¹ As an illustrative text, see Brian Davies: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford 2004.
divine worship. This absence of discussion on the topic may be due to a belief, not uncommon within this tradition, that the topic of the acts of worship are an exclusively theological issue and, therefore, do not belong in the philosophy of religion.

But there is no justification, especially within Analytical Thomism, for assuming that this is an issue that depends on a faith tradition, and cannot stand firmly on reason. There is no reason to think that religious worship is something essentially supernatural, and not natural, and therefore, that it is a theological and not philosophical issue, and thus does not have a place within contemporary philosophy of religion. The classical position, and especially the Thomistic position, on religious worship is radically different. Among pre-Christian philosophers, we already see Plato, in his *Euthyphro*, had considered a completely rational definition of ‘piety’ (or ‘the holy’, *to hoios*). Cicero, too, had defined ‘religion’ (*religio*) as the part of the just that “offers care and ceremonies to a certain nature that they call divine.” These classical definitions place the issue of worship firmly within the context of moral philosophy. Yet this general perspective changed in the West at the start of the middle ages, when St. Augustine proposed a radical difference between pagan worship and Christian worship: according to him, pagan worship is nothing other than idolatry, and it is thus not a virtue, but a vice, whereas Christian worship is genuine worship, is essentially supernatural, and consists in the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. These two currents, the philosophical-Platonic current and the theological-Augustinian current, competed against each other for centuries and reached St. Thomas through his teacher, St. Albert the Great.

---

3 Cf. Cicero: *De inventione rhetoricae* 2.53, in *Opera omnia quae extant critico apparatus instructa*, 12 volumes, Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori 1990. “Religio est quae superiors cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam et caeremoniamque affert.” St. Thomas accepts this definition as authoritative, but omits the word *cuiusdam* (‘certain’); cf. ST II-II.81.1 s.c., in *Opera omnia in usum impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, 50 vols. Rome: Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda fide 1882-. All of St. Thomas’ texts, with the exception of those from *Sententia libri Metaphysicae* and *Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos lectione*, are taken from the Leonine edition. All translations are my own.
In St. Thomas’ synthesis, both currents are affirmed without contradiction, the theological-Augustinian being subordinated to the philosophical-Platonic through profound distinctions based on his theory of human acts and virtues. In St. Thomas, then, worship is essentially a natural, moral virtue, yet he does not deny its relationship with the theological plane. Thus, Aquinas teaches that acts of religious worship are not essentially supernatural acts directly related to some theological virtue, but natural acts directly related to the cardinal virtues. Following the philosophical-Platonic current, St. Thomas places the virtue of religion among the virtues annexed to justice and teaches that, just as acts of piety are due to a father out of justice, and acts of ‘observance’ (obedience and respect) are due to a superior out of justice, so acts of religious worship, such as sacrifices, adoration, devotion, etc. are due to God out of natural justice. This position has important implications: the obligation of rendering worship does not proceed solely out of positive ecclesiastical or divine law, which is binding only on Christians, but rather is an obligation stemming from the natural law.

---

6 Admittedly, the entire *Summa theologiae* is, essentially, a theological work. In Thomistic terms, this means that the formal object *qua* of the entire work, i.e., the formality or point of view from which everything therein is looked at, is thoroughly theological. Thus, when Aquinas deals with the cardinal virtues, he is thinking of them *qua* infused virtues, and not acquired. Nonetheless, insofar as there is a parallelism between the infused and moral virtues of the same name, through a certain process of abstraction the Thomistic philosopher is entitled to find in the *Secunda Pars* a philosophical discussion of morality in general, and of individual virtues in particular. I employ this methodology in the present study. Cf. the explanation of the distinction between the infused and acquired virtues of religion offered by Thomist Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange in his book, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life*, St. Louis: Herder Book Co. 1947: “The same difference exists between the acquired virtue of religion, which ought to render to God, the Author of nature, the worship due Him, and the infused virtue of religion, which offers to God, the Author of grace, the essentially supernatural sacrifice of the Mass, which perpetuates in substance that of the cross. Between these two virtues of the same name, there is even more than the difference of an octave; there is a difference of orders, so that the acquired virtue of religion or that of temperance could grow forever by the repetition of acts without ever attaining the dignity of the slightest degree of the infused virtue of the same name. The tonality is entirely different; the spirit animating the word is no longer the same. In the case of the acquired virtue, the spirit is simply that of right reason; in the infused virtue, the spirit is that of faith which comes from God through grace. These two formal objects and two motives of action differ greatly.” For Aquinas’ discussion on the distinction and relationship between the acquired and infused virtues, see *ST* I-II.63, especially art. 4.

7 Cf. *ST* II-II.80.

Tópicos 39 (2010)
which is common to all men.\textsuperscript{8} This obligation exists independently from the religious tradition or faith-claims of the moral agent. This means that acts of religious worship are an authentically philosophical topic in St. Thomas; this issue does not pertain exclusively to theology, but is open to rational-natural discourse.

This paper is precisely an attempt to introduce the issue of religious worship into the analytical Thomist tradition, based on a textual analysis of St. Thomas. More specifically, my aim is to develop a solution to the problem of the finality of worship: What is the end of worship? Why do we worship God? What benefit does God derive from our worship? Alternatively, perhaps, is it not ourselves, rather than God, who are the beneficiaries of our own worship? Through textual analysis, I aim to develop what I call the ‘Standard Thomistic Account’ as a solution to this problem. In the first part (I), I develop the problem of the finality of worship within the context of Classical Theism. Then (II), I present the current state of the problem in the contemporary secondary literature concerning this issue. In the third part (III), I give a summary of Cajetan’s version of the Standard Thomistic Account, and I show in which aspects it is in need of more nuance to be able to portray Aquinas’ complete solution. Finally (IV), I propose a careful and faithful reading of the texts and I lay out the foundations for a new and more nuanced solution to the problem.\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{I. The Problem of the Finality of Worship and Classical Theism}

According to classical Theism, God is immutable; nothing human beings do can change, alter, or modify the transcendent Deity; God cannot benefit in any way or even be pleased by any human action or person. Given this premise, it seems difficult to give an account of the purpose of divine worship, for it would seem that the worship of God must be considered to be an attempt to

\textsuperscript{8}Cf. \textit{ST} II-II.\textsuperscript{85}.1.

\textsuperscript{9}A full treatment of the issue in Aquinas would require an analysis of the end of each of the many different acts of religion that St. Thomas discusses in the treatise on religion (\textit{ST} II-II.81-100). I have done so only partially in my doctoral dissertation, \textit{The Finality of Religion in Aquinas’ Theory of Human Acts}, Chapter 6. Due to space constraints, I am limited to providing only the foundations of the solution here. Ultimately, however, discussing the finality of each act is not entirely necessary, given that Aquinas considers the finality of \textit{the virtue of religion itself} in \textit{ST} II-II.81.5 and 7.
please the Deity. If it is not God whose benefit is sought in worship, then could it be that of the worshipper himself? Then worship would seem to be an egocentric activity. This would be directly against the common sense view that worship is, or at least should be, theocentric, that is, centered on God as Him to whom due honor is paid. The do-ut-des conception of religious worship is generally considered inadequate in contemporary philosophy of religion.

Although Aquinas never devoted a full-length question or article to this issue, he did make very interesting remarks on the finality of worship, especially in Summa Theologiae (henceforth, ST) II-II.81, his discussion on the virtue of religion in general. Some of these remarks seem to assert that the end of worship is God, and others that worship is done for the sake of the worshipper himself. Thus, there is an apparent contradiction even within the texts of Aquinas on this issue. On the one hand, the anthropocentric tendency is very marked. For example, St. Thomas clearly explains that religious praise is useful for man and not for God. Consider the following text.11

\[ \text{T1: We do not praise God for his utility, but for our utility.}^\text{12} \]

St. Thomas also does the same regarding the interior acts of religion. He tells us, for example, that we exhibit reverence and honor to God in order to perfect ourselves, and not in order to perfect God:

\[ \text{T2: We exhibit reverence and honor to God, not on account of God Himself, who is in Himself full of glory, and to whom nothing can be added by a creature, but on account of ourselves; because, that is, through the fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him—and its perfection consists in this; for any thing is perfected through the fact that it is subjected to} \]

---

\[ ^{10} \text{For a detailed and eloquent exposition of ‘classical theism’ according to the analytical tradition, especially in contrast with ‘theistic personalism’, which admits divine mutability, see Brian Davies: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Ch. 1, “Concepts of God.”} \]

\[ ^{11} \text{Henceforth I shall list texts with a “T” and a number (e.g., T1, T2, etc.), according to the order of presentation in this paper, in order to refer to them later more conveniently without having to reproduce them.} \]

\[ ^{12} \text{ST II-II.91.1 ad 3: “Deum non laudamus propter utilitatem suam, sed propter utilitatem nostram.” Cf. ST II-II.81.6 ad 2: “Deo autem non exhibetur aliquid propter eius utilitatem, sed propter eius gloriam, nostram autem utilitatem.”} \]

Tópicos 39 (2010)
its superior, just as the body through the fact that it is vivified by the soul, and air through the fact that it is illumined by the Sun.\textsuperscript{13}

Aquinas also explains the reason for prayer in similar terms. When we pray—he tells us—it is for our own benefit that we do so; it is in order that we become conscious that we need to receive benefits from God, not so that we inform God of anything, since He already knows everything. Consider the following texts:

\textbf{T3}: [I]t is not necessary for us to offer prayers to God so that we may manifest to Him our needs and desires, but so that we ourselves may consider that in these [matters] recourse must be had to divine help.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{T4}: [P]rayer is not offered to God so that we may bend him, but so that we may excite within ourselves the confidence of petitioning. This [confidence] indeed is primarily excited in us by considering: His charity towards us, by which He wills our good—and hence we say, “Our Father;” and his excellence, by which he is capable [of accomplishing our good]—and hence we say, “Who art in Heaven.”\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{T5}: Hence it is necessary that men do some things, not so that through their acts they may change the divine disposition, but so that through their acts they may accomplish certain effects according to the order disposed by God. The same is also [true] in natural causes. Moreover, it is similar in the case of prayer. For

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{ST} II-II.81.7c: Respondeo dicendum quod Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus non propter ipsam, qui in seipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adici postet, sed propter nos, quia videiiciet per hoc quod Deum reveremur et honoramus, mens nostra ei subicitur, et in hoc eius perfectio consistit; quaelibet enim res perficiatur per hoc quod subditur suo superiori, sicet corpus per hoc quod vivificatur ab anima, et aet per hoc quod illuminatur a sole.

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{ST} II-II.83.2 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est necessarium nos Deo preces porrigere ut ei nostras indigentias vel desideria manifestemus, sed ut nosipsi consideremus in his divinum auxilium esse recurrendum.

\textsuperscript{15}Cf. \textit{ST} II-II.83.9 ad 5: Ad quintum dicendum quod oratio non porrigitur Deo ut ipsum flectamus, sed ut in nobis ipsius fiduciam eximemus postulandi. Quae quidem praecipue excitatur in nobis considering eos caritatem ad nos, qua bonum nostrum vult, et ideo dicimus, pater noster; et eius excellentiam, qua potest, et ideo dicimus, qui es in caelis.
we pray not in order to change the divine disposition but in order that we beseech that which God has disposed to be fulfilled through the prayers of holy people; “that is, in order that men, by petitioning, may merit to receive what Almighty God has disposed before the ages to give them,” as Gregory says in the book of The Dialogues.¹⁶

All of these texts unequivocally affirm the anthropocentric finality of religious acts. Nevertheless, there are many other texts that clearly affirm the theocentric finality of worship, which tell us that worship and religion are ordered to the honor, reverence, and glory of God, and even to God Himself, as to their end:

T6:  It pertains to religion to render due honor to someone, that is, to God.¹⁷

T7:  The good to which religion is ordered is to exhibit due honor to God.¹⁸

T8:  To religion pertains doing certain things for the sake of divine reverence.¹⁹

T9:  All things, according as they are done for God’s glory, pertain to religion.²⁰

¹⁶Cf. ST II-II.83.2: Unde oportet homines agere aliqua, non ut per suos actus divinam dispositionem immutent, sed ut per actus suos impleant quodam effectus secundum ordinem a Deo dispositum. Et idem etiam est in naturalibus causis. Et simile est etiam de oratione. Non enim propter hoc oramus ut divinam dispositionem immutemus, sed ut id impetremus quod Deus disposuit per orationes sanctarum esse impendum; ut silicet homines postulando mercantur accipere quod eis omnipotens Deus ante saecula dispensit donare, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro dialogorum.

¹⁷ST II-II.81.2c: [A]d religionem pertineat reddere honorem aliquo, silicet Deo.

¹⁸ST II-II.81.4c: Bonum autem ad quod ordinatur religio est exhibere Deo debitum hominem; cf. 81.7 arg. 2: Religionis finis est Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibere.

¹⁹ST II-II.81.2 ad 1: Ad religionem autem pertinent facere aliqua propter divinam reverentiam.

²⁰ST II-II.81.4 ad 2: Omnia, secundum quod in gloriam Dei fiunt, pertinent ad religionem.
The Problem of the Finality of Worship

**T10**: Religion has proper and immediate acts... through which man is ordered to God alone, such as sacrifice, adoration, and other suchlike things.\(^{21}\)

**T11**: Religion... brings about those things that are directly and immediately ordered to divine honor.\(^{22}\)

**T12**: Divine worship is ordered... primarily to exhibiting reverence to God.\(^{23}\)

**T13**: The end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God.\(^{24}\)

**T14**: It is manifest that... God is related to religion... as end.\(^{25}\)

**T15**: Religion orders man to God... as to an end.\(^{26}\)

Cajetan, the Thomistic commentator, was aware of these apparent contradictions and provided a key for interpreting the relevant texts in Aquinas’ *Summa*. His interpretation, which for centuries has been the standard Thomistic account of the issue (and which I will henceforth call the “Standard Thomistic Account”), is based on an Aristotelian distinction between two senses of the term “end.” Cajetan classifies each of the various texts into either of these two categories of ends, and shows how the two categories are compatible. This paper consists in an attempt to develop the Standard Thomistic Account. Yet before doing so, let us consider the present status of the issue in order to locate this solution in its proper context.

\(^{21}\) Cf. *ST* II-II.81.1: *Religio habet... actus... proprios et immediatos, quos elicit, per quos homo ordinatur ad solum Deum, sicut sacrificare, adorare et alia huiusmodi.*

\(^{22}\) Cf. *ST* II-II.81.6c: *Religio... operatur ea quae directe et immediate ordinantur in honorem divinum.*

\(^{23}\) *ST* II-II.92.2c: *Ordinatur... primo divinis cultus ad reverentiam Deo exhibendam.*

\(^{24}\) *ST* II-II.93.2c: *Finis autem divini cultus est ut homo Deo det gloriam...; cf. ST II-II.81.4 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia, secundum quod in gloriam Dei fiunt, pertinent ad religionem non quasi ad elicientem, sed quasi ad imperantem. Ila autem pertinent ad religionem elicientem quae secundum rationem suae speciei pertinent ad reverentiam Dei; cf. ST II-II.81.6 ad 2: Deo autem non exhibetur aliquid propter eius utilitatem, sed propter eius gloriam, nostram autem utilitatem.*

\(^{25}\) *ST* II-II.81.5 c: *Unde manifestum est quod Deus... comparatur ad virtutem religionis... sicut finis.*

\(^{26}\) *ST* II-II.81.5 ad 2: [R]eligio ordinat hominem in Deum non sicut in obiectum, sed sicut in finem.*

Tópicos 39 (2010)
II. Present State of the Issue

Even though this topic is just now beginning to be considered within the analytical tradition, it is by no means a new issue within the history of philosophy. The literature on the issue can be divided into three broad views, based on the answer that each gives to our original dilemma. In outline:

1. Anthropocentric Theories.
2. Theocentric Theories.
3. “Compatibilist” Theories:
   a. Simplistic readings.
   b. Standard Thomistic Account.

(1) The great majority of the discussions on the issue from the point of view of the history of ancient and medieval philosophy, and especially within the context of Socratic Piety, fall within the first group. The basis for an egocentric or ‘humanistic’ interpretation of Socratic piety lies in the fact that the most serious hypothetical definition of piety offered in the *Euthyphro* is the following: “piety is the part of justice that is concerned with the service of the gods.”

Here, “caring” for the gods seems to imply that the gods benefit from worship, and this, for both Socrates and Euthyphro, is unacceptable. This *aporia* intimates that, due to the human inability to affect the divine, such a theocentric view of piety is impossible, and, therefore, the solution lies in anthropocentrism. In the dialogue, Socrates also raises the question of whether piety is coextensive with justice, and strongly suggests an affirmative answer. In that sense, piety would be reducible to a virtue that consists in doing good to others generally, and, thus, would have an entirely humanistic import.

(2) Principally within the group of theocentric theories, especially within continental philosophy, we find the proponents of objectivism in the theory of value. The most notable of these is Rudolf Otto, who, following the Kantian *Critique of Judgment*, claims that affective experiences furnish the subject with a non-rational intuition of noumenal values. By applying this epistemology to the religious sphere, in his *The Idea of the Holy*, Otto argues that worship is the nonrational, affective response of a subject to the numen, or the “numinous”

---

27 *Plato: Euthyphro* 12e.
object, that is, the Divine. As he expresses it, worship is the appropriate affective response to the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. From Otto’s analysis, it follows that worship is not so much an act that we perform in order to accomplish some good, but rather a response to an Object that is worthy of such a response: “the numen . . . is ‘august’ (*augustum*) insofar as it is recognized as possessing in itself *objective* value that claims our homage.”\(^{29}\) In sum, the motivation for such a response is the Object Itself, and not some subjective need. Otto, however, did not develop his ideas on this issue any further.

For a more developed version of this line of thinking we must wait until Dietrich Von Hildebrand, who, following Max Scheler, defends the existence of objective, extramental values (which are ontologically independent of the subject), and claims that the agent’s duty is to give a proper response to such values. Within this context, he argues\(^{30}\) that religious worship consists in an adequate affective response to God. Thus, one does not worship in order to attain some benefit or for any other purpose than to give God a proper response. For Von Hildebrand, the quality of worship is directly proportional to the degree in which the worshipper assumes “the Spirit of Response-to-Value,” that is, to the degree that he is focused on giving God the proper response that he deserves as an object of worship. As is common in von Hildebrand’s thought, the metaphysical foundations of this response receive little development.\(^{31}\)

(3) Most Thomists are “Compatibilists” of some sort; that is, they hold views that are simultaneously theocentric and egocentric.\(^{32}\) This group itself, however, can be divided into two. Some Thomists offer the following as a solution (a): the worshipper seeks God’s glory, but in doing so, obtains a sort of utility. The goodness of the act is reduced to the perfection of the worshipper; this is the ultimate end.\(^{33}\) This view, which consists in affirming a double

---


\(^{30}\) Cf. Dietrich Von Hildebrand: *Liturgy and Personality*, New York; London; Toronto: Longman’s, Green and Co. 1943, especially chs. 4-6.

\(^{31}\) For an important development of von Hildebrand’s philosophy of religion, see Alice Von Hildebrand: *Introduction to a Philosophy of Religion*, Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press 1971.

\(^{32}\) So far I have not found any non-compatibilists among Thomists who discuss the issue.

\(^{33}\) See, for example, Mennessier: *La religion, traduction française de la Somme Théologique de saint Thomas d’Aquin, III-Illae; QQ. 80-100*, Paris: Desclée et Cie 1932, p. 241: Ce profit que la vertu morale de religion nous assure, dans le moment même où elle poursuit la gloire de Dieu, c’est la perfection de notre union spirituelle à Lui . . . Son désintéressément même nous grandit, assurant en défait de l’apparente inutilité de ses demarches extérieures, notre...
Finality according to which one end is subordinated to the other, is governed by the text of II-II.81.7 (= T2). The importance of the 'theocentric' texts is diminished. Other Thomists, 34 employing greater philosophical precision, adopt Cajetan's explanation, which I have called the 'Standard Thomistic Account': they make a distinction between the finis cuius and finis quo of worship: the finis cuius is God, and the finis quo is the perfection of the worshipper. In the following section, I shall explain this position more in detail. My contribution to the issue rests in a development of this second solution.

III. The Standard Thomistic Account

Within the Thomistic tradition, in fact, one finds reconstructions of Aquinas’ view on the finality of worship that weave a coherent whole from the apparently contradictory strands. What I call the “Standard Thomistic Account” aims to reconcile these two apparently incompatible tendencies. This solution is best encapsulated in Aquinas’ commentator, Cajetan. His interpretation of T2 relies on the Aristotelian distinction between finis cuius (to hou heneka tinos) and finis quo (to hou heneka tioi) that Aristotle makes in the second book of De Anima.

T16: The phrase ‘for the sake of which’ is ambiguous; it may mean either (a) the end to achieve which, or (b) the being in whose interest, the act is done.35

The philosopher from Stagira also makes this distinction within the context of natural theology in his discussion in Metaphysics, Book Lambda:

T17: ‘That for the sake of which’ is both that for which and that towards which, and of these, the one is unmovable and the other is not.36

Aquinas interprets this distinction in terms of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” ends:

T18: Good, inasmuch as it is the end or goal of a thing, is twofold. For an end is either extrinsic to the thing ordained to it, as when we say that a place is the end of something that is moved locally, or it is intrinsic, as a form is the end of the process of generation or alteration. A form already acquired is a kind of intrinsic good of the thing whose form it is.37

He also notes that, while extrinsic ends exist independently of the actions that aim at them, intrinsic ends are only potential and are brought about through the actions whose end they are.

**T19**: Now one thing can be the goal of another in two ways: first, as something having prior existence, as the center of the world is said to be a goal which is prior to the motion of heavy bodies... the first mover can be a goal in this way. Second, one thing is said to be the goal of another, not as something that exists actually, but only as existing in the intention of the agent by whose activity it is produced, as health is the goal of the activity of the medical art. And end or goal of this kind does not exist in the realm of immovable things.38

Thus, God is the end or goal of worship in the sense that he is the extrinsic (and pre-existing) goal. Neither God nor his perfection is ‘brought about’ through worship. That is, worship is not for the sake of God; in that sense, God is not ‘the end’ of worship. God is only the end insofar as he is that ‘in view of which’ it is done. Hence, H4 and H5 are compatible. Cajetan renders the distinction as one between (a) the “term of utility” (terminus utilitatis) and (b) “end” (finis) or “final cause” (causa finalis). By means of this distinction, Cajetan intends to group the different (and seemingly contradictory) passages according to the two elements of the distinction and, thus, escape the inconsistency. Commenting on T2, he says:

**T20**: When it is said that we give honor to God ‘not for his sake’ (non propter seipsum), the ‘for his sake’ does not connote final cause but the ‘term of utility’ (terminum utilitatis). For it is evident that we render worship to God for Himself as end (propter seipsum ut finem)

---

Turin-Rome 1971:“Bonum enim, secundum quod est finis alciuis, est duplex. Est enim finis extrinsecus ab eo quod est ad finem, sicut si dicimus locum esse finem eius quod movetur ad locum. Est etiam finis intra, sicut forma finis generationis et alterationis, et forma iam adepta, est quoddam bonum intrinsecum eius, cuius est forma.”

38Sententia libri Metaphysic., XII: L. 7: C2528: Dupliciter autem potest esse aliquid aliiquis finis alterius. Un modo sicut praeexistens; sicut medium dicitur finis praeexistens motus gravitum, et huiusmodi finem nihil prohibet esse in immobilibus: potest enim aliquid tendere per suum motum ad participandum aliiqualter aliquo immobile et sic primum movens immobile potest esse finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse finis aliquis, sicut quod non est in actu, sed solum in intentione agents, per cuius actionem generatur, sicut sanitatis est finis operationis medicinae; et huiusmodi finis non est in rebus immobilibus.

Tópicos 39 (2010)
… but not for God’s utility but rather for our utility, in such a way that our worship will not be able to give to God any increase in glory or anything else—of which worship it is written: You are not in need of our goods (Ps 15:2). 39 Accordingly, Thomists who have utilized Cajetan to solve the issue have claimed that, for Aquinas, the ‘end’ of worship is twofold. 40 On the one hand, man gives honor to God (Deo) and, consequently, God is the “end of which” or “about which” (finis cuius), that is, the end toward which the worshipper tends. Here, of course, ‘end’ must be understood, not in the sense that God is the beneficiary, but in the sense that He is the ‘direction’ of the worship. On the other hand, the worship is done for “our sake” (propter nos), that is, the worshipper himself is the “term of utility” (terminus utilitatis), the beneficiary of the good sought in the acts of worship. Thus, while in worship our mind must be fixed on God, our purpose is to perfect ourselves. 41 Accordingly, worship can be said to be anthropocentric insofar as its intrinsic end is the worshipper, and theocentric insofar as its extrinsic end is God.

The Standard Thomistic Account does shed some light on the issue, but if it goes no further, it remains inadequate on two levels. First, philosophically, it does not solve the problem of the finality of worship, but only complicates it. As was said above, each of the two alternatives of the issue of the finality of worship is problematic. On the one hand, claiming that the worshipper is the end contradicts our intuitions about worship as non-egocentric. On the other hand, and most importantly, claiming that God is the end only in the sense of a goal, as a point in space towards which we are moving, does not seem to capture the very strong claim that in worship we give to God a debitum, that is,

39 Commentary on ST II-II.81.7: Cum dicitur, ‘Deo honorem exhibemus non propter seipsum’, ly ‘propter’ non denotat causam finalem, sed terminum utilitatis. Constat namque quod colimus Deum propter seipsum ut finem... sed non propter ipsius Dei, sed nostri utilitatem, ita quod nec augmentum gloriae nec quocumque aliud Deo ex nostro cultu accrescere potest, de quo scriptum est: ‘bonorum nostrorum non indiges’.

40 I say that Thomists who have used Cajetan have done this; Cajetan himself does not. Cajetan does not say that ‘end’ is twofold; rather, he makes a distinction between end (or final cause) and terminus utilitatis. In Cajetan, then, the terminum utilitatis is not an end. This is significant, since this means that the worshipper’s perfection, for Cajetan, does not enter into the intention of the worshipper. It is only a benefit that the worshipper receives, but does not (necessarily) intend. God, however, as end, must necessarily fall within the intention of the worshipper. This is nuance is absent in later Thomists.

41 Aquinas also speaks of some of the acts of the virtue of religion as being for our sake but done with God as terminus; e.g., prayer (cf. II-II.83.2c) and vows (cf. II-II.88.4c).
something that is due to him. Thus, it would seem that the dilemma, as it stands, requires choosing one of two contradictory alternatives and explaining how its apparent disadvantages can be countenanced or nullified. Instead of taking this route, however, the Standard Thomistic Account affirms both alternatives and leaves their problematic aspects unresolved.

Second, textually, the Standard Thomistic Account does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the doctrinal nuances of Aquinas’ claims. This account reduces Aquinas’ various statements on the finality of worship to two general categories: those that speak of the finis cuius (or causa finalis) and those that speak of the finis quo (which is ordered to the terminum utilitatis). Thus, one is left with the impression that claims that fall under the same category are roughly equivalent. Hence, for example, to claim that the end of worship is “the glory of God” would amount to saying that the end of worship is “God Himself” in the sense of causa finalis. Consider again T11-T13:

T11: Religion… brings about those things that are directly and immediately ordered to divine honor.

T12: Divine worship is ordered… primarily to exhibiting reverence to God.

T13: The end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God.

The Standard Thomistic Account, of course, would interpret these as roughly equivalent claims and would classify them under the finis cuius (or causa finalis) category. However, this is inadequate in view of Aquinas’ statements regarding the distinction between honor, reverence, and glory. We know that T11 and T12 are not equivalent because Aquinas makes a clear distinction between honor and reverence:

T21: Reverence is not the same as honor, but on the one hand it is the motive principle for honoring, insofar as someone honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as someone is honored in order that he may be held in reverence by others.\(^{43}\)

\(^{42}\)Cf. ST II-II.81.5c (= T14).

\(^{43}\)ST II-II.103.1 ad 1: [R]everentia non est idem quod honor, sed ex una parte est principium motivum ad honorandum, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex reverentia quam habet ad aliquem, eum honorat; ex alia vero parte est honoris finis, inquantum scilicet aliquis
Moreover, we know that $T_{13}$ is not equivalent to either $T_{11}$ or $T_{12}$ because he also speaks of glory as being distinct from honor and reverence:

**T22:** *Glory* is an effect of *honor* and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he becomes ‘clarified’ in the knowledge of others.\(^{44}\)

**T23:** From the fact that all things are from Him, through Him, and in Him, every creature owes Him *honor, reverence, and subjection*... but from the fact that neither council nor gift is received from another, [every creature] owes Him *glory*.\(^{45}\)

---


From these distinctions, therefore, it is clear that Aquinas’ various claims regarding finality of worship are by no means equivalent, but each refers to a feature that is distinct from and irreducible to the rest. Thus, one must go beyond the Standard Thomistic Account and employ a reading that is sophisticated enough to incorporate all of these claims into a coherent whole, instead of merely subsuming them under one of two kinds of final causality.

IV. Towards a New Solution

A. Four Theses

Thus far, I have laid out the problem, indicated how it emerges from Aquinas’ texts, and showed why the Standard Thomistic Account is insufficient. In light of the texts presented, I argue that from the texts of Aquinas one may gather a coherent doctrine regarding the finality of religion, where there is one finis cuius and a hierarchy of three fines quo. This doctrine can be expressed by means of four finality claims:

1. the immediate fines quo of religion is to give honor to God;
2. the mediate fines quo of religion is to give reverence to God;
3. the ultimate fines quo of religion is to give glory to God; and
4. the finis cuius of religion is God Himself.

In order to warrant these theses, note first that St. Thomas makes a distinction between the ‘object’ and end of the virtue of religion. The object, that is, what is offered to God in the acts of religion, is worship (cultus), or, as Aquinas expresses it when he quotes the famous Ciceroian definition of religion, the ceremonial ‘care’ of the divine.46 The “end,” that is to say, that towards which the agent orders or directs his action, is God.

\[\text{T24: Religion is that which offers to God due worship. Therefore, two things are considered in religion. One is what religion offers to God, that is, worship (\textit{cultus}), and this is related to religion as matter and object. The other is that to which it is offered, namely,}\]

\[\text{a tota creatura . . . . Ex eo vero quod ab alio non accipitur nec consilium, nec donum, debetur ei Gloria . . . .}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{46} Cf. ST II-II.81.1 s. c.: Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, II \textit{Rhet.}, quod \textit{religio est quae superioris naturae, quam divinum vocant, curam caeremoniamque afferit.}}\]

Tópicos 39 (2010)
God…. Hence, it is evident that God is not related to the virtue of religion as matter or object, but as end.\(^\text{47}\)

Through this text, it is clear that God is the end of worship. Yet, in what sense of ‘end’? \(\text{Finis cuius}\) (that is, \(\text{causa finalis}\), in Cajetan’s terminology), or \(\text{finis quo}\) or the \(\text{utilitas}\) (that is, the perfection of the \(\text{terminum utilitatis}\))? St. Thomas, as a good classical theist, cannot say that God is the \(\text{finis quo}\) or the \(\text{terminum utilitatis}\); God cannot benefit from being worshipped. Therefore, God is only the \(\text{finis cuius}\) of religion (= Thesis 1). For this reason, concerning the \(\text{finis cuius}\), I accept the Standard Thomistic Account without reserve.

Now, what about the \(\text{finis quo}\) of worship? T6 and T7 speak of honor as being the end of religion. But honor is something that is present in the person that gives honor, rather than in the person honored:

\textbf{T25:} Honor seems to consist rather in the act of him who renders honor and in his power, than in the act of who is honored.\(^\text{48}\)

Therefore, honor is not a \(\text{finis cuius}\), but a \(\text{finis quo}\) of religion. In addition, T11 notes that honor is the primary and immediate end of religion. Thus, we can conclude that the primary and immediate \(\text{finis quo}\) of worship is divine honor (= Thesis 2).

Thirdly, as we saw in T13, Aquinas claims that the “glory” of God is also one of the ends of worship.\(^\text{49}\) He clearly states that:

\textbf{T26:} [P]raise and honor stand in relation to glory… as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is

\(^{47}\)Cf. \(\text{ST II-II.81.5c}\): Religio est quae Deo debitum cultum affert. Duo igitur in religione considerantur. Unum quidem quod religio Deo affert, cultus scilicet, et hoc se habet per modum materiar et objecti ad religionem. Aliud autem est id cui affertur, scilicet Deus…. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non comparatur ad virtutem religionis sicut materia vel objectum, sed sicut finis. Et ideo religio non est virtus theologica, cuius objectum est ultimus finis, sed est virtus moralis, cuius est esse circa ea quae sunt ad finem.

\(^{48}\)Cf. \(\text{ST II-II.103.1 ad 2}\): [H]onor magis videtur consistere in actu quodam honorantis et in eius potestate, quam ipsius etiam qui honoratur.

\(^{49}\)Cf. \(\text{ST II-II.81.6 ad 2}\): Deo autem non exhibetur aliquid propter eius utilitatem, sed propter eius gloriam, nostram autem utilitatem.
that he thinks thereby to acquire certain renown in the knowledge of others.\textsuperscript{50}

By way of inference, we can say, then, that the honor of God is ordered to the glory of God as to its end (= Thesis 3). In fact, this finality claim is not one that is peculiar or unique to worship; rather, it falls within the context of the teleology of the entire universe. Aquinas tells us that the good of the entire universe (here we include the goods sought by the virtue of religion) is ordered to the glory of God as to its end.

\textbf{T27:} Now, ultimately, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God.\textsuperscript{51}

It is not surprising, then, that the glory of God is the end of worship, for it is the end of all creation.

\section*{B. The Concepts of ‘Honor’, ‘Reverence’, and ‘Glory’}

Now, what exactly are honor, reverence, and glory? Is the distinction critical enough to warrant four different tiers, as it were, in the finality of religion? Answering this question involves a more careful and faithful reading of the texts than has hitherto been done. A careful analysis that would ‘unpack’ philosophically these three notions of honor, reverence, and glory in Aquinas would require a full-length study and thus fall outside of the scope of a short paper such as this. However, a few interesting remarks are in order.

Regarding honor, the following must be said. According to Aquinas:

\textbf{T28:} Honor signifies a certain testimony of someone’s excellence.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50}ST II-II.132.4 ad 2: \[L\]aus et honor comparantur ad gloriam… sicut causae ex quibus gloria sequitur. Unde gloria comparatur ad ca sicut finis, propter hoc enim alius amat honorari et laudari, inquantum per hoc alius aestimat se in aliorum notitia fore praeclarum.

\textsuperscript{51}ST I.65.1: Ulterius autem, totum universum, cum singulis suis partibus, ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem, inquantum in eis per quandam imitationem divina bonitas repre- sentatur ad gloriarn Dei.

\textsuperscript{52}Cf. ST II-II.103.1: \[H\]onor testificationem quandam importat de excellentia alicius. As the term \textit{importat} makes clear, this is a definitional statement regarding honor, and not an accidental predication.
Thus, we infer that worship is offered to God in order that men may give testimony of His excellence.

Now, the degree of honor rendered to a person, accordingly, is directly proportional to the degree of the honored person’s excellence. Hence, since God’s excellence is absolute (as natural philosophy establishes), human beings naturally owe the Deity absolute honor:

**T29:** Honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor due, just as we observe in human affairs that a different honor is due to each of the different excellences of persons, one kind of honor to the father, another to the king, and thus with others.

Concerning reverence (which is perhaps the most obscure of these three notions), it could be said that it is the psychological effect produced by the fact that someone is being honored. That is, reverence is the “fear” produced by the honoring of someone excellent. Hence, we may say that we honor God so that men may acknowledge His excellence and fear Him.

Now, what does Aquinas mean by giving “glory” to God? In order to make sense of this term, I defend the Thomistic distinction between God’s intrinsic glory and His extrinsic glory. God’s intrinsic glory is the supreme perfection and goodness of the Divine Being; it is identical to God Himself. Hence, His intrinsic glory cannot be increased or decreased, as is stated very clearly in T2: “We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake—who is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything—but for our sake.”

God’s extrinsic glory, however, is not identical to God Himself. Consider the following texts on glory as an effect in creatures:

---

53 ST II-II.81.4c: Honor autem debetur alci ratione excellentiae. Deo autem competit singularis excellentia, inquantum omnia in infinitum transcendit secundum omniummodum excessum. Unde ei debetur specialis honor, sicut in rebus humanis videmus quod diversis excellentiis personarum diversus honor debetur, alius quidem patri, alius regi, et sic de alis.

54 Cf. In Psal. 34 ad finem: [T]imor initialis et castus proprie reverentia dicitur.

55 Although Aquinas himself never used this language (it is of later Thomistic origin), the distinction is implicit throughout his texts on gloria, cf. especially In Psal. 28, n. 3: “Ipse in se gloriosus est; sed nonnihil ejus debet in nobis gloriosum esse, idest ut in notitia nostra sit gloriosum.”

56 ST II-II.81.7c; emphasis added.

---

Tópicos 39 (2010)
T30: Now glory is the effect of honor and praise. For, from the fact that we give testimony to someone’s goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the awareness of many. The word “glory” indicates this, for “gloria” is said like “claria” [clearness]. Hence, in Romans I, a gloss of Ambrose says that glory is clear awareness with praise.\footnote{ST II-II.103.1 ad 3: Gloria autem est effectus honoris et laudis. Quia ex hoc quod testificamur de bonitate alieuius, clarescit eius bonitas in notitia plurimorum. Et hoc importat nomen gloriae, nam gloria dicitur quasi claria. Unde Rom. I, dicit quaedam Glossa Ambrosii quod gloria est clara cum laude notitiae.}

T31: *Gloria* signifies a certain clarity (*claria*), hence “to be glorified is the same as to be made clear,” as Augustine says (*Tractatus on John* 82). Clarity, moreover, implies both a certain comeliness and [a thing’s] being made manifest. For this reason, the word “glory” properly conveys someone’s making manifest what seems comely before men, whether it be a corporeal or a spiritual good. But since that which is clear absolutely can be observed by many, including by those who are far away, for this reason the word “glory” properly designates that someone’s good enters the awareness and attains the approval of many.\footnote{ST II-II.132.1c: “Gloria claritatem quandam significat, unde glorificari idem est quod clarificari, ut Augustinus dicit, *super Ioan.* Claritas autem et decorum quendam habet, et manifestationem. Et ideo nomen gloriae proprie importat manifestationem alieuius de hoc quod apud homines decorum videtur, sive illud sit bonum aliquod corporale, sive spirituale. Quia vero illud quod simpliciter clarum est, a multis conspici potest et a remotis, ideo proprie per nomen gloriae designatur quod bonum alieuius deveniat in multorum notitiam et approbationem…..” See also *ST* II-II.145.2 ad 2, quoted in note 42.}

Thus, God’s extrinsic glory is nothing other than the awareness of God’s intrinsic glory.\footnote{ST II-II.145.2 ad 2, quoted in note 42.} ‘Glory’ in this sense can be increased. This is the kind of ‘divine glory’ that the worshipper seeks to increase.

C. Conclusion

For St. Thomas, the first two levels of the hierarchy of the finality of religion (honor and reverence) are ordered to the *finis quo* of increasing the extrinsic glory.\footnote{The fact that *gloria* has cognitive import is evident from the text of *In Psal. 28*, n. 3, quoted in note 53.}
glory of God, that is, the external manifestation and consequent rational recognition of the interior goodness of God. All of this is done in view of God as the finis cuius. In other words, the worshipper must do it, not with a merely anthropocentric finality, so as to perfect himself psychologically, but rather, he must do it in order to make the divine excellence manifest to all (including himself, of course), in view of God. The finality of religion according to St. Thomas consists in this manifestation and recognition of the divine goodness, together with the divine focus.

What is especially significant and hitherto unnoticed in the exposition of Aquinas is that the finis quo of worship, that by which its end is attained in us, is neither merely the individual worshipper nor God himself (that would be impossible) but rather, it is principally a tertium quid, a third thing—and it is here that the notion of 'glory' in St. Thomas becomes one of crucial importance. This tertium quid that is sought is the increase of the divine extrinsic glory, the manifestation of the intrinsic glory of God within the created universe, together with the rational recognition of this manifestation. This tertium quid is a complex reality that contains elements of both terms in the initial dichotomy: on the one hand, the divine extrinsic glory whose increase is sought in worship consists materially in the created universe, and, on the other hand, it is formally something divine insofar as it represents God Himself. For example, when a high altar (reredos or retable) is decorated, it is not done in order that God may gain some benefit, but it is also not done merely so that the person decorating it may benefit directly. The altar is materially something created and it is for this reason that it is perfectible and that it is possible to decorate it. But those who decorate it take it formally as something divine, and hence, decorate it in view of God, in order to make manifest the divine majesty and beauty. In other words, since God Himself is immutable and not perfectible, the worshipper may seek the perfection of something that is merely a manifestation of God, and not God Himself. That whose perfection is sought is materially a creature; but this is seen formally as something divine, as a representation or manifestation of the intrinsic glory of God. This is the unifying core of all of Aquinas’ claims on the finality of worship.