Daily life and sociological reclassifications according to Giddens, Bourdieu, Habermas and Luhmann

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between daily life and sociological reclassifications in the “meaning turn” proposed by Giddens, Bourdieu, Habermas and Luhmann. From the methodology of the “problematic approach” it traces their uses of spatial metaphors of “horizon” and “background”, which explicit the characteristics of meaning as the condition of social possibility. Among the results, it is seen that Giddens, Bourdieu and Habermas find in everyday life the metaphorical space to observe meaning, whereas Luhmann does it in a formal world. So, the paper approaches the ways in which sociology reclassifies the general social (re)classifications, which reclassify the sociological ones as well. In sum, it emerges a game of transformation, disruption or disconnection in which the importance or not of everyday life allows to establish a space of transformation between sociological and social reclassifications, or which limits and closes that possibility, understood as irritation.

Key words: contemporary sociological theory, meaning, metaphors, everyday life, reclassifications.

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la relación entre la vida cotidiana y las reclasificaciones sociológicas en el “giro del sentido”, propuesto por Giddens, Bourdieu, Habermas y Luhmann. Desde la metodología del “abordaje problemático”, se rastrean sus usos de las metáforas espaciales de “horizonte” y “trasfondo”, que explicitan las características del sentido como condición de posibilidad de lo social. Entre los resultados, se detecta que Giddens, Bourdieu y Habermas encuentran en la vida cotidiana el espacio metafórico de observación del sentido, mientras que Luhmann lo hace en un mundo formal. Desde allí, se abordan los modos en que la sociología reclasifica las (re)clasificaciones sociales generales, que también reclasifican a las sociológicas. Como conclusión, emerge un juego de transformación, disrupción o desconexión, en el cual la importancia o no de la vida cotidiana permite establecer un espacio de transformación entre reclasificaciones sociológicas y sociales o bien, limita y cierra esa posibilidad como irritación.

Palabras clave: teoría sociológica contemporánea, sentido, metáforas, vida cotidiana, reclasificaciones.

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Introduction

In the framework of the “meaning turn” proposed by Giddens, Bourdieu, Habermas and Luhmann, everyday life has become one of the key dimensions to conceptualize meaning and the social in general. This is not new in sociological theory, since several perspectives different from the “structural and functionalist consensus” –such as symbolic interaction or phenomenological sociology– have stressed this dimension. From their different viewpoints, these four authors make their own ideas about the relationship between everyday life and meaning, which accompanies their expectations of creating a social unified theory that allows them encompass its multiple dimensions (Alexander, 2014). Hence, for them it should be possible to link everyday life with far-reaching processes or be left as a key matter of the sociological analysis (as Luhmann does).

In order to create those unified social theories, Bourdieu, Giddens, Habermas and Luhmann define meaning as the condition of social possibility, both emerging and procedural starting from the concepts of “mutual knowledge” (Giddens, 2011 and 2012), “practical meaning” (Bourdieu, 1990 and 2007), “lifeworld” (Habermas, 2010 and 2011) and “meaning” (Luhmann, 1996 and 2016). In an “evident” manner, beyond the convergence which their reflections on meaning imply, such turn seems to be divided in two courses, for example, the centrality of temporality and the possibility to study it (Bialakowsky, 2017a). These theoretical courses will be differentiated by the social definition each author argues according to the importance each gives to action, especially, from Luhmann’s theoretical anti-actionalist “scandal”, from which action would not be an essential concept of sociology.

Despite this “evident” division among the four perspectives, I consider we should not focus only on their recognition or rebuttal of action in order to address these two theoretical courses, but rather conform to the distinctive

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1 Bibliography on these topics is incredibly wide, for example, the analyses of “face to face” relationships by Schütz (Dreher, 2012) or the “taken-for-granted” character of everyday life by Berger and Luckmann (Dreher, 2012). In addition, it should be noted Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis and the symbolic interactionism studies (Rizo-García, 2011), Thompson’s research on popular culture and the life of working class (Sanz et al., 2016), Lefebvre’s urban research (Goonewardena, 2011), the analyses of day-to-day dialectics from a praxis philosophy (Netto, 2012), general cultural studies (Martin and Torres, 2013) and the pragmatic perspectives about action (Cristiano, 2010).
features the problem of meaning acquires according to the four authors. For them, meaning cannot be observed directly since it has to do with the condition of social possibility, both present and absent in the agencies (Giddens), in practice (Bourdieu), in actions (Habermas) or in operations of communication (Luhmann). According to these points of view meaning is shaped only in the “effects”, that is to say, it emerges in the unfolding of the social processes themselves because it is not prior to the social nor it adopts an essential definition. Therefore, it requires a type of theorization different from other problems of sociology.

I believe, that in order to posit such theoretical and analytical qualities of meaning, the four perspectives make use of a double metaphor. On the one hand, they appropriate spatial metaphors of phenomenological sociology, especially the ones about “horizon” and “background” of meaning, which allow them to unfold its eluding qualities (e.g. their vague bounds yet manageable to be limited or their ongoing contextualization). On the other hand, due to the eluding nature of these spatial metaphors such proposals require to delimit a metaphorical “space” in order to observe meaning. Here, the analyzed theories take different courses: three of them (Bourdieu’s, Giddens’ and Habermas’) find in everyday life the exceptional space to observe and conceptualize meaning, whereas Luhmann constructs a formal notion of the world as the space to observe it.

At the same time, in these proposals the relevance of everyday life is linked to the idea each one of them has of what I call “sociological process of social reclassification.” In these theories, when specifying the implied qualities of meaning sociological theory unfolds a reclassification process of the taken-for-granted classifications in society through which the social world is divided and is hierarchically organized. Thus, such sociological reclassification process may draw nearer or move away from the logics studied, especially, from everyday life (in Giddens, Bourdieu and Habermas) or from the formal world (in Luhmann). Such “proximity” or “distance” is directly linked with the aspirations of social transformation in a complex and vertiginous game where the different social spheres reclassify and appropriate social reclassifications.

In such context, I analyze, firstly, the theoretical and analytical consequences of Bourdieu, Giddens, Habermas and Luhmann’s use of a double metaphor of meaning, both in their use of spatial metaphors for contextualization as well as in their pointing to a metaphorical space for its observation (whether everyday life or formal world). Secondly, I trace how their different stances are connected concerning the categories and scopes
of the sociological processes of social reclassification in order to identify whether everyday life is an essential dimension of meaning or not. Lastly, in the conclusion, I consider both matters again in order to elaborate on the implications these two ways of understanding the relationship among meaning, everyday life and reclassifications have, particularly for the present context of the sociological theory.

Everyday life and the world as metaphorical spaces for meaning

When these two perspectives were created, sociological theory was witnessing a spread of its proposals, such stage has stood out by its “multiparadigmatic” qualities –term suggested by Ritzer– (Paredes, 2009). In the mid 1970’s and in the 1980’s, Bourdieu, Giddens, Habermas and Luhmann resolved to integrate, in different ways, the theoretical traditions competing at the time in order to develop unified social theories, which would conceptualize their different analytic dimensions. Consequently, they unfold meaning as a theoretical problem which allowed to set aside the prevailing disquisitions back then.

Thus, these authors gave rise to what I have called the “meaning turn”, as the key transformation of the general presuppositions of the discipline by their perspectives, which drifted apart from both the steady and structural answers of social order (e.g. from Parson’s structural-functionalism or from French structuralism) as well as from “ideal” hypothesis about meaning, which excessively stressed “linguistic” or “discursive” definitions of meaning.

I believe, that in methodological terms a “problematic approach” (Bialakowsky, 2017b) is required to account for the specificity of the theoretical transformations expressed by Bourdieu, Giddens, Habermas and Luhmann. Such methodological proposal allows to focus on the different dimensions which constitute and shape a theoretical problem, not delimited by the core ideas and dilemmas of the classics of sociology. Thus, while it considers some of its accurate points it departs from Ritzer’s (2010) and Alexander’s (2014) elaborations, which reduce “metatheory” and “theoretical logic” to the different combinations or among that which is subjective, objective, micro and macro (Ritzer), or among the individualist or collectivist order and the instrumental or normative action (Alexander).

In this manner, the reformulation of the problem of meaning suggested by Bourdieu, Giddens, Habermas and Luhmann can be studied from certain emerging dimensions: contingency, temporality, everyday life, conscience and body (Bialakowsky, 2014). In this paper, as I have indicated, I focus on
everyday life as a decisive dimension of the “meaning turn” proposed by the four authors.

For these four perspectives meaning is, primarily, taken-for-granted, virtual, implied and perfectly understood (Pelfini, 2000). Hence, in order to conceptualize meaning a strong metaphor is required to account for its peculiar features. According to these perspectives, metaphors of phenomenology are the most appropriated to capture its qualities: meaning becomes the “background” or “horizon” of the social. In these perspectives the use of spatial metaphors, “anti-positivist” ones (Silber, 1995), is key. It is worth mentioning that metaphors produce an explicitness with a strong “effect”, especially to account for difficult processes hard to compress into a single concept. Such effect compels to elaborate on its theoretical consequences, which many times are implied (Derrida, 2006).

According to Ricoeur (Albaladejo, 2014) metaphors cannot be reduced to a mere “implicit comparison.” Metaphors “redefine” reality by innovating about a fundamental tension which makes them “alive.” Hence, we should ask: what does such spatial metaphorical images involve? Two of their features concern meaning: on the one hand, it is about a paradoxical image of a boundless space, or vaguely bounded, from which it is impossible to “come out”, yet it is limited according to the studied social configuration; on the other hand, a proximity is indicated, both present and absent, which is only observable in its “shapes”, in the “effects” of agencies, practices, actions or communications.

Both features are indivisibly intertwined with the “meaning turn.” According to the four authors, such qualities imply its immediacy as well as its availability. The figures of “background” and “horizon” used to define practical meaning, mutual knowledge, lifeworld and the environment for autopoiesis, run concurrently with the “opening” of social action –another spatial metaphor– of agents or alter and ego. As long as meaning exists, society exists since meaning is mutual, is social. In addition, without the background or horizon of meaning, what is social would not be possible.

Likewise, these four perspectives conceptualize meaning as limitless. Following Luhmann (1996), it is a “paradox” of space itself: the word itself does not imply a clear definition since it is a space with infinite-like features. Its own condition of “background” or “horizon” shapes its form, not a polymorphic one, but one unfamiliar with a precise shape. It is also circular, yet without a circumference, and it is possible to conceptualize it without limit it accurately. Such features reveal the “already-given” and “always-there” condition of meaning for the social processes, understood as a condition of social possibility:
such characteristics are connected with processes of interaction, negotiation, agreement, contingency, revision, and contextualization, thus, they acquire an ambiguous, changeable and feasible shape.

Now, these qualities imprison theorization in the forcefulness of metaphors because meaning is only observable in its “effects”, which are simply the sociological definitions of the social each author unfolds: the participation of agency (Giddens, 2011), the practical strategies of agents (Bourdieu, 2007), the display of communicative rationality in discourse (Habermas, 2010) and the shapes “provided with meaning” of communicative operations (Luhmann, 2016). Even though these definitions assume meaning, they are not meaning itself. In my understanding, here the presuppositions of the two courses the “meaning turn” takes are revealed, such division occurs due to the manner the question of how feasible it is to observe this problem is answered.

When developing theories on meaning, the authors not only use the aforementioned spatial metaphors, but also construct a metaphorical “space” which allows them to observe the implied qualities of meaning according to the different ways the social happens (Crook, 1998). Everyday life, then, is a stage in which the particular outlines of meaning become more evident in such a way that there is a continuity between the definitions of meaning in each perspective and their ways of analyzing social “day-to-day” aspects.²

Although Luhmann sets everyday life aside of his main point of study, this does not mean he discards the metaphors about meaning nor that there is a lack of a metaphorical space for its observation. Such space for Luhmann is the “world”, which has formal characteristics. This is harmonious with his also formal definition of meaning as a distinction between actuality of operative selection of the system and potentiality of the horizon of possible selections. That is, for Luhmann neither meaning nor the world are made with precise elements –e.g. knowledge, skills or directions, compared with the other three authors–.

Thus, for three authors, everyday life rises as a peculiar “space” to analyze meaning. However, for Luhmann (1996), that “space” –“the place of examination”– is formalized when the notions of “world” and “reduction of complexity” are combined. His concept of world is not confined to everyday mundaneness but rather to the space in which the most diverse operations of

² Reguillo (2000) calls this observation, which is always oblique albeit key about everyday life, “the clandestine centrality of everyday life.” It should not be mistaken for the metaphors used in everyday life (Lakoff and Johnson, 2017).
the social and psychological systems are unfold, such operations reduce the complexity of the environment and widen the internal complexity of such systems, which produce by themselves their own operations and elements (Castro-Sáez, 2011).

Giddens (2011) emphasizes the reflexive management of everyday situations through mutual knowledge (Cristiano, 2011). During the constant flow of agency, agents bring into play their shared knowledge, that is, the background of implied rules to act and the frames to interpret everyday life. Such knowledge is manifested with a certain level of practical consciousness of which the agent is neither unaware of nor unfamiliar with and it is not immediately reflected upon either, but rather it accompanies agency itself in that “gray area” between consciousness and unconsciousness.

Even the agencies that are greatly taken-for-granted in the complex day-to-day recurrences require skills to be put into practice: in everyday life, as agents reproduce the horizons of rules and the implied frames in mutual knowledge, agents negotiate, contextualize and modify or make them reflexive as well –e.g. explanations for a specific action are given when questioned by other agents–.

Thus, on the one hand, Giddens (2012) suggests that agency in its everyday reasoning entails a decisive ability of transformation, enabled by mutual knowledge. Agency is connected with practical and irreversible intervention about everyday world, which adopts one shape and not another according to the course of punctual agencies, who skillfully employ “natural” or “social” resources to widen their capacity of intervention (Kaspersen, 2000).

On the other hand, Giddens assures that everyday life is connected with institutional and structural reversibility as well, which ends up being the other inseparable side of the constitution of society, for instance, the structural principles of capitalism (Giddens, 2011) or the dimensions of modernity (Giddens, 2008). Such recursivity of the implied mutual knowledge in agencies allows to maintain an “ontological security”, which takes for granted a definition of the surrounding world, especially, of everyday life. It is in this manner that in modernity ontological security is constituted through the emergence of daily routines which lower the anxiety of agents, for instance, when they make their domestic and work practices a routine or spaces they circulate in certain temporary spectra.

Likewise, Bourdieu (2007) considers that a social study cannot be reduced to the interpretation of its objective and panoramic observations such as the ones found in irreplaceable statistics. It is also needed to search
“practical knowledge”, the background of the meaning of the game which agents manifest in their daily practice and which is overlooked when seen from a mere objective viewpoint (Velasco-Yáñez, 2015). Such practice is found in the most diverse social spaces, which in the capitalist modernity are strongly defined by the distinction of autonomous fields (arts, science, economics, politics, religion, etc.)

The analyses of the author focus on the forms of ordinary and banal practices which occur in such spaces, for instance, in the continuous fight for the domineering positions between the ones who already possess them and the “new ones” in the field. Thus, the diverse, practical and close strategies of agents can be reconstructed, in which “need becomes virtue” due to the urgency to act. Therefore, Bourdieu (1990) underscores the ability to intervene, or abstain, in the “precise moment” according to the intersection between the definitions agents possess of that which is possible and impossible and those which are established by a certain social space.

Now, such daily dynamic of the social fields or spaces is not enough to account neither for the individual courses nor for the genesis of positions within a social space. It is indispensable, then, that the dominant ones in the field conceptualize the recognition of certain “heritages” agents possess, which many times are inherent such as the way of standing, moving or speaking. Such “heritages” imply not only economical capital but also other sorts of capitals and brands, which result legitimate or illegitimate for a period of the limited social space during a time of fight of its definition.

In order to comprehend such “heritages”, Bourdieu (2012) gives to “first experiences” a fundamental place, that is, to family everyday life in which key elements of practical meaning are conformed, especially concerning body dispositions (the hexis of dispositions of habitus.) Such operate as “heritages” in the different social spaces, which reaffirm them or expect to modify them by means of symbolic violence, for example. (Dukuen, 2011). In this manner, such cultivated “heritages” during the routine of first experiences allow the reproduction of social dominance.

Habermas (2010) considers lifeworld to be fundamentally quotidian (Estrada-Saavedra, 2000). In such background of meaning, certain knowledge and traditions, norms and identities are taken for granted. All of them are brought into play in the individuals’ everyday practice as well as in moments which may also be quotidian, and in which such world should be rationalized; that is, when it is needed to obtain through communication a consensus about a portion of the world that has been called into question. In the capitalist modernity, lifeworld symbolically reproduces society by
reproducing through communication the legitimate knowledge, norms and identities, which legalize the material side of social reproduction –essentially the State and the market–.

According to Habermas (2011), with the study of daily speech it is possible to identify the validity criteria by which communicative consensus with universal aspirations are obtained. Such criteria are divided according to lifeworld structures (culture, society and personality) and its formal worlds (objective, social and subjective): the objective truth of knowledge, the rectitude or fairness of social norms and the veracity or authenticity of personal identities are discussed.

Nevertheless, for Habermas (2010) there are certain pathologies which prevent the wide reproduction of this everyday lifeworld through intersubjective communicative actions (Browne, 2017). The modern lifeworld is crossed with two pathological processes. On the one hand, the rationalization of such world is not homogeneous: there is a cultural specialization which rationalizes knowledge, norms and identities but it is not linked with the everyday life of actors. Thus, the mundane everyday life is not taken into account since the methods of cultural rationalization are alien to it, which cannot be mediated by a public space open to communicative debate.

On the other hand, lifeworld is “colonized” by the systematic logics of the bureaucratic modern State and the capitalist market. Such colonization entails the triumph of motivations and empirical imperatives –not based on communicative reasons– of money and power, which subjugate the coordination attempts of everyday life actions through intersubjective communication.

Lastly, Luhmann (1996) does not focus his attention on everyday life but on the formal world with its particular horizons, –as the space of operations and observations of the systems operating in the sphere of meaning, starting from the difference between actuality and potentiality (Torres-Nafarrate, 2011). The world with meaning entails a paradoxical unity, invisible, of actuality of systems selection and potentiality of the latent possibilities –available for other selections– of the dimensions of meaning –whether past or future (temporal dimension) whether of the system or the environment (object dimension) whether of alter or ego (social dimension).

So, this formal world is the result of the co-evolutionary emergence of the background of meaning as a means for the operational closure of the psychic and social systems, which can operate only with operations of the same sort even if they irritate mutually: social systems can only communicate whereas for psychic systems it is only possible to think.
Such conceptualization of a formal world connected with a formal meaning, which sets everyday life aside as a metaphorical space of its observation, it is linked with Luhmann’s interpretation (2016) about the acentric modern and functionally differentiated society (Dockendorff, 2013). From his point of view, in modern society interaction systems are losing importance, systems which set their boundaries by co-presence since from the spread of printing communication between absent people is increasingly more relevant. Even though systems of interaction do not disappear, they begin to lose power in the field of communications at the expense of organizations and symbolically generalized media (money, power, truth, love, etc.), which allow to make functional differences. Therefore, a possible theorization of everyday life from the interaction systems has no place in Luhmann’s proposal either.³

From where I stand, as it can be clearly seen in these two concepts, three out of the four authors (Giddens, Bourdieu and Habermas) in order to account for meaning need an analytical unfolding of everyday life dimension. This allows them to observe meaning indirectly, without reducing it to everyday life nor without ceasing to consider its importance. Thus, such indirect observation through everyday life has decisive consequences for each of their stances on meaning, and with this, for their theoretical and analytical point concerning the social.

Everyday life operates not only as a privileged field to study meaning and social aspects, but also as a metaphor of their ways of constitution, reproduction and mutation. Such everyday life crossed by far-reaching processes results in a space which, as metaphor of meaning, makes fallible to approach social aspects in theoretical and conceptual and political terms: any understanding of its characteristics or any supposition of its transformation may find in everyday life an appropriate field for its unfolding and reflection.

In contrast, as I see it, Luhmann breaks away from everyday life as a metaphorical space to observe meaning since he leads the metaphorical game towards a formal analysis of systemic operations and their condition of possibility. In this sense, Luhmann draws up his observation of modernity in which society is, as a system encompassing all communications, fundamentally defined by other objects of study different from interaction systems to which less analytic importance is given despite having a place in his general theory of systems.

³ Many followers of Luhmann’s proposal have tried to develop their concept of interaction systems so as to make possible to have conversations with other sociological traditions such as symbolic interactionism or ethnomethodology in order to incorporate their contributions to Luhmann’s perspective (Galindo-Monteagudo, 1999; Robles, 2002).
Formalization of the metaphorical space to observe meaning permeates meaning itself with formality, and consequently, the social in general as well. Whether everyday life is a metaphorical space of meaning or not, we should ask what likely relationship is there to be between its theoretical and conceptual definitions and some proposals of political transformation? In order to answer this question, it is indispensable to delve into the process of social reclassification in each of these four theories.

**Meaning, everyday life, world and reclassifications**

The problem of social reclassifications is highly important for the debate on everyday life as a relevant or irrelevant dimension of the sociological analysis. The different types of social classification are inserted, precisely, between what is implicit and explicit: between the implicit characteristics of meaning and the explicit forms discourses and symbols adopt. The ways to divide and value the world, whether quotidian or formal, permeate both the background as well as the performance of social relationships. Thus, for the four authors, sociology must become reflexive concerning the ways through which it categorizes, distinguishes, codifies, classifies or evaluates other social classifications.

In order to understand such processes, I use the concept of “reclassifications”, since it explains the dynamic according to which every sociological classification is a reclassification of other social classifications. Now, these classifications can reclassify taxonomies either of other social fields or of sociology itself, definitely being reclassifications as well.

In its effort to reclassify, sociology indicates the details of its discourse, however, they do not exempt it from being part of the classifying and reclassifying logics, which are implicitly present in other fields. Within these logics, the ones who unfold themselves in everyday life or in the emergence of a formal world stand out. Hence, for the four theories it becomes a decisive point to develop theories on the connections, disconnections or interruptions between the sociological reclassifying mechanisms and those (re)classifications which are taken under analysis, and even, as objects of intervention and transformation.

Thus, according to Bourdieu (2007), in order to understand social classifications, it should be analyzed the way in which the everyday perceptive, appreciative and action schemes of agents unit with the taxonomies expressed in practices and institutions. Such connection between schemes and taxonomies is maintained, in many cases, through
the emergence of an analogical mechanism among certain social divisions and the agent’s body and nature, since there is a “given order of things” what is natural legitimizes analogically the arbitrary and unequal social order (e.g. when the “popular” along with the “grotesque” and “excessive” body are united with “instinct” and with “animality”).

Therefore, it is necessary to study the types of social dominance when reconstructing different ways to act in the world, the ways to understand it and to legitimize the hierarchies and positions of social spaces (Swartz, 2013). From where I stand, for Bourdieu, with such intertwining of diverse horizons of practical meanings –understood as meanings of the game–, the conflictive and always-dynamic process of definition and redefinition of social classifications is unfolded, that is, the ways in which the social world is divided. In this sense, the necessary reflexivity of sociology is sustained in the objectivity of the objective social classifications of which sociology itself makes use. In many times, such reproduce the everyday social doxa, and consequently, the relationships of dominance which negotiate undeclared or partially declared “heritages” as well.

In this framework, the “effects of theory” of sociology, that is, its reclassifications about the social world, should be specify in a reflexive way from its own logics in a continual game of revealing and transforming the social practical world, which moves the boundaries of what is “possible” and “impossible”. It is in this way that the development of reflexive sociological reclassifications allows to call the presuppositions and dynamics of the research into question as it influences the general social processes of reclassification when collaborating with the dominated groups in their everyday battles deployed by their practices and practical meanings in the different social spaces (Martínez, 2007).

This occurs due to the fact that the hidden or partially hidden mechanisms are dismantled in everyday banality of sociological and social practices in general. Such mechanisms are connected with the euphemisms of dominance, which deny or “obviate” or make “indisputable” the arbitrary aspects of the production and reproduction of social divisions since they are rooted in the body and are articulated by the strategies of a same social game which preserves what already exists (“orthodoxy”) or calls it into question in order to reconfigure it for its own advantage (“heresy”).

In the same way, for Giddens (2011), the stocks of mutual knowledge, when distributed unequally, allow to apply rules (formal and informal) and interpretative frames to interpret and (re)classify the social world skillfully and practically (Gaitán-Rossi, 2015). When brought into play such
background of mutual knowledge in the constitution of society, the different processes to structure agencies become reflexive and are negotiated such as the “speech turn” or the ways to access certain “resources” or “information”, crossed by the lack of symmetry in the distribution of resources and in the levels of legitimacy of hierarchies and knowledge.

Thus, everyday reflexivity of the practical conscience affects the ways of interpreting and (re)classifying situations, contexts, agents, agencies, and institutions, at the same time that it is linked with a social recursive dynamic and with the “ontological security” of the everyday world. In modernity such dynamic is revealed by making everyday life a routine as well as by the emergence of certain structural principles, which are linked with the shapes of tying space and time.

As a paradigmatic matter, such processes imply the structuring of spatio-temporal paths, which regionalize society according to different attributes, visible or invisible features of each of these central or outlying regions (certain barrios and locations, some paths which are traced among the different places where people live, study, work, and spent their leisure time.)

Now, from Giddens’ viewpoint (2011, 2012) I consider that from the relationship among the know how of the reflexive agency and the talk about of rationalization, sociology proposes a double hermeneutic: it unfolds a scientific stance, both understanding and critical, about the agents’ implicit or explicit fallible beliefs, which interpret and legitimize the asymmetrical distribution of symbolic and material resources. Such double hermeneutic supposes the transformation of common sense which legitimatizes the background of mutual knowledge (Bryant, 2014). Once common sense is called into question, it could involve a fundamental change of the classifications of the agents’ everyday mutual knowledge.

Nonetheless, such dynamic is not linear: sociological reclassification is reconsidered and reclassified by the agents themselves, resulting in unforeseen consequences for sociology itself. According to Giddens, in the context of late modernity such reclassifying process of reflexive features, whose consequences are unpredictable, is intensified more and more. This is so because of the features of a society in which non-present relationships prevail over the ones in which agents are present –the so-called “globalization”–, which threatens and fissures everyday “ontological security” from the changes propelled by the unmanageable long-distance relationships.

The increasing circular reflexivity among sociological reclassifications, common sense and everyday mutual knowledge, does not lead to a
“manageable” and “predictable” society, on the contrary, its future is much more unpredictable by propelling such action of reclassifying that which has already been reclassified countless times and by multiple agents and institutions.

Concerning Habermas’ viewpoint (2010) a proliferation of classifications and typologies is observed, which gives rise to the unfolding of his theory about lifeworld and the system in modern society among types of action and reasoning –communicative and strategic–, fields and peculiar forms of social coordination –everyday life or systemic logics– or structures of lifeworld –along with its validity criteria with universal aspirations– (Baxter, 2011).

Habermas sets certain theoretical and analytical “interventions” among the different classifications and typologies he proposes. For example, this is seen in the relationships among communicative actions addressed to the understanding, to the normative background of everyday life of the lifeworld and the stipulated and debated rules by law, which coordinate the labyrinthine social actions legitimately and in good disposition to receive criticism. It is conversely seen in the connections between strategic actions leading to success –sustained by imperatives, material and empirical motivations, especially, money of market and power of the State–, and the self-adjusted dynamic of the functional system, which coordinates actions outside linguistic communication and its consensus, despite it needs them because of their scientific knowledge, legitimatized rules and abilities to socialize.

According to Habermas (2011), such sociological reclassifications emerge from society itself, particularly, from everyday life but in a different manner. Reclassifications of systemic logics involve an “external” observer, who distances themselves from everyday life in order to capture the material and functional logic; whereas the reclassifications connected to lifeworld are unfolded from an “internal” sight, implied in its debates and intersubjective criteria. Both emergences can only be understood in the frame of a process of rationalizing lifeworld and its representations, which directly affects the reclassifications connected to lifeworld (Cooke, 2012).

I consider this means a correspondence between the reclassifications proposed in his theory and the social (re)classifications proposed in the everyday consensus obtained through communication. Such reclassifications should make the reclassifying rationalizations of social sciences their own – which have generic intensions–, so as not to be trapped in the developments of massive media and the everyday traditions of particularism.
In this manner, compared with the reclassifications of an “external” systemic sociology, the reclassifications of a critical theory of society include and redefine the systemic reclassifications by incorporating and including them between theory and social praxis in the game of mutual critical reclassification: an existing game –limited by the modern pathologies–, feasible –due to the potentiality of communicative action–, and desirable –as a horizon of independence–. Such game calls into question the pathological processes of modernity, in the context of a public sphere open to communicative criticism with aspirations of universality before particularism. It is then, a matter of reverting the loss of autonomy of everyday life before the system and the lack of connection between everyday life and cultural experts.

Lastly, in the words of Luhmann (1996, 2016), social reclassification should be analyzed from distinguishing a shape from which only one of its sides can be pointed out (observe) (Blanco-Rivero, 2012) through the concepts of “schemes”, characteristic to communication operations, and “observation”. For the author, I understand, this implies in every classification, on the one hand, the existence of a paradox in and concerning not only the everyday world but also the formal world with meaning. It results impossible to observe the whole unity (both sides simultaneously) of any classification of the world from classification itself since, for instance, the system and the environment which constitute social and psychic systems operating in the world with meaning cannot be observed simultaneously. Before such paradox, self-descriptive, imaginary, totalizing formulas of the world are created, that is, world representations, which carry meaning (especially, as a memory of other potentialities).

In operational terms, social systems tend to codify their communications, which allows to set a binary logic and to positively level one side so as not get caught in paradoxes and tautologies, whether operational or observable (e.g. in language there is more pressure leading to a “yes” than to a “no”, to accept instead of rejecting the prior communication or observation).

In modern society, acentric and functionally differentiated, in which everyday interaction systems lose their fundamental importance compared to what occurs in other types of societies, each system produces its own schemes (with its symbolically generalized media) and its own self-observations (Farias, 2013). Luhmann calls such self-descriptions “reflection theories”, through which each functional system reflects upon its own schemes and observable distinctions, and so reclassifies them internally.
In this sense, by operating within the science system with its own codes as a secondary observer, sociology observes social observations and “reclassifies” them with its own codes and programs: the true/not true code of science and the different sociological theories and methods, which provide certain sociological communications with the right conditions of designation and validity of the code, which is detrimental to others. Thus, in Luhmann’s viewpoint (2016), sociology should refrain itself from unfolding a critical potentiality of such reclassifications since it focuses on the ways each system effectively observes its own operations, instead of the ones it “should” or “could have” observed and operated. In this manner, his formal conception of meaning and the world, linked to the idea of setting aside everyday life as a metaphorical space of meaning, limits the theoretical and analytical extent of the reclassifying process of sociology. This is reduced to an internal operation of observation, which although it can irritate other systems, such irritation can only be understood from the own logic of those irritated systems.

Surely, regarding the four proposals, the link between sociology and its multiple objects of study is decisively crossed with the issue of social reclassifications. On the one hand, classifications are a key element of the social: needed for interpreting and constituting the agencies of society (Giddens), for schemes and taxonomies which cross bodies, games, and social spaces (Bourdieu) for typologies and classifications of communicative and strategic actions (Habermas) and for the schemes and distinctions of communicative and observational operations (Luhmann).

On the other hand, sociology reclassifies these classifications with particular mechanisms, which does not make them “external” to the general ones. For Giddens, sociology comprehensively and critically addresses mutual knowledge and rationalization of common sense, reflexively posited by agents and institutions. According to Bourdieu, sociology makes reflexive the objectifications of sociology itself and of agents, revealing the hidden or partially hidden ways of their generation and dynamic. For Habermas, sociology rationalizes in a specialized manner the emerging typologies of communicative and strategic actions by providing such typologies with critical ability and generic aspirations. According to Luhmann, sociology observes the observations of other social communications by recodifying them from the scientific code and sociological programs.

Now, such processes of sociological reclassification are not linear. Consequently, I consider, that from these four authors’ stances, general social classifications should also be called “reclassifications”, since there are no “original” classifications which are the result of reclassifying mutations,
whether regarding reclassifications of other social fields or reclassifications of sociological discourse. Thus, for Giddens, the results of the sociological double hermeneutics are appropriated and modified uncontrollably, with consequences the agents or institutions did not look for. According to Bourdieu, the battles for defining the social spaces call into question or particularly recover the proposals and sociological disclosures.

Habermas, open to criticism, considers that communicative discussions bring into play the sociological reasoning in their own actions and consensus. Likewise, Luhmann suggests that the reflection theories and the communications of functional systems communicate the “irritation” of sociological observations in their own codes and programs.

Even though there are differences in concepts, the four authors coincide in certain aspects in order to tackle the problem of social reclassifications. However, it is not so regarding the other two decisive issues, which are linked to each other: what is the fundamental process of society which becomes observable from the game between sociological and social reclassifications? What are the odds and extents to which sociological reclassifications can transform this fundamental process?

Here the analyses of the first section –regarding each author’s perspective about the relationship between everyday life and meaning– are relevant, since once again the division among those three perspectives is key (Giddens, Bourdieu and Habermas), in them everyday life is the metaphorical space to observe meaning, and Luhmann’s perspective, in which meaning is defined formally in the observation of a world, formal as well.

Concerning the first question, a couple of answers can be given regarding the fundamental process which becomes visible from the reclassifying game between sociology and other social fields. According to Giddens, it is the legitimacy of knowledge and discourse, crossed with asymmetries and search of ontological security. According to Bourdieu, it is the mechanisms of social dominance, framed in the fights of different groups by their continuity or modification. According to Habermas, such process is found in the pathologies of “colonization” and “desertification”, which do not allow lifeworld to be communicatively rationalized. Lastly, for Luhmann, it is the systems’ operations of observation, self-observation and self-description, especially, functionally differentiated systems.

These four ways to understand the point in which the theory of reclassifications should place itself differ greatly concerning the ability of sociological reclassifications in order to take part in such processes. For
Giddens, con consecuencias impredecibles, legitimidad de reclasificaciones entrelazadas con el conocimiento y discursos prácticos así como la búsqueda inconsciente de seguridad categorial en el mundo cotidiano puede ser examinada con un ojo crítico. Según Bourdieu, los mecanismos clasificatorios de dominancia desplegados en el mundo cotidiano de espacios sociales deben ser “desvelados”, lo que puede producir nuevas reclasificaciones como “efectos teóricos” apropiados ahora por los grupos abandonados en sus luchas.

Según Habermas, la sociología debe ampliar el razonamiento comunicativo y desde sus conceptos intervenga públicamente, tanto para dar cuenta de las patologías existentes en los modos diarios de coordinación de acciones sociales como para participar en los debates presentes sobre cuestiones de relevancia social. Finalmente, Luhmann considera que la sociología sólo es capaz de irritar las observaciones de otros sistemas al reconstruir teóricamente y analíticamente las formas implícitas y características en las distinciones y esquemas de operaciones de observación –de la ciencia y otros sistemas–. En consecuencia, en mi opinión, los dos últimos materias revelan las consecuencias teóricas y políticas de la división anteriormente señalada entre la vida cotidiana y el significado. Dado un conocimiento de la interacción entre la reclasificación sociológica y social de los procesos emergentes y visibles, Giddens, Habermas y Bourdieu requieren que la vida cotidiana no sólo sea un espacio simbólico de significado, sino también un espacio privilegiado para analizar el dinámico de reclasificación de este significado. Significado, entonces, es el “lugar” en el que las posibilidades y extremos de intervención sociológica, descrita anteriormente, se mueven y son medidos.

Conversamente, como Luhmann no desarrolla una teoría sobre este espacio simbólico de significado, y, consecuentemente, de reclasificaciones, no puede subrayar un dinámico de reclasificaciones sociológicas, ya que son procesados en las operaciones generales de cualquier observación, que se despliegan en el mundo de las características formales. Por lo tanto, la intervención de reclasificaciones sociológicas es casi en contra de todas las posibilidades, a excepción de la adición de un gradiente de reflexividad a la ciencia misma, mantenida en su lógica, lo que impide el despliegue del juego entre reclasificaciones sociológicas y sociales.

**Conclusión**

Desde el punto de vista de la vida cotidiana, la división de las diferentes perspectivas propuestas para la teoría sociológica sugiere un “giro de significado” revelado bajo un camino analítico diferente del debate sobre la importancia de la acción. La característica simbólica espacial del significado, como condición de
possibility of the social, implies also a space of observation, a “localization”, in which the elusive and explicit character of such problem can be observed. There, I consider, a double game emerges between everyday life as a privileged space of analysis of meaning and the possibility of a transforming reclassification which calls into question such everyday life.

Nevertheless, this is not the only theoretical course of the “meaning turn”. Because of his presuppositions and his diagnostic of modernity as well, Luhmann prefers a path of different theoretical consequences from two points: the incursion of a space for observing meaning in a paradoxical formal world and the little relevance the acentric and functionally differentiated modernity gives to interaction systems. This would mean a closure of sociological reclassifications in themselves, which limits the potential character of such sociological reclassifications, although that does not reduces the importance and creativity of other features of his theory.

Consequently, in these four theories there is a key reciprocity between whether or not everyday life is relevant as a dimension of the meaning turn, especially, as a metaphorical space for observing the ways of its emergence and unfolding, and the dynamic which links sociological reclassifications with general social reclassifications.

Nowadays, the problem of sociological reclassifications is increasingly more important for sociological theory. This is so, because: on the one hand, social movements, identity transformations, political mutations and public debates have spread out, all in which reconfigurations and reclassificatory conflicts are decisive, whether from the State, media, social movements, individuals who question and are questioned or the most diverse practices and representations.

On the other hand, in the theoretical and conceptual aspect, the problem of reclassifications has proved to be very fruitful to trace a multidimensional view of sociology that cannot not be kept in certain reductionisms of the discipline itself (for instance, between explicit representations and the implied meaning) as it reflexively focuses on the features, forms, and possibilities of sociological analysis.

Nowadays, the importance of reclassifications is not accompanied by the continuity of the “meaning turn”. Such has been set aside gradually by the new producer generations of sociological theory. However, the connection between the two issues addressed in this paper, which can be understood from the “meaning turn”, is still central: what I am referring to is to the relationship between everyday life and sociological reclassifications.
Several questions concerning any new theoretical proposal are still valid: what is the place of everyday life in it? Does everyday life comes to be the metaphorical space to account for the processes of constitution, continuity and social change? Has it been replaced by other metaphorical space? What are the consequences of this for a theory of social reclassifications, and consequently, for the extents of sociological analyses and interventions? Such questions, I believe, provide an unavoidable field of study to modern sociological theory.

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